This is the first of a two-part series assessing the success, or otherwise of President Zardari's foreign tour. The first part deals with the political/diplomatic successes and the second part will deal with economic successes, if any.
The President has come under intense criticism from all sections of society for undertaking the longest ever foreign tour even by the standards set by our past profligate heads of state. The issue, so argue a growing number of his detractors, is not only one of timing, but also of performance.
In the minds of many there was nothing the President achieved during his foreign tour. Some analysts go a step further and argue that his ownership of democracy (he referred to 'my democracy' more than 20 times), his poor command over English, an Afghan transit trade agreement signed under US auspices and, indeed, his focus on seeking support for his government transcended all other objectives, including national interest. These are harsh criticisms and while it is evident that President Zardari has yet to capture the hearts and minds of the people of this country with his personal ratings remaining below 20 percent, unlike his late wife and father-in-law, yet he is a democratically elected President and, given our nascent democracy at present, it is pertinent to assess his performance during more than a three week foreign tour objectively.
First of all there is criticism about the Libyan leg of the trip. It is pertinent to recall that during the prime ministership of Z. A. Bhutto, President Zardari's late father-in law, there were a total of 150,000 Pakistanis working in Libya. Today there are less than 10,000 while the volume of trade between the two countries is around 6 million dollars per annum. The reason for such poor performance in the post-Bhutto era has less to do with the policies of subsequent Pakistani governments and more to do with Libya being ostracised by the international community on charges of exporting terrorism. Only recently has Libya re-emerged in the comity of nations. Be that as it may the President's three-day visit identified areas of possible co-operation - unlikely to bear fruit as long as security risks remain in this country - and therefore talks remained short on any specific support.
Libya's main source of income is from oil, 95 percent of export revenues come from oil and the sector accounts for 60 percent of public sector wages. Pakistan is not a major buyer of Libyan oil. There was no mention during the official foreign tour that Libya would provide Pakistan with cheaper oil, or, indeed, at deferred payment - the demand of the government to our traditional oil suppliers like Saudi Arabia and UAE. The Libyans requested some support for improving their banking sector as well as training facilities for teachers and students.
It is unfortunate that President Zardari's large delegation did not comprise people from the private banking sector and, perhaps, that is one lesson learned namely that the private sector must accompany the President in future if the target is attracting private sector investment.
On the second leg of his visit, the President dealt with domestic political issues and met with Altaf Hussain in London. No concrete long-term solution emerged leaving many to fear that violence in Karachi may erupt again though, to the President's credit, violence did cease in the aftermath of this meeting.
The third leg was, perhaps, the most important component of the foreign tour and evoked the greatest criticism which ranges from his acceptance of what is being seen as a summon by the US, to his performance, including during a luncheon meeting at Capitol Hill where he was grilled and the consensus of the US senators was that he performed poorly, to his 5000 dollar a night hotel room discounted to $2800 per night as revealed by the Pakistan Embassy (or 244,000 rupees per day that would provide an IDP family with food for 37 months according to the government estimates of Rs 6000 per month per family), to his four-day private visit in New York, and taking his son along at government to government negotiations.
On 7th May, the President was photographed in the Grand Foyer of the White House with Barack Obama and a day later Prime Minister Gilani announced to the nation that his government has declared a war on the Taliban and had called on the army to deal with the menace. The President did not deem it politic to return to the country at that time fuelling further criticism.
His critics, however, had begun sharpening their knives well before the visit to the US even began: the US invited President Zardari at the same time as President Karzai as part of the Obama Administration's Af-Pak policy.
Karzai is regarded as a US puppet with little control over his country extending beyond Kabul, while President Zardari for all his unpopularity ratings, is a democratically elected president. Pakistan's foreign office had resisted the move to lump Pakistan and Afghanistan together initially. Acceptance of the invitation effectively implies Pakistan's delinking with India by the US.
This will imply, so argue his critics, that all Pak-India issues will be allowed to fester: from Kashmir to the water issues, due to the Indian building of Baglihar as well as its intent to build Kishanganga dams expected to severely curtail our water supply to the fear that the Indian threat would be on both Pakistan's eastern and western borders given India's increasing clout in Afghanistan as well as the international community.
The US focus during the visit remained, as always, on our commitment to fight terror and our willingness to cooperate with Afghanistan's government. The stick was followed by a carrot, in terms of financial assistance, which would be dealt with in the second part of this two part series. Nothing gained and nothing achieved as far as political gains were concerned for the President.
The UK leg of the journey put to rest all claims made when Gordon Brown was here on a visit. At the time President Zardari, reportedly, refused a joint Press conference as a protest against the mishandling of Pakistani students by the British police without evidence. In London there was a joint Press conference and Zardari accepted the 12 million pounds assistance for the IDPs. Zardari supporters claim that the cheque would only have been handed to President Zardari and not to our High Commissioner in the UK. This does not seem credible as the international media attention on the plight of the IDPs would lead one to assume that the President's presence was not a prerequisite to getting the assistance.
France was the last leg of the foreign tour. There was no joint press conference and what took place was revealed by the Pakistani delegation, specifically President Zardari and the Foreign Minister: France agreed to give 12 million euros for the IDPs; and agreed to extend civil nuclear technology to Pakistan. It would have been preferable to have a joint press conference on the latter issue, as it remains controversial and does not have US endorsement as we were painfully made aware during Bush's last visit to Pakistan.
France though does have an independent foreign policy based on financial interests, a fact that led her to agree to support us in the past on this very issue, but later she retracted through a formal letter sent by President D'Estaing to Ziaul Haq terminating the contract for the supply of a reprocessing plant though French technicians continued to work till 1979 at the plant's construction site in Chashma. The reason cited by France: a concern that we may develop a bomb. Today that is a fait accompli, a fact that may lead to France honouring an agreement to provide us with civilian nuclear technology.
France, however, retained a rather ambiguous approach towards French companies with contracts for the delivery of mechanical and nuclear-sensitive parts for the plutonium reprocessing plant that was to be built with French assistance in Pakistan. At the urging of the then Foreign Minister Jean Francois-Poncet, Industry Minister Andre Giraud issued a formal notice to French companies not to supply any further equipment for the Chashma nuclear reprocessing plant in February 1979 though there were reports at the time that the US had paid off the entire amount to the French companies with the stipulation not to provide Pakistan with these mechanical and nuclear sensitive parts for the plant. History, therefore, accounts for the skepticism in Pakistan that is likely to remain till President Sarkozy himself announces a deal and the actual modalities are worked out. The US reaction would also be a key to assessing whether this deal would ever be honoured.
The President's defence for his extended foreign tour during which he went to four countries is that, barring Libya, all the other three countries visited exert considerable international clout. He can maintain that he presented Pakistan's case of a country committed to the war on terror at a political level as well as the need to provide resources to the country in this fight. His critics argue this is the "same o, same o". The President unfortunately was met with extreme skepticism based on his past as the country's first spouse and charges of continuing poor governance in the country were levelled that led the US officialdom to talk of the need for greater oversight over US assistance to Pakistan.
Members of the independent media, who were not part of the official entourage, reported that the President wanted to project the view that the PPP government is critical to delivering what the US wants delivered but failed to convince the Obama administration, which is fully cognisant of his poor ratings at home as well as his party's popularity that declined to just 17 percent. But, so claim many a supporter, the economic fallout of his tour will be extremely beneficial for the country. This will be examined next week.