David Miliband, British Foreign Secretary, as a prelude to his forthcoming visit to Pakistan later this week, has emphasised what he terms the importance of Pakistan to UK's strategic national interest. This 'strategic interest' post-dates 9/11 reflecting a host of security related policies that the UK, together with the US, wants Pakistan to continue to support - policies that have begun to create tensions in the strategic partnership in the wake of enhanced attacks on our border regions by US/ISAF forces.
While the Pakistani public is largely confused as to whether a deal was actually struck between the PPP-led government and the US, a deal envisaging tacit sanction of US/ISAF air attacks in the tribal belt and wherever intelligence indicates there is al Qaeda or Taliban activity, there is absolutely no confusion about what the Pakistani public wants its government to do: stop all attacks by foreign forces on Pakistani territory and negotiate with the tribals, a demand that has strengthened with reports that Saudi Arabia is in negotiations with the Taliban, with full knowledge of US officials, in an effort to defuse the conflict within Afghanistan.
History has shown that terrorism with its inextricable linkage to a political ideology can be better dealt with through negotiations, as in the case of the Irish Republican Army and the British government, whilst military options may lead to an initial weakening of the terrorist movement that may later propel the recruitment drive, thereby negating the initial gains.
Pakistan's options, we have been repeatedly told, are limited in formulating policies that are in our national interest with respect to the war on terror for one reason: we need massive aid injections, to the tune of 5 to 10 billion dollars, on an emergency basis to be able to stem the decline in foreign exchange reserves that have reached critical proportions, provide support to the balance of payments position and arrest the rupee decline that is increasing the country's foreign indebtedness.
These issues are over and above the need for the government to undertake structural reforms to turn the economy around, arrest the rising inflationary pressures and thereby increase productivity and tax collections as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product.
However the recent failure of the government of Pakistan to convince bilaterals to extend even a single additional dollar during the much-hyped Friends of Democratic Pakistan meeting held in Abu Dhabi on the 17th of November has got many a government detractor pointing out that the cost of our support to the US-led war on terror is too high to be sustainable even in a very short term.
Miliband disagreed in his interview and insisted that the outcome of the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, was 'not a failure' and added that the "IMF loan is not an alternative to bilateral agreements but a foundation for them."
Diplomatic parlance aside, there is evidence to suggest that Pakistan did misuse the massive bilateral aid injections received in the post 9/11 period and the bilaterals' are understandably deeply concerned that this trend may continue until and unless Pakistan is on a rigid programme monitored by the IMF in which the achievement of structural adjustments is a prerequisite for further assistance.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that at this present juncture in our economic history, Pakistan needs support and the PPP-led government's hands would have been considerably strengthened had it been able to get bilateral funding in return for the unflinching support for the war on terror as well as the democracy dividend.
That this did not happen must be a source of concern to the government; however, Miliband was quick to note that his government's support for the economy is to the tune of 480 million pounds for the next three years. While in comparison to the country's immediate needs of 4 to 10 billion dollars, this amount maybe considered paltry yet it is relevant to understand that bilaterals and indeed multilaterals as well are unlikely to extend assistance unless it is evident that the commitment to reforms will be sustained.
That, unfortunately, can only be guaranteed if Pakistan is on the IMF programme. Thus, the impending visit of David Miliband to Pakistan must not be seen in the context of presenting a venue where either a meaningful increase in UK's assistance to Pakistan or indeed a change in how ISAF forces are operating in our border areas maybe announced.
It is a visit that would reiterate the continuation of the policies of the UK government with respect to their expectation about Pakistan's input in the war on terror as well as financial support to Pakistan; and may, to a limited extent, appease public opinion here regarding financial support and ongoing ISAF military attacks on our border areas through rhetoric as opposed to action.
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