Iraq had no stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons before last year's US-led invasion and its nuclear programme had decayed since the 1991 Gulf War, a weapons inspector appointed by the Bush administration said on Wednesday.
The report contrasted with statements by President George W. Bush before the invasion, when he cited the threat of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction as the reason for overthrowing President Saddam Hussein.
"I still do not expect that militarily significant WMD stocks are cached in Iraq," Charles Duelfer, the CIA special adviser who led the hunt for weapons of mass destruction, said in testimony prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee obtained by Reuters.
He said Iraq's nuclear weapons program had deteriorated since the 1991 Gulf War, but he said Saddam did not abandon his nuclear ambitions.
The issue has figured prominently in the campaign for the November 2 US presidential election, with Bush's Democratic opponent John Kerry saying Bush rushed to war without allowing UN inspections enough time to check out Iraq's armaments.
Duelfer's conclusion tallied with that of his predecessor, David Kay, who said when he stepped down in January that no large stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons existed in Iraq when the United States went to war.
Duelfer said that "despite Saddam's expressed desire to retain the knowledge of his nuclear team, and his attempts to retain some key parts of the program (after 1991), during the course of the following 12 years Iraq's ability to produce a weapon decayed."
Duelfer briefed the Senate Intelligence Committee behind closed doors about his report in the morning and was to testify at an open Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in the afternoon.
"While it is clear that Saddam wanted a long-range missile, there was little work done on warheads. It is apparent that he drew the line at that point ... so long as sanctions remained," Duelfer said.
One of Saddam's priorities was to escape UN sanctions, he said.
"Over time, sanctions had steadily weakened to the point where Iraq, in 2000-2001 was confidently designing missiles around components that could only be obtained outside sanctions," Duelfer said.
By 2003, Iraq would have been able to produce mustard agent in months and nerve agent in less than a year. "We have not come across explicit guidance from Saddam on this point, yet it was an inherent consequence of his decision to develop a domestic chemical production capacity," Duelfer said.