Tribal Areas have been in the spotlight for more than four years now. Occasional skirmishes between militants and the security forces have now assumed the shape of a full-blown insurgency. Besides having caused a total disruption of life, the fighting has resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides, in Waziristan. In its intensity and persistence, the movement is unprecedented in recent history.
One irretrievable damage that has been caused as a consequence is the erosion of the institutional framework which has held the areas together since partition. It is this aspect of the whole issue that will have to be addressed as far as long-term solution is concerned.
The present political system in the tribal areas owes its origin to the Mughal period. The area was the halting ground for the Mughal armies on their forays into India from what is now Afghanistan. As the Mughal armies passed through these areas, there were frequent violent confrontations causing heavy casualties. The area was of no economic value to the invaders but its strategic relevance to the invading forces was never underestimated.
The carrot and stick approach was used to overcome the stiff resistance of the tribes. This approach, in a tribally structured society, soon assumed the form of an indigenous hierarchy. The tribal headman was recognised as the principal focal point in dealing with a section or a sub-section of a tribe. This was in consonance with the tribal traditions because 'elders' as they were called, were an indispensable component of the tribal society even before the arrival of the Mughals.
The Sikh period did not witness any significant change in the way the tribesmen conducted themselves in relation to the occupying forces in and around Khyber. But it was a period of turmoil and rapid decline of state and order which, to some extent, impacted the tribal areas also.
The Sikh rule was brought to an end by the expanding British army in the mid twentieth century. The British penetration into the tribal areas was slow and very calculated. There was a well-orchestrated policy of advancing into these areas by establishing contacts with the tribes. By employing a combination of skilful subterfuges including the principle of "divide and rule," momentary incentives, coercion, deception and treachery, slowly and gradually the British influence in the area grew.
The annexation of the tribal areas into the British India was thus achieved, more or less peacefully. But as soon as tribes realised that the British penetration was actually a prelude to a partial occupation, troubles began. Resistance to the British annexation was sometimes muted; sometimes quite aggressive.
At times, the whole area of a tribe was up in arms; at another time the administration was fairly relaxed. The turn of the century, ie, later 19th and the early 20th century saw a movement spearheaded by Mullah Powinda in South Waziristan Agency. The movement was led by "Ulema and their followers" and it destabilised the entire Mahsud area and had also its ripple effects across the border.
In early twentieth century, there was a violent uprising in Mohmand area. It was being led by that great charismatic freedom fighter, Haji Sahib Turangzai. In the early thirties, another remarkable and formidable personality waged a relentless campaign in North Waziristan against the British targets. He was known as "faqir or Ippi." The violent anti-government uprising had debilitating impact on the British administration in the tribal areas, scores of people were killed and the government had to resort to aerial bombardment on many occasions in an effort to kill the "Faqir."
But the important thing is that these and many more such movements launched in the tribal areas against the British Raj did not in anyway fundamentally disrupt or destabilise the administrative institutions that had been developed by the rulers. In other words, the essential character of the administration was not tarnished or altered. On the other hand, belief in the correctness of the system grew.
The British rulers handled the myriad security issues as well as suppressing rebellions and creating an infrastructure, by creating a sound administrative machinery which was rooted in the local culture and traditions and which reflected the resolve of an administration that was firm yet flexible, responsive and assertive and above all fair, just and consistent; a system which penalised those who were proved guilty under "Riwaj" and which rewarded generously for services rendered; a system which did not put premium on mischief and which created an administration that was prepared to take risks in defence of its strategic objectives as long as the basis parameters of "Riwaj" were not trespassed.
THIS WAS THE INDIRECT SYSTEM OF GOVERNING THE TRIBAL AREAS, AND WAS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES:
TERRITORIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The system of territorial or collective responsibility was enshrined as the basis of the administration of tribal areas. The idea was to bind the whole section of a tribe in an arrangement where the tribesmen will collectively ensure that their territory is not used for any offence or any anti-government initiative.
HEADMEN OR MALIKS: In recognition of the tribal structure of society, the administration encouraged the growth of a class of tribal headmen called "Maliks" who were to be the intermediaries between the tribes and the administration.
