In a recent editorial comment, the Financial Times observed that hopes generated by the February 18 general elections are evaporating as elected politicians of Pakistan "seem unwilling or unable to do anything about it". May be the outside world can help Pakistan with finance for development but, "solutions really lie at home" - unattended because there is a "worrying vacuum at the centre".
According to the FT, with Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif, the heads of two main ruling coalition partners, having failed to put aside their "personal rivalries and thirst for power" the Gilani government has hardly moved to address the problems that are multiplying. Coming as it does from a highly regarded newspaper it is a strong indictment of the ruling elite of Pakistan.
The paper's observation that the extremists in the tribal areas of Pakistan took "advantage of recent cease-fires to launch bolder incursions into Afghanistan", however, may not sit well with the general perception held by the majority of the people who, as a recent IRI survey suggested, are for a dialogue with the militants. But, its warning that 'hot pursuits missions' that these "incursions" may trigger and thus in the process may strengthen religious extremists inside the country cannot be overlooked, either.
The fact that the Pakistan Army is back on the battlefront in Hangu - where of late in the wake of some jirga-moderated cease-fires, war and peace had alternated on a daily basis - lends weight to the argument that in the absence of a strong military action, peace negotiations have no chance of success. Something similar is happening in Swat as well where an evidently pro-militants deal agreed to by the provincial government is floundering, all the more now that leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Baitullah Mehsud has asked the ANP government to resign or face dire consequences. Then a couple of new battlefronts have opened up in the Mohmand Agency and Tirah Valley in Khyber Agency where rival sectarian factions are engaged in murderous clashes, in addition to the never-ending Shia-Sunni feud in Kurram Agency.
These are essentially fights for the turf having very little to do with war in Afghanistan. But they cause lawlessness, foment militancy and breed terrorism. Unfortunately, the sentimental approach of general public towards the tribal militancy tends to weaken the argument for strong military action against militancy.
Of course it is difficult to defend a one-dimensional approach of taming militancy in the tribal areas with the use of force and one would never give up on the need to employ multi-pronged solution to this imbroglio. But at the same time we would plead for pragmatism to replace unrealistic cavalier handling of the crisis in the tribal areas. The times have changed and the takers of the argument that cross-border interference is justified in cases of tribes straddling the common border have ceased to exist. In the modern day of nation-states, international relations brook no interference on basis of common tribal heritage or religious fellowship.
But there is a historical perspective to the situation Pakistan is presently placed in and that too merits serious consideration by the government and the people. No doubt the war is centered in Afghanistan and what we experience is its collateral fallout. But the danger is that we may allow this fallout to thicken by inviting retaliatory hot pursuit forays by our inability to stem the cross-border interference.
That would be disastrous because in that eventuality the targeted Taliban's blowback would strike deeper into Pakistan. And they have that capability, proved as such by their now halted countrywide suicide-bombings. It would be in Pakistan's interest therefore that the patience of coalition forces over 'incursions' by Pakistan-based Taliban does not run out. If history is any guide we should realise that while the main battlefield country Vietnam recovered from war ravages in a couple of years its collaterally damaged neighbours like Cambodia and Laos took much longer time to return to normalcy.
Pakistan should avert the possibility of suffering acute collateral damage in form of hot pursuits by the Nato-coalition forces. Our current crises are much more serious than what one would like to guess. We cannot afford the luxury of a cavalier approach towards war in Afghanistan. We must be pragmatic, even if it means following the policy mapped out by President Musharraf. The stakes are too high and call for an absolutely realistic approach.