British Home Secretary Jacqui Smith currently on a visit to Pakistan has stated that there are links between terrorist organisations operating in the UK and Pakistan. This is an obvious source of concern for both countries and is the reason behind greater cooperation between the intelligence agencies of the two countries.
This cooperation, till 18th February 2008, was premised on a common strategy on the war on terror whose architects were resident in neither London nor Islamabad; but in Washington DC. The thrust of the strategy was to use force, disproportionate if need be which has had ramifications in terms of increasing civilian casualties, with the objective of annihilating the terrorists.
That this objective is still far from being met almost seven years after the strategy was first formulated and implemented is patently evident to all; but particularly so in regions of the world where the actual war on terror is being fought: Iraq, Afghanistan and border areas of Pakistan. Many also include Lebanon and Palestine in this list. What is disturbing is that areas where this war is being fought have witnessed collateral damage defined as civilian casualties that has led to local support for the terrorists.
It is significant that since Gordon Brown took over as the prime minister he has been at pains to distance himself from the US position especially with reference to Iraq. That he does not feel the same in the case of Afghanistan is due largely to a worldwide consensus that the Taliban and al Qaeda support a brand of terrorism that has little concern for the religion and ethnicity of their victims.
Indiscriminate attacks do not make fertile ground for support. Nonetheless such support is evident in Pakistan's border areas with Afghanistan. The rationale for such support can be seen in the context of ongoing military operations in these areas which have caused considerable loss of civilian life with large parts of Pakistani nationals living in this area feeling alienated from the government in Islamabad.
It is little wonder that the new government feels strongly that instead of further alienating tribal areas it is politic to begin negotiations that would ease discontent with the former government's strategy and thereby generate support for government policies.
Thus a shift in the strategy to fight terrorism similar to the one supported by Gordon Brown with respect to Iraq has been taking place in the corridors of power in Pakistan post 18 February 2008 elections - a shift that seems to reflect changing ground realities.
There is little justification for continuing a strategy that, almost seven years down the line for Pakistan as well, has had only limited success. Thus the new government's support for dialogue and not military confrontation must be supported. For Britain to feel the same concerns as the US in the post Blair era does not at first glance seem justified.
Britain however like other coalition partners maintains that Pakistan needs to stop tribal support for the Taliban who cross the border into Afghanistan at will and escape back into Pakistani territory when pursued by coalition forces. Pakistan's capacity to control a long porous border with Afghanistan is a difficult if not an impossible task. However our ability to shift tribal loyalties away from the Taliban and towards the Centre will be strengthened with dialogue. It is therefore in Pakistan's interests as well as in the interest of the coalition partners to support dialogue over military action.