Not that Pakistanis are standing at their doors holding garlands to welcome US President Obama. He was to come during the year; but if the visit does not materialise there would not be much of public disappointment in this country. No problem that he did not come to Pakistan when he visited India last year. And that he was to visit Pakistan during the year, in reciprocity to President Zardari's scheduled visit, a normal courtesy in inter-state relations. But the explanation being offered by the US officials for the cancellation of President Obama's promised visit to Pakistan is indeed troubling to many here.
His remark to the CBS that some kind of a 'support network' was available to Osama bin Laden in Pakistan - later supplemented by his National Security Advisor Thomas E. Donilon that President Obama had no plan to visit Pakistan "at this point of time" - does amply suggest that highhandedness is going to take place of the henceforth claimed equality in the Pak-US anti-terror partnership.
May be such a hard position is of some electoral advantage to President Obama. But it doesn't sit well with the Pakistani people, who are already castigating their government and its agencies for being too obliging to the United States to the extent of being obsequious. It seems that the American leadership is bent upon taking the much-maligned "do-more" pressure to new highs. That can and will backfire given that in Pakistan not many are ready to put up with such hubris and arrogance as comes out from recent statements in Washington. In United States, too, there is a strong opposite position. The cancellation of President Obama's visit as a pressure tactic would work at cross-purposes with a popular point of view in the United States as quite a few important quarters find stepped-up and more intense engagement with Pakistani authorities as the only pragmatic way to move forward in the post-Osama scenario.
That the Obama administration should be taking such an uncompromising line, even when it acknowledges that its officials have not seen any evidence that at any senior level the Pakistani agencies knew of Osama's presence, it is all the more disappointing. If the Americans are not clear yet on issues as Osama's presence in Abbottabad and his so-called 'support network' the Pakistani authorities too are busy connecting the dots. Of course, under the Security Council resolution, the government of Pakistan is duty-bound to keep track of the al Qaeda leaders and fighters to ensure they don't enjoy the comfort of safe havens. Whether the Pakistani authorities were on it or not in real earnestness and as to why it missed out Osama bin Laden, the question is being looked into in all of its possible dimensions. As said by the Pakistan ambassador to Washington, Hussain Haqqani, "heads will roll once the investigation is completed", both for 'incompetence' and/or 'complicity'. However, while the Americans may be anxious only to go into the issue of 'complicity' the Pakistan government and the people are greatly annoyed over the brazen infringement of their national sovereignty. They ask how come the American helicopters could fly deep into the Pakistan territory, carrying out a raid in the vicinity of a prominent military installation and go back unchallenged. There is an accusation of monumental failure on the part of the armed forces to defend the country and the government is being criticised for its inability to keep the people informed of the development leading to the killing of Osama bin Laden.
This is a crisis situation but as they say, it is also an opportunity - to reset the goals of engagement with the United States in our fight against international terrorism. If the American side is piqued at the mystery of Osama's prolonged presence in Pakistan, the Pakistanis are extremely disturbed over the blatant violation of their national sovereignty by an alliance partner. However, the reality of the situation seems to be that a parting of ways is an option for neither, the United States nor Pakistan. What tends to separate them in the wake of unwarranted incursion leading to Osama's killing is much less important than what keeps them together - in terms of economic, political and strategic relations. But the two sides have to revisit the quality and extent of bilateral relationship in order to harmonise their objectives with the obtaining ground realities, particularly now as it tends to evolve in the wake of developments in Afghanistan. For this, it is imperative that the US leadership acknowledges Pakistan's strategic interests in this region, without worrying much whether such a move is countenanced by Islamabad's traditional adversaries. And, as to how Pakistan deals with the threat of domestic terrorism this should also be left to Islamabad. To treat Pakistan as a fall guy in the wake of Osama's undetected hiding in this country would be a dangerous proposition. The various attempts being made in that direction should be discouraged and subverted in order to protect and preserve the mutually beneficial anti-terrorism partnership between Islamabad and Washington.