It is known for a while that the US has been telling the new civilian government in Islamabad in hushed tones to 'reform' Pakistan's military intelligence agency, the ISI, alleging that some of its officers have links with the extremist elements. Now the US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian affairs, Richard Boucher, has publicly demanded 'reform' of the ISI, adding the emphatic assertion, "it has to be done."
A career diplomat like Boucher is expected at least to observe the niceties of public diplomacy, but he has allowed the usual American hubris to get the better of him. Such a demand from any foreign country in any other state would be outrageous, in fact unthinkable - all the more so when it comes from the US at a time when it has taken to violating Pakistan's sovereignty and routinely launching missile attacks on its territory.
It can only reinforce reverse psychology that is already applicable to US policies towards this country, undermining the government's ability to curb ISI's powers even if it wants to and has genuine reasons to do so. While the ISI has much to be proud of by way of its accomplishments within its originally designated sphere of work, it has been dabbling in internal politics as well.
People have long resented the raison d'être of its political wing or internal directorate, and its use of special funds and manipulative tactics to create certain political entities in order to destabilise civilian governments. Hence it will not be surprising if the present government wants to check the agency's powers. But it cannot afford to be doing so at US' bidding.
A case in point is the announcement back in July to place the agency under the interior ministry's control. The decision was generally well received with opinion leaders stressing the principle of military subservience to civilian authority.
Those concerned, of course, knew the background and therefore, it seems, found it easier to offer stiff resistance. The move was reversed within hours as embarrassed ministers and other officials tried hard to justify the reversal. The decision, it needs to be emphasised, was generally supported by the opinion leaders as long as it appeared to be based on the principle of civilian supremacy over military affairs.
Subsequent reports though tell another story. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani later revealed in an interview with an American paper, Washington Times, that CIA Deputy Director Stephen Kappes and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, during a mid-July visit to Islamabad had complained of some ISI officials' alleged links with the extremists.
From which it follows that the change was initiated at the US behest, and could only meet the fate it did. It goes without saying that any fresh attempt at 'reform' in the wake of Boucher's publically stated demand will harm the government's standing with the public.
If it has a home-grown ISI reform plan it would be well served to present the same before Parliament for approval. That is the only way to secure the democratic system against dirty interference, and to ensure that in all matters, whether related to extremism or external affairs, the agency follows the guidelines set by the civilian government.