Pakistani military establishment and civilian government went into high gear on Thursday in defence of what is being termed domestically as massive intelligence failure on two fronts: failure to ferret Osama bin Laden's whereabouts in the garrison city of Abbottabad where he was reportedly resident for over 5 years (a responsibility that analysts maintain rests with ISI) and being unaware of the arrival and departure of Blackhawk helicopters that transported US Navy SEALS from Bagram base in Kabul to bin Laden's compound under operation codenamed Geronimo (the domain of the armed forces).
Two days after the killing of bin Laden Leon Panetta, the nineteenth director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) informed Congress members in a widely reported closed door meeting that CIA's Pakistani counterpart agency was either incompetent or complicit. In his words "neither place is a good place to be." The focus of the Americans no doubt was on bin Laden's location and not on the US raid inside Pakistani territory. It took Pakistani officialdom two more days of, one would assume, intense internal deliberations before deciding to own up to incompetence as the lesser charge.
On Thursday, Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir in the continued absence of a Foreign Minister addressed the media and the major thrust of his briefing was threefold. The US carried out unauthorised unilateral action which he emphasised cannot be taken as a rule: "It would be catastrophic if any other country even imagines it can follow the example of the United States." This was in response to statements from the Indian army chief that such covert operations in Pakistan targeting those engaged in allegedly planning terror attacks in India may be launched. Second, Bashir defended the ISI and pointed out that intelligence lapses around the world maybe uncommon but are not non-existent and cited 9/11/2001 as epitomising CIA's failure. And thirdly, the Foreign Secretary pointed out that the "notion that Pakistan-US relations have nose-dived is not how we understand things. Pakistan considers its relations with the United States as being of high importance and significance."
On Thursday, the Corps Commanders also met with a one-point agenda: damage control in the aftermath of Operation Geronimo. Their focus was twofold: while accepting shortcomings in developing intelligence on Osama's presence a few hundred metres from the prestigious Kakul Academy the meeting concluded that ISI's achievements against al-Qaeda are nonetheless unparallel with around 100 of the terrorist entity's leaders/operators killed or arrested by the ISI. However, the Corps Commanders were compelled to promise an investigation into the reasons behind the intelligence failure but, at the same time, called for a reduction in the number of US operatives in this country, indirectly blaming the political government for issuing an unprecedented number of visas. And second the US was warned that any future action of such a clandestine nature would merit a "review". The review did not include drone strikes as the US launched a drone strike on Friday in North Waziristan, killing 17 people. The possibility of hostile action against Pakistan's strategic assets was addressed as follows: 'unlike an undefended civilian compound our strategic assets are well-defended and an elaborate defensive mechanism is in place.'
While there is much criticism and little support for the Pakistani position in the local and international media yet there has been few analyses of what the death of Osama bin Laden may mean for the US's Afghan policy and on Pakistan. There is general agreement that bin Laden had become an iconic figure in his later years rather than a military commander with troops on the ground able to inflict massive damage on his enemies notably the United States yet his death remained an operational priority for the Americans post-9/11. During his election campaign, Obama had consistently maintained that Afghanistan was the central front of the war on terror and that the situation in South Asia (Afghanistan and Pakistan) was deteriorating because the US was unable to divert adequate resources, manpower and financial injections, from the war in Iraq. He also constantly referred to the need to 'finish the fight against al-Qaeda and Taliban' and stated that "al-Qaeda and the radical Islamic Taliban movement cannot be allowed to establish new havens for planning terrorist attacks... that could affect Paris or New York... So we don't have a choice; we've got to finish the job."
The critical question is does the Obama White House think the job is finished after the death of Osama bin Laden? Two major developments with respect to US declared policy pre-Osama bin Laden's death need to be highlighted. First and foremost, the US President had committed to robust drawdown starting in July this year with complete pullout envisaged for 2014. And, its corollary, a much greater emphasis was to be placed on political rapprochement as opposed to military engagement with the nomination of Ryan Crocker, a diplomatic heavyweight, as the next US Ambassador to Afghanistan. In a speech in February 2011 before the Asia Society in New York, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed this strategy and stated that the US is ramping up a "diplomatic surge" that follows increases in military and civilian deployments. And second, the US began to hold talks with select Taliban leadership who had begun to soften their image as fundamentalists. Clinton in the same venue stated that "now, I know that reconciling with an adversary that can be as brutal as the Taliban sounds distasteful, even unimaginable. And diplomacy would be easy if we only had to talk to our friends...but that is not how one makes peace. President Reagan understood that when he sat down with the Soviets."
For the past three decades, US engagement in Pakistan - both in terms of financial injections as well as support for our military - was premised on events in Afghanistan. Thus as the US begins disengaging in Afghanistan coupled with the death of US enemy number 1 Pakistan's relevance would automatically decline. True that most US officials are stating and some are restating that Pakistan remains relevant as the threat of fundamentalist Islam willing and able to attack western targets remains yet such statements are hardly likely to be relevant in the long-term. And with India sitting on the sidelines leaving no opportunity to hammer any lapse on our part, advertent or inadvertent, to the world polity the chance of our sustaining our relevance may be further compromised with time. Much has already been written on the US pro-India policy as reflected by US President Obama's visit to India where he wooed the Indians into purchasing US products in an effort to jumpstart the US beleaguered economy while Pakistan as the front line state on the war against terror has yet to receive a visit.
So what are the options available to Pakistan? On the military front it is likely that the armed forces maybe compelled to begin strikes in North Waziristan, a longstanding US demand. And on the economic side, it is obvious that as disbursements under the Kerry-Lugar bill remain critical to Dr Hafeez Sheikh's strategy to turn the economy around and contain the deficit the US would continue to enjoy considerable leverage with respect to our military strategy. This in all probability accounted for Salman Bashir's statement noted above that Pakistan considers its relations with the United States as being of high importance and significance. In other words, it is damned if we do (in terms of launching operations in North Waziristan that would widen the conflict within Pakistan) and damned if we don't.
In this context, there is an urgent need for the military and civilian government together with major political parties to come up with a four-pronged strategy that must include: (i) massively slashing domestic expenditure, (ii) ending income tax exemptions on the rich and influential, (iii) taking decisions on the war on terror at both the political and military levels, and (iv) renegotiating military and economic deals with our major partners with a view to papering over any differences to ensure a win-win situation for all. This would require some hard bargaining skills and a wily Foreign Minister able and willing to use all ammunition at his disposal provided by a joint civil-military task force.