This facilitated the handling of the tribes. On the one hand, it made the tribes happy because the government, by acknowledging the status of their elders, had honoured their traditions. And on the other hand, it made the task of the administration easier because dealing or handling a few chosen headmen was easier. Moreover, these Maliks were amenable to all sorts of incentives.
KHASADARS/LEVIES: Likewise the British decided to create a local force of Khasadars to help the administration in carrying out multifarious duties like check posts, pickets, protection of offices, residences, escorting officers, delivering messages, making arrests, impounding vehicles, etc.
The creation of such a force had two principal objectives: to perform the duties mentioned above and to create a strong vested interest of the tribes in running the administration of the area. In the course of time, Khasadars became hereditary institution although the Political Agent could cancel a Khasadar in the event of absence or non-compliance with orders. A sword of Damocles' hung over the shoulders of the recipients of Khasadari, which would act as a deterrent in favour of the administration.
"Nikat": It was imperative that a strict balance be maintained in the way benefits were distributed amongst individuals and dozens of sections of various tribes. Thus the institution of "Nikat" was born and later codified.
The system of Maliks and Lungi holders, which existed before the arrival of the British, was institutionalised and formalised. The system provided an easy reference to gauge the status of an individual.
POLITICAL AGENT: Political Agent was on the one hand a representative of the government and on the other hand an advocate of the tribes vis-à-vis the British government. He was the focal point of every development that occurred in an agency. By constant interaction with the tribes, his hand was on the pulse of the tribes and his views and his advice to the government constituted an important element in the formulation of policy on critical issues.
FRONTIER CRIMES REGULATION (FCR): This is a procedural law which emphasises trial by "Jury," that is "Jirga." It is, in actual fact, based on the tribal "Rewaj" because the Jirga which is called upon to adjudicate upon a case, comprises tribal elders themselves.
There is the indirect system of administration where the tribes were left to live under their own systems and way of life without any interference from the government and where the government took responsibility only for security of the administrative area.
The system delivered. It had built-in mechanisms and flexibility to respond to a variety of situations. That explains why there was no administrative collapse even though there were a number of violent movements, attacks on government installations, repeated assaults on government forces and personnel throughout the British occupation of the area.
An important feature of their administration was the principle of unity of command. Another was extensive administrative autonomy to the Political Agent. This, coupled with the fact that the administration always put on a humane face, was responsive to the needs and sentiments of the people and was based on equity and justice, respecting the local "Rewaj," ensured that there was no major obstacle to the British Rule and that there was no major upheaval in the tribal areas.
During this whole period, the tribesmen were wooed by the Afghan government and depending upon the relations existing at a given point in time between Afghanistan and British India, were given incentives or instructions to foment trouble in the British administrated areas. As the rivalry of the two contending empires continued, the tribal areas remained a major focus of the British Administration in as far as its vital security interests in the area were concerned.
The nature of the conflict changed when Czarist Russia was replaced by the emergence of the Soviet Union. But much before the demise of the Czarist Russia, the latter's intervention in the Central Asian Republics had started.
The Soviet Union accelerated the policy of annexation and used brute force and the full savagery and its awesome power, unleashed by the revolutionary forces sweeping the Russian landscape at the time, in suppressing the resistance to its expansionist policy. Tens of thousand of people were killed and mutilated and the last Basmachi resistance finally died down in 1936. By this time, the Soviet Union had extended its full and undisputed control over the Central Asian Republics.
South of Oxus Lay Afghanistan where the British had established a firm hold. Although the Afghan rulers had a morbid fear of Russia and under a new incarnation the Soviet Union, they were reassured by the presence of British Representative in Kabul. This deterrence enabled the Afghan rulers to focus on issues of internal security and its relations with the British Empire. The tribal areas, therefore, continued to draw attention and in many ways took advantage of such position by employing their characteristic manipulations in obtaining favours from the two governments.
This was a period of intense diplomatic manoeuvring, endless intrigues and constant mutual recriminations occasionally assuming shape of limited warfare, use of carrot and stick policy to woo or subdue the opponents. The hardy tribesmen learnt the art of diplomacy on the rugged tribal and Afghan landscape, a tradition that has passed on from generation to generation - to this day.
