As expected, President Obama's lingering trepidation that nuclear materials remain vulnerable and can fall into the hands of non-state terrorists has received the unanimous endorsement of some 47 heads of state and government who attended his Nuclear Security Summit in Washington early this week. In a non-binding resolution, they pledged to 'lock up the most vulnerable nuclear materials within four years'.
An action plan, to be prepared mainly by the UN watchdog International Atomic Energy Agency, will see to it that nuclear materials are secured against illegal possession by "sharing information and expertise in detection, forensic and law enforcement".
It may be, that nuclear weapons are possessed by eight states only - including Israel, which maintains mysterious ambiguity on its nuclear arsenal. The nuclear materials, of which the summit spoke about are spread around the globe, in some 40 countries, with each having these stored, or dispersed, at different places, in myriad forms.
Keeping it safe and secure against pilferage and proliferation is, of course, a huge challenge. And how exacting would be the task, President Obama illustrated: nuclear material "just the size of apple would be enough to kill thousands", he said, holding out a half-clenched fist. Over 1600 tons of highly enriched uranium are lying with the declared nuclear-weapons states. Even a small quantity of moderately enriched nuclear material can kill - as a possible constituent of so-called dirty bomb.
That's the nature of the challenge besetting international security, when militancy, not only of the al Qaeda brand but of all kinds, easily diffuses itself in society, anywhere in the world. We are not here to take issue with President Obama's determination that it's the 'irony of history' that the risk of confrontation between states has shifted to non-state actors and is growing.
Ours is a different experience. In Pakistan, we tend to see nuclear terrorism raising its ugly head far more menacingly from a state actor, in the east of us, than from anywhere else. In the last one year alone, India has not only warned to inflict upon Pakistan a "Cold Start"-triggered aggression, under a "nuclear overhang," but has also warned of a "two-front war".
How is it that this historic summit completely skirted the much more palpable threat of state-sponsored terrorism and exclusively focused on non-state actors, whose threat of using the mythical dirty bomb, that of course lurks all-around, was never explored - even when 'atomic suitcases' were being sold in the open market. It is our hope that next month, when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty comes up for review, the nuclear issues that concern states are dealt with greater seriousness.
Having said this, we cannot underestimate the importance of President Obama's public acknowledgement that Pakistan's nuclear programme is safe and in secure hands. We expect him to move further on this positive note by offering Pakistan the same civil-nuclear technology and material that his predecessor agreed to give to India. Even when Pakistan is being increasingly recognised in Washington as the United States' strategic ally in the war against terrorism and extremism, it is not being treated at par with the much-less committed India.
Add to this Pakistan's crippling energy shortages and we have a genuine case for American help and co-operation in getting nuclear power generation capacity. As Prime Minister Gilani said in Washington, "Pakistan qualifies for participation in civil-nuclear co-operation at the international level. We urge all relevant forums to give Pakistan access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses, in a non-discriminatory manner". We think that should the Obama administration find it unfeasible to meet Pakistan's demand in this regard, its consequences would tend to undermine the spirit of the ongoing bilateral partnership in areas of war and peace.