The 17th Constitutional Amendment passed by the National Assembly and Senate retains local bodies in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution for six years, after which these institutions would revert to provincial oversight.
The Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) had, after its initial insistence on the removal of this provision from the Sixth Schedule immediately, conceded the new arrangement.
Thus two more local bodies' elections will be conducted under this dispensation, before the provincial governments can once again claim the district and other governments under their control in 2009.
The devolution plan framed by the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) had failed to spell out the relationship between the provincial governments and the new district and tehsil level governments.
This flaw in the design of the devolution plan has been brought into focus by the reports of discord between the local bodies and provincial governments since the general elections of October 2002.
One cause of friction has been the penchant of provincial governments to sit on funds meant for the local bodies, and to transfer civil servants serving at the local bodies level according to the likes, dislikes, and whims of provincial ministers and others.
One such case has led to the resignation of the District Nazim, Dr Makhdoom Rafiquzzaman, from the steering and working committees constituted by the Sindh government to oversee the Rs 10.5 billion Hyderabad development plan.
The Makhdoom has thereby lodged his protest over the transfer of the Health and Revenue EDOs of his district at the behest of a provincial minister.
Such reports are neither new nor unique. They reflect a pattern of interference by provincial governments in the affairs of the local bodies that nullifies the purpose of the devolution of powers.
Each local government should have its own service cadre, recruited by the local government to serve exclusively in that government.
The initial staffing of the cadre may be done by emulating the scheme of transfer of civil servants from West Pakistan upon its break-up into four provinces.
Civil servants at that time were offered the option of serving in their home province, or making themselves available for posting anywhere in the country. A similar exercise is now required at the local bodies level.
Civil servants at the local bodies level should be offered the choice of serving in their home district or offering themselves for placement anywhere in the province of their domicile.
This would also do away with the problem of whimsical transfers of local government functionaries at the behest of provincial authorities.
Some form of legislative and administrative protection is clearly required to negate the tendency of provincial ministers and other powerful actors to interfere in the postings and transfers of local bodies level civil servants on the basis of their own vested interests.
The frictions over funds transfers to the local bodies could be resolved by constituting a provincial finance award on the lines of the National Finance Commission Award.
Funds allocated to local bodies under such an award should pass smoothly and without hindrance to the local bodies and not be subject to the whims of the provincial authorities.
The step-motherly treatment of local bodies by provincial and federal governments in the past persuaded President General Pervez Musharraf and the military establishment to 'protect' their pet devolution plan through inclusion of the local bodies in the Sixth Schedule.
Although this has now had its life extended by another six years, the pattern of friction between the local and provincial governments is unlikely to go away unless remedial steps are taken.
The six years interregnum should be treated as an opportunity to correct the wrongs, flaws and causes of tension between the discrete tiers of government.
It has to be appreciated before such an exercise is begun that the local bodies represent the most desirable form of governance and delivery of services to the citizen.
The sequencing of the devolution process too needs to be reviewed. The provinces would be more amenable to cede powers and resources to the local bodies if the centre would do likewise in respect of provincial subjects by excluding them from the concurrent list.
The flaws and lacunae in the political structure should be addressed by the NRB. Its recommendations should then be taken up by the committee constituted under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and including the four chief ministers to reflect on, and take decisions to implement the NRB recommendations that enjoy consensus.