CREATION OF PAKISTAN: On the eve of partition, Pakistan inherited an orderly and well established and time tested administrative and institutional framework, which could, with some minor adjustments, be allowed to continue.
The decision of the government to withdraw military from the tribal areas less in response to the requirement of the eastern border and more in order to put trust in the capability of the tribesmen to assume the role of defenders of the newly created state were widely welcomed. The situation did not change substantially until the Afghan government, now led by Sardar Daud Khan, began to stir up trouble along the border.
Sardar Daud imagined himself to be a committed Pakhtoon nationalist although he could not speak the language. In 1955, the first ransacking of the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul took place a pastime with Kabalites to this day. In the early 1960s, the two militaries confronted each other in Bajaur area and relations became extremely tense.
But in 1965, the historic gesture of King Zahir Shah whereby he asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the western border and focus only on border with India in the wake of Pakistan-India war had a very salutary effect on the relations. A somewhat similar message was sent to Pakistan again at the time of 1971 Bangladesh crisis.
The coup of 1973 which toppled the monarchy and the events of 1978 and 1979 transformed the Afghan and tribal landscape perhaps permanently. As "Jehad" progressed, the tribal areas were used as a conduit for supply of weapons to the "Mujahideen."
The enormous movement of men and material across the tribal area and the long drawn out war against the pro-communist regime did not, however, cause any administrative collapse or any weakening of the authority of the government. The reason was simple: Institutions and administrative systems remained intact. There was no induction of the military to counter the threat posed by the presence of the Red Army at the Durand Line.
THE CURRENT SCENARIO: This provides a clue to the policy makers of today. Once time honoured institutions are weakened, systems discarded, a Pandoras' box is opened. It leads to a host of issues appearing one after the other in an escalating destabilisation where the writ of the government is the principal casualty.
Dealing more specially with the present situation, the following factors have led to the collapse of the order and decline of the writ of the government especially in Waziristan.
MILITARISATION: The induction of the military in the tribal are in 2002-2003 was not preceded by any careful consideration. The pros and cons were not dispassionately evaluated. Deploying military at the border to check infiltration is one thing, to station troops all over the area is another. It was not realised that exposure of troops in an extended geographical area, in a climate of rising tensions, was the least desirable thing to do. The issue was not considered in its appropriate context.
A perception was allowed to grow that military deployment both in the hinterland and on the border was being resorted to as part of advancement of US agenda in the area. This perception has inflamed passions that has led to the insurgency.
WEAKENING OF SYSTEMS: With the induction of the military, the writ of the Political Agent weakened. Indeed the decision making process suffered irreparably. The centre of gravity of the administrative machinery shifted to Peshawar. A duality was introduced. The Political Agent has had his hand on the pulse of the tribe. He understands the systems like no other. He has knowledge of the internal tribal intra sectional balance.
He operates through the system of collective and protective responsibility. He meets dozens of tribesmen everyday and he is the best-informed person in the area. Then he has his own tribal informers. His Khasadars also feed constant information.
Then there is the Assistant Political Agent, Tehsildar and Political Moharrir who have their own clientele and a network of informers. There is a regular inflow of information on the whereabouts, intents and motives of foreigners and who all are sheltering them.
In his capacity as Political Agent, he has powers under the FCR. The Political Agent is also the District Magistrate. He co-ordinates all the developmental projects, removes any hurdles that come in the way, ensure compliance with government policy on the timely completion of works; awards contracts, services, etc.
This institution could have been employed to deal with an extraordinary situation. At a time, when the institution of Political Agent was so badly needed in the service of the area and country, it was allowed to become wholly irrelevant to the scheme of things with devastating implications.
The principle of unity of command so consistently being advocated was overlooked in the tribal area as indeed in the settled area. With the systems crumbling and tensions rising the stage was set for a full scale insurgency. The office of the Political Agent was the last resort of the tribesmen.
They could seek remedy for their grievances. Now on the one hand, there was this feeling that the government is actively promoting and protecting American interests in the area, bringing US war to its own area and on the other hand, a heavy deployment of forces and then there being no system or institution which could come to their rescue, of any one in authority who could help resolve the myriad issues, despondency prevailed. The tribesmen felt helpless like never before.
