Tri-train collision

21 Jul, 2005

The unfortunate 'Tri-Trains Collision' at Sarhad Railway Station on 13th July 2005, around 0350 hours, and its breaking news at short intervals on the electronic media as well as telephonic communication from eye witnesses and victims who were travelling in all the three ill-fated trains was the worst passenger train accident in the history of Pakistan.
This caused loss of precious lives besides rendering many disabled affecting many bereaved families and raised the following questions in the minds of citizens:--
Whether the tri-accident occurred on account of a 'Technical fault' or 'Human Error' or a planned 'Sabotage' in the wake of on-going terrorism activities around the world?
In case of any technical fault in control of railway-operations, is it the negligence of the 'Controller-operations' or Assistant Station Master (ASM) 'Duty-officer' or 'Cabin controller' or 'Pointman of Sarhad Railway Station or Communications from other online stations?
The shifting of simple 'Human error' on the shoulders of the 'Drivers' of diesel engines of the trains who died in the accident, is neither logical nor justified and unbelievable. What, the drivers of fast-moving trains involved in accident, saw from their engines prior to the accident and instantly died without giving a declaration, will always remain a mystery.
In fact, prior to duty assignments of leading/running any 'Express or Mail-trains' the concerned driver has to gain practical experiences of shunting passenger and goods bogies on different tracks in railway yards and the placement of complete 'rack of trains' on platforms, running of slow-moving goods trains and passenger trains.
This gives expertness, professionalism and awareness of operational knowledge over a span of years, in which the vision of signals on the railway track, whether static or in motion of a railway engine, is the basic initial training of a 'Driver'. Was an untrained driver deployed on duty to run those express/mail trains?
In view of such a long-training, practical-experience and expert job knowledge, the simple shifting of entire (100%) responsibility of the accident on the deceased drivers, as claimed by the Chairman Railway Board saying "Driver misread/ignored signal", is irrelevant, illogical, untrue and unproved without examining all the possibilities of the accident.
The credibility, professionalism of the deceased drivers shall be proved by their files. What was the device or instrument fixed at the 'Sarhad Railway Station' which locked the time and picture of the 'Red-signal' and its ignorance of the driver resulting in the accident?
The tri-accidents at the same place occurred within a gap of 15-20 minutes, as reported by many of the surviving passengers travelling in those trains. Why did the ASM and all other railway staff on duty, knowing that three express/mail trains are scheduled to pass via Sarhad -station, failed to communicate the news of the first accident, by every possible mean, as a precautionary measure to all the concerned prior to the occurrence of second and third accident?
This was to be investigated and answered by the PR to the citizens.
If it is a sabotage, the concerned authorities have to examine and take the nation into confidence?

Read Comments