Differences between Pakistan and the US over Afghanistan settlement are now out in the open. Pakistan is not pleased with the US bypassing it to hold direct negotiations with the Taliban. Prime Minister Gilani issued a statement on the eve of Tuesday's trilateral meeting in Kabul, asserting that "efforts should be to create conducive environment for negotiations leading to a situation acceptable to Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US."
Pakistan, being a direct affectee of the US' two wars in that unfortunate country, has its own concerns about how things shape up in post-conflict Afghanistan. It has worries also about Washington's oft-stated intention of giving this country's traditional rival, India, a prominent role in Afghanistan.
Some have argued that as an independent and sovereign nation Afghanistan has every right to make friends with whichever country it likes, including India. A valid point, indeed. The argument though ignores the important detail that at present Afghanistan is neither independent nor sovereign; the government presiding over it has been installed by occupation forces.
A post-war government which derives legitimacy from the Afghan people would have an unquestionable right to decide who to befriend and who to ignore. In any case, there is nothing new or wrong about trying to outmaneuver a major rival. But our security establishment must disabuse itself of its strange obsession to seek 'strategic depth' in another country.
The other big issue of contention is the American insistence, as iterated by Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Marc Grossman, at a news conference in Kabul earlier this week, that Pakistan now has "important choices to make" and prove that it wants an end to Afghan conflict by acting against militant sanctuaries on its soil. To put it plainly, Pakistan is being given the choice to be sidelined or fight Afghan Taliban, particularly the powerful Haqqani network holed up in North Waziristan so as to improve the US' bargaining position in the ongoing negotiations. Sidelining Pakistan won't be possible.
Recent reports show that Americans have held discussions, facilitated by Germany and Qatar, with a senior deputy of Mullah Omar, bin Laden's original host and protector. By the same token, they should have no problem dealing with the Haqqani network. Our government has told the US it can have the Haqqanis make a clean break with al Qaeda and participate in the ongoing peace negotiations. There is little justification for the US, therefore, to insist that we go after them.
Our security forces, however, certainly need to sort out the violent extremists using the two Waziristans to launch attacks in different parts of this country. Towards that end, Islamabad must also do all that is necessary to prevent the flow of funds to these groups from different Middle Eastern countries that, as per WikiLeaks reports, include Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. But the case of Afghan Taliban is different. As long as they shun al Qaeda, which is even more dangerous for this society than the US, we need not worry about them.
Washington's stated objective of the war was, is, elimination of al Qaeda. With the killing of Osama bin laden it has achieved a vital victory on that score. Even before bin Laden's dramatic elimination, American officials were claiming that the Nato campaign in Afghanistan and drone strikes on militant hideouts in Pakistan's tribal areas had greatly weakened the terrorist organisation, and that only a handful al Qaeda activists remain in Afghanistan/Pakistan.
That seems to have been an objective assessment. Hence, a prominent American expert on terrorism, Peter Bergen, termed the Abbottabad operation as "end of the war on terror", noting also that bin Laden's death undercuts al Qaeda as an organisation. According to him, it is time to move on.
In a major speech he delivered a few days ago, President Obama declared the beginning of the end of the war, ordering all 33000 'reinforcement' troops home by next summer he had sent in under the more palatable name of 'surge'. He also said Washington would no longer try to build a "perfect" Afghanistan.
As a matter of fact, Washington can ill afford to do that because the American public is growing wearier and wearier of the war which has gone on for ten years, making it the longest American war. Equally, if not more, important is the economic cost of $100 billion a year, which in the words of Senator John Kerry has become "unsustainable". It really is time to move on. But Washington has other designs.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week that American officials are involved in "very preliminary" contacts with Taliban, but that Washington would not deal with extremists who are unwilling to break their ties with al Qaeda and to support the Afghan constitution, including its provisions for respecting the rights of women and minorities. As regards the Afghan constitution, it has been drafted by occupation forces and their local collaborators, and hence its acceptance is not obligatory though that may serve as a good foundation for the achievement of political stability.
There, of course, can be no civilised argument against protection of women and minority rights. But as far as the US is concerned, these are not the real issues. Considering that it happily tolerates violations of such fundamental rights in certain Middle Eastern monarchies and sheikdoms, the constitution or the rights issues have little to do with its Afghan exit strategy.
It is all about the New Great Game. The US is seeking permanent military bases in post-war Afghanistan so as to control the region's energy resources and trade routes, and also maintain military presence so close to the rising superpower - China. The hope is that the Karzai government and other groups aligned with it, like those comprising the erstwhile Northern Alliance, would help push the negotiations in that direction. And to bring hard-liners like the Haqqani network in line, Pakistan is being pressured to launch military operation so that they are sufficiently weakened to accept the US demand for military bases.
It is hard to imagine though that the Taliban - Mullah Omer's men, the Haqqanis or Gulbadin Hekmatyar's Mujahideen - who have been fiercely fighting the US and its Nato allies for ten long years, would now let it maintain long term military presence - that despite the fact that they remain unvanquished.
There are several reasons why Pakistan should resist the US' demand. First of all, we have nothing to gain and a lot to lose from making enemies of Afghan Pashtuns with whom we share borders and other important interests. Second, the consequences of fighting them will be disastrous. The so-called TTP will be more than eager to lend them a helping hand, and mount attacks on all sorts of targets in our cities.
Third, American bases and the greater role Washington seeks for its strategic partner, India, in Afghanistan will be a constant thorn in this country's side in terms of its security, strategic, and economic interests. Fourth, others attracted to the Great Game, especially China, would be more than uneasy about the US bases in Afghanistan.
As it is, the endgame has reached a point where it is kind of crossroads for Pak-US relationship as well. We should expect to face more intimidation tactics like Hillary Clinton's recent threat of aid cut off if Pakistan did not behave as told, and the outgoing Defence Secretary Robert Gates' empty warning that success is possible in the Afghan war even if Pakistan fails to fully cooperate in countering the militants along its borders.
saida_fazal@yahoo.com