Such despair and feeling of being abandoned could drive people to adopt militant, belligerent attitude. This is exactly what has happened. When shots are being called from Peshawar and the systems of unity of command being thrown to the wind and the time honoured system of territorial responsibility discarded, law and order as indeed peace would certainly be a major casualty.
Then there is a system of dealing with foreigners or any other person who is wanted by any government agency and is being sheltered in the tribal area.Although, the procedure was adopted in this case, it was not fully, sincerely enforced. The gravity of the situation was not realised. And the detailed mechanisms which are required to be put into action were not implemented in order to make sure that the sureties (tribal elders) would adhere to their duties in respect of the good conduct of the foreigners for whom they stood surety.
Lastly such good conduct sureties should have been obtained from the very beginning so that there could be no need to resort to military action. Once blood has been spilled, collateral damage caused, the situation becomes more and more complicated.
Because one ought not to forget that there are intense rivalries and deep-seated enmities in the tribal area and obtaining credible information, uninfluenced by such rivalries, is the job of an expert. We have landed ourselves in a difficult and unsustainable situation.
As a consequence of a basic and grave error of judgement, we have lost more than one thousand soldiers and more than 5000 tribesmen have perished in the last few years in the armed conflict and as a result of aerial bombardment.
These include thousands of non-combatants, women and children. The list of those wounded is also in the thousands. Was this huge and appalling cost worth the objective that one wanted to achieve? And what objective have we achieved.
If the goal was to eliminate foreign militants, that could have been accomplished by using other, time-tested methods that have been referred to above. If the objective was to restore peace, that has eluded us. In the process one has scarified the very fundamental edifice of the tribal system of administration, namely, the principle of unity of command and territorial responsibility.
HOW TO RETRIEVE THE SITUATION?
Resolving the current crisis would involve undoing what has been happening in the last four-year or more. In the first place, the government has to proceed firmly in order to remove the perception that the heavy deployment of forces is meant to safeguard American vital interests in the area. Because the domestic cost of the policy is now increasingly high and therefore unacceptable, some adjustment in the policy is clearly needed.
To give practical shape to this reappraisal of policy, the government needs to announce a phased withdrawal of military from the tribal areas in the first place and from the border, later. As well as doing this, the government has to reach out to the so-called militants and deal with them strictly in accordance with the "Rewaj." Having handled the foreign militants, the government may have to explain the rationale of this policy to the US and its allies.
It is claimed that withdrawal of troops from the border would tempt US/Nato forces to launch strikes in the tribal areas. This is not strictly true. In the first place, the government would not withdraw the entire bulk of forces from the border and the tribal areas.
Some forces would have to continue to be stationed there. Then the government would reassure the US and its allies that there are no bases, training camps or militants in the tribal area. The tribesmen themselves would ensure that such bases and camps do not exist.
The other step would be to restore the systems and end diarchy in decision-making and revive the institution of the Political Agent and the Maliks. That would be a significant step in the right direction. As laid down in the Frontier Corps Ordinance, the Frontier Corps Units would be placed under the administrative control of the Political Agent.
The Political Agent is authorised to conduct raids, arrest militants, punish tribes and take a host or other punitive measures, should the situation so warrant. As a matter of fact, the army units on the fringes of the tribal areas can be commissioned to assist the scouts in operations, whenever and wherever needed.
These steps would end insurgency. There would be the phenomenon of Taliban to contend with. With the systems restored, the Taliban phenomenon would be more amenable to a resolution.
As in the past, such movements, with time, lose their vitality and vigour as they are joined by unmotivated youngsters who join the band-wagon for booty, etc. With the collective resources of the administration and the tribes, the Taliban movement, in a climate where the government have shown itself not to be totally subservient to the US interests, would begin to lose steam, making it easy for the administration to marginalise them.
THE AFGHAN INSURGENCY: But efforts to bring peace in the tribal areas and the adjoining settled areas would not bear fruit unless the issue of Afghan insurgency is resolved.
Six years on, the situation in Afghanistan shows no signs of improving. There are clearly visible signs that it is deteriorating. It is increasingly clear that unless the Taliban are mainstreamed into the evolving political institutions, it would not be possible to manage the looming crisis. For that to happen the issue of presence of coalition forces have to be addressed.
