This is the second and final part on the non-proliferation treaty. [I apologise for a factual error in the first part of this article. Russia ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty on June 30, 2000.] Non-proliferation has become a major policy goal, and it has remained so with the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon states "to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons."
Like any other undertaking given and accepted, there must be the mutuality of obligations between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states with respect to non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Today's non-proliferation regime is a one-sided deal. It favours those states which are beneficiaries of deterrence, ie, the nuclear-weapon states which are the creators of deterrence-the rule of first capability--and those states which are covered by the nuclear umbrella provided by the nuclear-weapon states.
Many countries do not necessarily wish to be linked militarily to any of the nuclear-weapon states in exchange for a nuclear umbrella; nor is any of the nuclear-weapon states willing to provide its nuclear umbrella indiscriminately to whichever country asks.
For non-proliferation to continue to remain a major policy goal today, the security needs of those countries which remain outside the reach of the nuclear umbrella must be taken into account. Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal, "The Logic of Zero: Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons," published in the 2008 November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, advocate the abolition of nuclear weapons.
As the global demand for nuclear energy increases, spreading the infrastructure necessary to produce fissile nuclear materials, the authors see the world "on the verge of entering an age of more nuclear weapons states, more nuclear materials, and more nuclear facilities that are poorly secured-making the job of the terrorists seeking the bomb easier and the odds that a nuclear weapon will be used greater."
What we need, therefore, is a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons like any other treaties prohibiting the use of certain types of weapons such as the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons in Latin America, the 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological Weapons, the 1981 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious, and the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction, the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, which is being signed.
Without a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, the moral dilemma that confronts individual conscience notwithstanding, a court, be it national or international, "could obviously not go beyond what the law says," as Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, the then President of the International Court of Justice, lamented in his declaration appended to the Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons of 8 July 1996. He continued, "It could not say what the law does not say." The Tokyo District Court similarly stated forty-five years ago in it judgement of 7 December 1963 in the Shimoda case: "Of course, it is right that the use of new weapon is legal as long as international law does not prohibit it."
Accordingly, the International Court of Justice in the same Advisory Opinion left its answer to the question hanging by stating: "[I]n view of the current state of international law, and the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake."
If the ultimate purpose of nuclear weapons is to secure deterrence and the nuclear powers believe that they possess a deterrent, isn't it strange for any such nuclear power to condemn any other state for acquiring such instrument of deterrence? Daalder and Lodal say in plain terms, "so long as others have nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain a viable nuclear deterrent." The Court also acknowledged that the "policy of deterrence" had for many years been, and still was, adhered to by "an appreciable section of the international community."
As the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter enemy attack, ie, to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others, the actual use of nuclear weapons would mean a fundamental failure of the policy of deterrence, but ironically, the fundamental underpinning of the policy of deterrence is necessarily to prepare against the possibility that nuclear weapons may actually be used by others.
Judge Carl-August Fleischhauser of Germany candidly concluded that the policy of deterrence "must be regarded as State practice in the legal sense," and in the words of Judge Shigeru Oda of Japan, "the doctrine of nuclear deterrence continues to be meaningful and valid."
Ivo Daalder and Jan Lodal suggest that the first step toward the "Logic of Zero" is for the US to establish as official policy "the limited purpose of US nuclear forces: to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by others." It is essentially the same "deterrence" principle in a different expression while maintaining "no change in [US] nuclear weapons policy (before zero is reached)".
The target "zero" looks like a moving target which will never be achieved so long as nuclear weapons policy does not change. Nonetheless, I whole-heartedly support the suggestion by Daalder and Lodal of a comprehensive nuclear-control regime that could account for and monitor "all fissile and weapons-grade materials (whether used for military or civilian purposes) during the many years it would take to get to zero-and then after all nuclear weapons had been eliminated."
The point of emphasis is that this new nuclear-control regime must continue to be in place even after the abolition of nuclear weapons. The reason for this is clear and simple: so long as a nuclear technology is acquired, applied and maintained, that technology will be inevitably acquired by some other people by diffusion, as explained by Jared Diamond, "Guns, Germs, and Steel:
The Fate of Human Societies" (1999). A technology for a nuclear power plant is an obvious example. In that context, it cannot be hoped today that the abandonment of nuclear technology will ever happen like Japan's abandonment of guns in 17th century or China's abandonment of ocean-going ships in the 16th century.
Some countries such as Japan have chosen not to acquire nuclear weapons. That decision was made according to their own conscience and calculations of cost and benefits, and not because of the NPT. Those in the West who joined a chorus of non-proliferation are all covered by a nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. Japan is no exception. What we need is to undertake the determined pursuit of the abolition of nuclear weapons. Article VI of the NPT has created a specific obligation to be discharged by all the parties to the NPT.
It provides: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith in effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The Court in the same Advisory Opinion unanimously found that "[t]here exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."
The Court elaborated on "the obligation involved here" as "an obligation to achieve a precise result-nuclear disarmament in all its aspects-by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations on the matter in good faith."
The position of Japan is unique not only as the sole nation that has ever been subjected to the horror of the real bombs, but also as the only nation used as "a showcase" in the United States' effort to deter the Soviet Union, as documented by Gar Alperovitz's "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" (1995).
Japan could play a lead role in mobilising nuclear and non-nuclear states alike, non-governmental organisations, scientists and other relevant groups and individuals into planning the focused attention on the abolition of nuclear weapons, taking strategic steps toward a serious process of negotiating and concluding multilateral treaty on the global abolition of nuclear weapons.
So long as Japan remains under the US nuclear umbrella, however, its power of persuasion is perhaps of limited value whereas, as Daalder and Lodal suggest, "a willingness to act boldly to reduce its own reliance on nuclear weapons and drastically cut its own arsenal can give Washington the credibility necessary to succeed."
As I earlier mentioned in this column ("Building a foundation of common interest," December 3, 2008), speaking to an Indian audience on a satellite TV last month, Mr Zardari proposed a "no first nuclear strike" policy with India just like India's policy. Moreover, he said South Asia should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which could be achieved by a "nonnuclear treaty." President Zardari is openly saying that Pakistan is taking a step toward the "Logic of Zero."
Setting aside for the moment the question about the possible effect of the recent Mumbai attacks to Mr Zardari's new initiative, it is an extraordinary development that Pakistan proposed a "no first nuclear strike" policy with India. Let's face it. Pakistan and India are two countries sharing a border, and they are armed with nuclear bombs.
They waged three wars since 1947! And these two countries are likewise facing nuclear-armed China, which also adopted a "no first nuclear strike" policy. We need to encourage the development of closer relations between Pakistan and India which are not contingent upon what the third neighbour, China, might do. There is enormous opportunity for Pakistan to work with India for the achievement of the Logic of Zero.
(Concluded)