Nato summit

On the face of it, the Pakistan-US stand-off over the question of reopening the Nato supply route persists. Neither the Nato summit's final communiqué nor the optics made available publicly during the two-day conference betray any sign of a breakthrough. Nor was it expected, given that both the host, President Barack Obama and his Pakistani counterpart, President Asif Ali Zardari, had come to the summit with their domestic political situations fully occupying the backs of their minds.
In this election year, both in the United States and Pakistan, any flexibility in their stated positions on the question of the supply route was not conceivable, and it didn't happen. Yet there was some ground for optimism, in that the communiqué could say that the Nato "continues to work with Pakistan to reopen the ground lines of communication (read Nato supply routes) as soon as possible". And, quite unexpectedly in this otherwise, less-than-friendly situation, the communiqué found Pakistan to have an important role "in ensuring peace, stability and security in Afghanistan and in facilitating the completion of the transition process". Plausibly, there is a marked contrast between the interlocutors' public posturing and their private positions. And that is understandable in a situation like that which the both sides are confronted with. One may think that the Pakistani leadership may have asked for patience till the storm raised by the political opposition is over and the American side may have conceded that request. International diplomacy places great premium on the pragmatics and that seems to have worked in Chicago.
On the return home of our delegation one thing is instantly clear that is the United States' keenness on getting out of Afghanistan as quickly and as safely as possible. President Obama made the telling confession; he told a summit session: "Our nations and the world have a vital interest in the success of this mission. I am confident ... that we can advance that goal today and responsibly bring this war to an end". The keyword that adequately sums up the main purpose of the Chicago summit is a 'responsible end' to the 10-year Nato invasion of Afghanistan that has brought the invaders nothing but abysmal failures in achieving any of its announced objectives. The Taliban remain undefeated, democracy remains a pipedream, and political future of the country is murky. The assertion in the communiqué that the transition to handing over security control to the Afghan forces is "irreversible" is more to assure the Nato members' public that their boys and girls would be home soon, if possible, even before the target date of 2014 ends, than in response to the Afghans' demand for immediate evacuation. That the Nato mission in 2014 would 'shift to a training and advisory role', and that this would no more be a combat mission may be easier to announce than implement, in a situation that defies predictions given the unpredictable day-to-day incidents triggered often by the Afghans' anti-foreigner psyche. Then there is the fear of the impending economic apocalypse. The river of dollars that flows through that country now - US spends about 10 billion dollars a month on its military mission, while international outlets spend about 1.3 billions - will dry up after the troop's withdrawal. President Obama who now feels the pinch of spending the US taxpayers' dollars in chasing shadows, has asked his Nato alliance partners to share the estimated 4 billion-a-year cost of maintaining a training-cum-advisory mission in Kabul. Their response is awaited.
In this backdrop of extensive spending in Afghanistan, the United States is not prepared to reimburse Pakistan for even what we have suffered, both as damage to the transit route infrastructure and the colossal collateral damage to life and property as fallout of the Afghan imbroglio, as agreed by the Coalition Support Fund. That's indeed very disturbing. Of course, the Nato needs the Pakistani route, for it is comparatively much less costly, but to think that its use for reverse transition should be free is absolutely naïve, if not hypocritical. Pakistan has paid too heavily for its anti-terrorism alliance and should not be asked to do more on this issue also. Pakistan's fundamentals as its population size, strategic location and potential remain strong, requiring its allies in the West not to lose sight of them as they prepare for the stampede out of Afghanistan. Our leadership is rightly wary of bartering away the country's long-term interests in return for short-term gains, for that would only strengthen the growing public perception that the United States believes in transactional relationships - confirming the adage 'if you are America's friend, it would sell you, but if its enemy it would buy you'. Now that the Chicago summit is done, the government should pass the buck of initiating and working out, foreign policy issues to the professionals who sit in the Sherazad Hotel. President Zardari and his team could do only this much.