Readers of Carl von Clausewitz, the 19th century military historian, are familiar with "fog of war". The term concerns the uncertainty regarding an adversary's intents, capabilities and logistics. Well, a war is almost at his gates but the dense political fog is making it difficult for Nawaz Sharif's government to grasp and respond to its rivals designs.
Reason is often the first victim in a politically-charged environment. Therefore, without evaluating the merits and demerits of what has fueled this long summer of political discord, this column has undertaken a situational analysis based on the political noise thus far. The intention is only to identify the plausible outcomes, without falling prey to the temptation of assigning likelihoods or their impact on Pakistans political and economic systems.
There is still a week to go before August 14 when Imran Khan's party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) will start its march on Islamabad. Thats arguably a long time by political standards; things can drastically change in the interim. But, as of now, a few scenarios resulting from the PTI march and sit-down seem plausible, as highlighted in the matrix. The matrix has a few assumptions that are needed for the analysis to be simple and clear and hearsay-proof. It offers a perspective regardless of whether you perceive military as indifferent or not. It also works whether or not protesting parties are deemed as pawns in someone elses game.
It must be noted that while political postures (accommodative versus combative) are inherently fluid and flexible behind-the-scenes, public postures tend to be absolutist. The grid is based on public postures, with the assumption that posturing will only harden as the political showdown draws near. Of course, it is plausible that a prolonged opposition sit-down will end in a whimper if the government shows shrewd politicking before the march and patience during the sit-down. So, the matrix only highlights consequential scenarios.
A look at the figure shows that its looking bleak for the Federal Government. Sure, Nawaz would welcome outcome 1 with open arms and fulfill the oppositions demands of investigating the alleged vote fraud, re-polling on key constituencies and reforming the electoral system. Everybody goes home with something. But PML-N's problem is that the PTI has moved the goal post this week: they now want the mid-term elections (which may well be a tactic to gain upper hand in future negotiations to have their core demands met.)
Nawaz has probably waited too long to offer an olive branch and his nemesis now smells the opportunity to maximise his gains. But all hope is not lost yet for an amicable resolution scenario. The response of the rest of the elected political parties is important here. If they start coalescing around the governments now-accommodative position and offer to act as a bridge to the opposition, the latter may have to show some flexibility or otherwise risk isolation.
If the opposition can meet him halfway, would Nawaz be willing to go the distance? That's outcome 2, where the situation becomes such that only a political change can satisfy the opposition. In a deadlock, that would be a game-changing concession from the government.
For crisis diffusion and to cut their losses, there is a plausible scenario (however, improbable it may seem right now) where the PML-N may agree to the minus-Nawaz formula of an in-house change-it could be Shahbaz Sharif rising to the top, or some other acceptable figure like Chaudhry Nisar--in exchange for a time-barred agreement on pushing electoral reforms.
If even that doesn't do it for the PTI (and Dr. Tahirul Qadri), there is another plausible scenario where the veteran political parties (read: PPP) persuade the PML-N to give in to the stubborn opposition and call in mid-terms: After all, the entire political class has a stake in preserving the hard-earned democratic continuity in the country.
Status quo, the outcome 3, may seem the remotest among the four scenarios--but it is still plausible. As said earlier, if events unfolding in next seven days make the opposition somewhat submissive, the government can become combative to politically vanquish the protests for some time. History shows that unrelated, external events can come in handy for that kind of a scenario to emerge, so watch out for them! But that scenario will only kick the can down the road, with another showdown looming in the future.
All bets are off in outcome 4. This is the scenario where a hardened opposition forces the government to not only unleash administrative force on protesters but also call up a political march of its own. What will happen when the government and the opposition become so embroiled in conflict that one starts seeing signs of civil war, like street agitation? Well, nobody comes as a winner out of that--non-political force(s), which may or may not be prodding any side, will be forced to intervene in a deadly stalemate. These forces may well decide to trade backdoor nudges for a more direct undertaking, which may usher in a technocratic government, or even a junta.
The Federal Government has already invoked Article 245 in Islamabad, which means that Armed Forces are required to act in "aid of civil power". That's a slippery slope. History serves a chilly reminder. Same decision was taken by PM Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977. He was facing the same electoral legitimacy issues as Nawaz does now. But a few months after using this constitutional provision, his government ended in a military coup.
Do these scenarios seem outlandish? Well, these are unconventional outcomes but not unusual for the land of the pure. They have happened before and they can happen again. It was outcome 1 when former President Zardari defused three long marches (June 2008, March 2009 and January 2013). It was outcome 2 when back in the nineties, multiple governments ended prematurely, including the so-called Kakar formula of 1993. Outcome 4, well, Pakistan is all too familiar with that, dating back to 1958.
In all of these plausible outcomes, the Tahirul Qadri factor is really intriguing. TuQ has his own beef about the Sharif's, but his "revolutionary" drift is working to harden the stance of PTI. Now, PTI likes to position itself as the sole steward of the perceived public disenchantment with the government, so it is at pains to differentiate itself from TuQ, who represents the religious class.
That urge to differentiate means that TuQ's radical pronouncements, which directly undermine the younger Sharif's political prospects in Lahore, are indirectly narrowing Imran Khan's options in Islamabad, where the elder Sharif is in the eye of the storm. If there is no TuQ factor, or if it somewhat neutralises in the coming days, PTI's ultra-combative posture may start to soften a bit.
So, faced with these options, what will Nawaz do? The Prospect Theory in behavioural economics suggests that people are "loss averse": they tend to become risk-seekers when they are faced with mostly bad options. They underestimate a high-probability loss situation and choose to take on the daunting odds, just as they overestimate a low-probability loss situation and decide to go overboard in eliminating small risks.
If this theory is any guide, expect Nawaz to take his chances and become increasingly combative in his posture in response to his unyielding rivals. The battlefield will not be Islamabad in that case, but it will be the GT Road which the marchers will presumably take. It is plausible that a good show on the GT Road by either party will determine the chances of political change in Islamabad. Remember the 2009 lawyers march?
But the prospect theory also suggests that a person with very high winning odds would choose to settle for a smaller but respectable amount, out of fear of losing everything. As the odds increasingly favour Imran Khan right now, Nawaz should respond favourably to any hints of a compromise by the opposition. Otherwise, both may force each other into a tight corner which will not end well for either of them.

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                                                             Plausible scenarios arising from the August 14 march
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     Opposition
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                                                                  2                                                                           4
                                                     Political change                                                Non-political change
    Combative                        Negotiated mid-term polls                                       Technocratic setup
                                         In-house change, minus-Nawaz                                        Military rule
                                                                 1                                                                           3
    Accommodative                  Amicable resolution                                                 Status quo
                                           Give and take; concessions                                        Govt. survives
                                                       Face-saving                                                     Instability continues
                                                   Accommodative                                                         Combative
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                                   Government
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Assumptions
Its a zero-sum game among political parties
PTI and PAT will eventually form a joint, monolithic opposition
Even if PTI and PAT don't unite, they'll not undermine each other
Backdoor negotiations will be futile till August 14
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