The United States Congress has approved legislation by Senators John Kerry (D-MA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) to triple non-military assistance to Pakistan during the next five years. Congressional approval is said to have come at an important moment for the Obama administration, as it wrestles with how to move forward in Afghanistan.
But while focussed on development, the legislation comes with strict conditions regarding security aid that were, according to the US media, the subject of intense negotiations with the White House and the Pentagon. Not included in the legislation is a provision that would have created economic opportunity zones in border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan from which goods could be imported to the US duty-free.
Republicans, who earlier had asserted that conditions in the House version of the bill amounted to micromanaging US support for Pakistan, eventually supported the legislation. Rightly so, the legislation (the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act) that "enjoys the strong support of Departments of State and Defence" seeks to extend unprecedented levels of civilian and military assistance to Pakistan on the one hand, and imposes strict monitoring protocol on the other, that has generated much controversy in the Pakistani media.
This protocol constitutes an enhancement of 10 million dollars for oversight/audit by US officials, to be led by Robin Raphael - from 20 million dollars to 30. Few in Pakistan would take exception to this clause given the corruption perception index in this country with respect to our governments - past as well as present.
What was the US Senate's objective in passing the bill? Senator Kerry advised his fellow Senators in the second quarter of 2009 that "we must approach this endeavour (Kerry-Lugar bill) with a large dose of humility. Our leverage is limited. This bill aims to increase that leverage significantly".
There is a consensus in Pakistan that US leverage on our governments, past as well as present, has been significant. The evidence of this is before all: the US and Nato admonishments followed by acknowledgement of efforts to combat global terrorism by the Pakistan government/armed forces, as well as the continuing drone attacks. The people of this country, however, are another matter.
What the people have taken strong exception to is the bill requirement of the US Secretary of State having to certify each year that Pakistan is fighting the war on terror - terror defined not only by the United States as fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban, which may have been acceptable to some extent to our political pundits - but allowing for input from India and Afghanistan.
While the government of Pakistan has rightly committed to the world polity that Pakistan would not be used as a base to launch terror attacks on its neighbouring countries or for that matter any country, yet, this condition does not take note of Indian and Afghan territory being used as a launch pad for terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil.
Given that terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil are greater in some months than in Afghanistan, even this component of the bill appears unreasonable at best downright anti-Pakistan at worst. According to Prime Minister Gilani, there is evidence linking India to continued insurgency in Balochistan and Afghanistan, to replenishing the arsenal as well as manpower of the Pakistani Taliban.
Once, when this issue was raised bilaterally, the Indian government was quick to request proof of this allegation. One would hope that the Minister of Interior focuses his attention on providing the proof of Indian and Afghan complicity in the terror attacks on our soil to the world polity as soon as possible instead of prioritising the elimination of the hundi system or signing security deals with foreign governments.
The bill is also being criticised in Pakistan for extending assistance to Pakistan on terms that the US considers best meet its foreign policy goals. This element of assistance has been always a factor in bilateral donor assistance. Between 2001 and 2004, total assistance to the developing countries rose continually, however much of it was due to the geo-strategic concerns of the donors, notably fighting terrorism.
According to several analysts, US assistance has taken on a militaristic angle, post 9/11, similar to the aid pattern during the cold war. In addition, increase in assistance in 2005 was largely due to the enormous debt relief granted to Iraq, Nigeria, and some other one-off large items. Thus, to argue that the conditions attached to US assistance are not in Pakistan's interests is hardly surprising or indeed unexpected.
However, if the recipient does not get anything in return, the assistance would not go through. It is, therefore, fairly evident that Pakistan will benefit to some extent, though not to the full extent of the assistance package, due to the fact that US aid would (i) oblige Pakistan to purchase uncompetitively-priced imports from the US, an example being that all US assistance to fight HIV/AIDS virus in Africa has the condition of importing anti-viral drugs from the US, with a price tag of up to 15,000 dollars a year compared to the 350 dollars annually for generics; and (ii) US consultants are much higher priced than local consultants - money which is automatically remitted back to the US.
Be that as it may Pakistan is in desperate need for assistance to meet its budget deficit targets as well as to support its balance of payment position. With no other country or international financial institution, apart from the International Monetary Fund, interested in investing the kind of money needed, Pakistan has no option but to swallow the bitter pill.
Or so the public has been informed. One would have hoped that a cash-strapped government would have shifted the continued reliance on generating assistance from abroad, a strategy that has not paid dividends a year and a half after the government took over power, to slashing expenditure and imports.