On Tuesday, exactly a month after the start of operations in the Mehsud areas of South Waziristan, ISPR chief Major General Athar Abbas told the media that the army had captured most of the population centers and road arteries. Few had expected the army would be able to achieve the objective in such a short period.
This has also come as a surprise to the US military and intelligence circles as is indicated by a report carried by The New York Times on Tuesday. As Major General Athar Abbas put it, "The myth has been broken that this (South Waziristan) was a graveyard for empires and it would be a graveyard for the army".
Once Makeen is fully secured, this would mark the end of the first phase of the operation. While the militants put up stiff resistance in strongholds like Kotkai, Sararogha, Kaniguram and Makeen, what has surprised foreign observers is the relative ease with which the army routed an enemy supposed to be battle-hardy, highly motivated and armed with sophisticated weapons.
As the NYT put it, only seven soldiers died in the five-day long battle in Sararogha compared to 51 Americans killed in eight days of fighting in Falluja in 2004. The lighter resistance and smaller casualties are presumably the outcome of a better military strategy devised by the Pakistan army. Months before ground forces were deployed, the targets had been softened by air attacks.
That the bulk of the population had already migrated to the adjoining settled districts, particularly Dera Ismail Khan, made the task of the army easier as it could use heavy weapons in deserted localities. With the first phase of the operation soon to be over, the army plans to fan out to the interior where retreating militants are supposed to have taken shelter.
The second phase will have to be completed within the next few weeks because with the winter setting in, the weather would become unsuitable for the operation. The operation has to be extended to the villages and small habitations because the major portion of the Taliban fighting force, estimated at 10,000 remains still intact.
So are most of the foreign militants supposedly numbering 1,500. There are reports that a large chunk of the retreating militants might have taken shelter in other tribal agencies. There are reports indicating that some might have already reached Orakzai Agency from where Hakeemullah Mehsud had been operating before the death of Baitullah Mehsud.
That the military has started bombing suspected areas in the Agency indicates it is not ruling out the possibility. There are suggestions that part of the fleeing militants and their commanders might have taken shelter in the neighbouring North Waziristan Agency. Reports of the type have presumably prompted President Obama to write a letter to President Zardari calling on him to extend the military operation to other agencies also.
What particularly worries Washington is that Pakistan might bring the operation to an end once it has sorted out those conducting terrorist attacks in Pakistani cities and instead broker peace accords with militant groups, supposedly using the tribal areas as a spring board to launch attacks inside Afghanistan.
Washington is particularly perturbed over the understanding reached with commander Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan, who allowed Pakistani troops to proceed safely towards Makeen through area dominated by his group. The understanding accorded with the interests of Pakistan. Pakistan has already paid a heavy price for co-operation with the US. It must take into account the fact that public opinion in the US and countries allied to it are fast turning against the war in Afghanistan.
Keeping in view Washington's past track record, one cannot rule out the possibility of the US abruptly calling off the war and leaving Pakistan to fend for itself. Under the circumstances, Islamabad can ill-afford to keep all its eggs in one basket. What is worrisome is that the entire TTP leadership has managed to escape.
Unless it is captured or eliminated, it would serve as a rallying point for its followers. Another question that disturbs many concerns the control of the area after the completion of the operation. Will the weak and demoralised civil administration be able to hold it against the militants once the army has left?
As Baitullah Mehsud had got most of the tribal elders assassinated, few members of the local elite are left for the civil administration to rely upon. What remains most crucial is winning the hearts and minds of thousands of IDPs currently living in camps or with relatives. If interviews appearing in the media are any gauge of their feelings, much needs to be done to achieve this.