An important breakthrough will be achieved and a milestone crossed, if the United States were to agree to the stationing of forces from Islamic countries as a replacement to the US/Nato forces. This would require a fundamental change of policy. But then the American policy makers ought to realise that some of the assumptions which are at the core of their present policy, are totally invalid.
There is no evidence, circumstantial or documentary, to show that the "Taliban" leadership knew in advance of any Osama engineered attacks on the US. Indeed there is no concrete evidence of Osama himself having planned or motivated would-be-suicide bombers, thousands of miles away, to blow themselves up in attacks on the US. But that would not fall within the purview of this review.
The fact remains that the "Taliban" leadership had no inkling of the attacks and that the perpetrators need not have taken them into confidence. "Al Qaida" it must be emphasised, then comprised a small coterie of people who were close lieutenants of Osama. The world at large, did not know about the existence of "al Qaida." It became a brand name after 9/11. Now to associate or bracket the "Taliban" with "al Qaida" is en error of judgement.
The Taliban movement appeared on Afghan landscape in October 1994 as a consequence of an anarchy that had overtaken Afghanistan. Osama bin Ladin was not brought to Afghanistan by Taliban. He came to Jalalabad in August 1996 from Sudan. In August 1996, Jalalabad and Kabul were being ruled by Professor Rabbani, then President of Afghanistan.
Coming back to the issue of return of normalcy, mainstreaming the resistance in a grand national reconciliation programme is perhaps the only way out of the current impasse.
The United States, if it genuinely believes in containing and defeating terrorism, must agree to a long term, sustainable strategy which is underpinned by regard to pluralism, human rights and democracy. By sidelining a major chunk of population, by using lethal weapons to kill, exterminate, intimidate and humiliate opponents, the matter will only aggravate. If the past two years is any guide, the situation is getting more complicated and more difficult to resolve.
The Iraqi situation is going to have an impact on the conflict in Afghanistan. The turmoil in the region is going to breed terrorism not contain it. A reappraisal has long been overdue.
THE PAK-AFGHAN PEACE JIRGA: First of all, it must be admitted that insurgencies, backed by popular public support, are not resolved through "Jirgas." Secondly, the major stakeholders, ie Taliban were not present in the "Jirga." Then there was no representative from Waziristan, the major conflict zone on Pakistan side of the border.
In these circumstances, the deliberation of the "Jirga" would not carry much conviction with the tribal masses on both sides of the border, more so when the government nominated all the members who attended the "Jirga."
But in a broader sense, the holding of the Jirga was a beginning which provided a platform to at least some tribesmen to voice their feelings and be heard by those who matter.
Other than recommending a host of measures which would help promote and strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries, the Jirga also decided to constitute a sub-Jirga which would pursue the dialogue with opponents of the current dispensation. In other words, negotiations will be opened with Taliban resistance by the sub-Jirga. The sub-Jirga is currently being constituted.
It would depend on how and to what extent the Afghan Government would facilitate the small Jirga in opening parleys with the Taliban and Hikmatyar. Much would depend on whether the Americans would agree to any timetable for withdrawal of troops and induction of UN sponsored Islamic countries forces to take Afghanistan through the transition until full stability has been achieved.
The Jirga process would receive a boost only if the Afghan Government would allow the small Jirga to open negotiations with the Taliban. If that is not the case, the Jirga would fast become irrelevant and lose its image in the yes of the tribesmen and Afghans alike.
When so much is at stake, bold, at times unpopular decisions, have to be taken to salvage the situation. All the major stakeholders, the US, the Afghans and the Government of Pakistan are confronted with a huge challenge.
The way out is to recognise the ground realities, project into the future, abandon expediency and apply painful adjustments to create an environment of trust and an ambience of cordiality in order to re-establish the rule of law, respect for institutions and initiate multi dimensional approaches for socio-economic development of an area which has been bled white by years of unending conflict.
The alternative is a grim scenario of ever deepening quagmire with heavy human toll and suffering and continued destruction of whatever infrastructure has been left behind.
(The writer is former Chief Secretary NWFP and former ambassador to Afghanistan.)