Pakistan Army on Monday rejected the investigation report by US Central Command (Centcom) on the Salala incident, involving aerial strikes by US aircraft and helicopters resulting in the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers and injuries to 13 others.
In a statement issued here, ISPR said, "Pakistan does not agree with several portions and findings of the Investigation Report as these are factually not correct. The fundamental cause of the incident of 26th November 2011 was the failure of US/Isaf to share its near-border operation with Pakistan at any level."
Pakistan expresses its regret over the mandate and terms of reference given to the Investigating Team, which was not mandated to determine or affix responsibility for the incident. The detailed Pakistani Perspective on the US Investigation Report approved by Pakistan's Defence Committee of the Cabinet disagrees on a number of US findings.
Pakistan has noted US/Isaf acceptance of its failures were deep, varied and systemic. There have been several similar, though not as grave, US/Isaf failings in the past. Despite promises of thorough investigations, US/Isaf failed in holding anyone accountable for each of these incidents. The fundamental cause of the Salala incident was the failure of US/Isaf to share its near-border operation, with Pakistan at any level. It is highly regrettable that despite this major failing, the Investigation Report has tried to pin partial responsibility on Pakistan.
Positive identification of Pakistani posts could very conveniently have been done by a simple Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft sweep, which the US Investigation Report itself has also recommended. The US/Isaf violated all mutually agreed procedures with Pakistan for near-border operations put in place to avert such uncalled for actions. It is increasingly obvious to Pakistan Military that the entire co-ordination mechanism has been reduced to an exercise in futility, is more for the purposes of optics and that it has repeatedly been undermined.
There were instructions given to US personnel, as mentioned in the US/Isaf Investigation Report, wherein the information to Pakistan Military was to be deliberately withheld. Had the disclosure been honest and as per the agreed procedures, the attacks could have been stopped at the earliest and precious lives could be saved.
The report questions that the very purpose of sharing information about fire originating from Pakistan was for Pakistan to stop it. Without giving exact map references, how could this have been achieved? According to well-established mutually agreed procedures, in case of fire originating from across the border, the responsibility to stop it rests on the side from where the fire is originating. In the present instance, no such intimation was received from the US/Isaf.
Such an intimation would have demonstrated the bona fides of the US/Isaf stance. The only intimation that was conveyed to the Pakistan Liaison Officer at Nawa Border Co-ordination Centre was after both the posts had been struck by fire and even this late intimation was incorrect by as much as 14 kilometres.
The US Investigation Report states, "It was later discovered that a misconfigured electronic CPOF (Command Post of the Future) map overlay was used by the NBCC (Nawa Border Co-ordination Centre), this caused the NBCC to refer the NBCC's PAKMIL LNO (Pakistan Military Liaison Officer) to a "general location" that was 14km to the north of the actual engagement area." In an effort to provide justification for US/Isaf actions, the Investigation Report has gone to extreme lengths to construct the whole incident as an act of "self-defence" and the force used by US/ Isaf/Nato as legal and proportionate.
At no stage did the Pakistani Posts fire on, or in the direction of the Helicopter Landing Zone or the route from Helicopter Landing Zone to Maya Village. The report accepts that there were no US/Isaf casualties, yet it still argues the self-defence Rules of Engagement by stating that the "fire on GFs (Ground Forces) was effective." In fact, it were the Pakistani Posts which were defending against an unprovoked attack.
Pakistan, therefore, rejects the findings of the US Investigation Report that: "the catalyst for this tragedy ultimately was the initial and continuing engagement by PAKMIL (Pakistan Military) forces on Coalition Forces - who in turn responded accordingly and appropriately."
The report elaborates that the incident was deliberate at some level because there have been incidents in the past where as small an activity, as addition of new weapons on existing Pakistani posts by Pakistan Military, were immediately noticed by US/Isaf and their purpose discussed with Pakistan. The US aircraft/helicopters continued to target Pakistani Military personnel deliberately for two hours, the ISPR said.
"Even if we assume that these posts were not known to US/Isaf, within minutes of initiation of unprovoked attack by US, US/Isaf had been informed at multiple levels by the Pakistani side, but they continued firing with impunity," it added. All Pakistani soldiers were in uniform and could not be mistaken for anyone else. The failure in timely sharing of Concept of Operations even with concerned US co-ordination staff at Nawa Border Co-ordination Centre and ISAF Co-ordination Element Pakistan raises serious doubts about the incident being "accidental".
It is highly improbable that such a large number of mistakes(as acknowledged in the US Investigation Report) could have been coincidental. Unfortunately the impartiality and transparency of the investigation was adversely affected when senior US officials repeatedly stated that the incident was "not intentional", without waiting for completion of the investigation.
Due to complicated chain of command, complex command and control structure and unimaginative/intricate Rules of Engagement the responsibility for failing to stop the attack rests squarely on US/Isaf. Pakistan Army on its part had, on numerous occasions and at all levels, highlighted the potential problems associated with not having all the forces in the Afghan theatre under a unified command.
Pakistan Military is dismayed to learn that despite being ten years into the war, one reason to which the incident of November 26, 2011 has been attributed is, "imprecise terminology between the RC-E JOC (Regional Command - East Joint Operations Centre) and SOTF-E JOC (Special Operations Task Force - East Joint Operations Centre)."
US/Isaf/Nato in knowingly targeting Pakistani Posts well inside Pakistan were in clear violation of the ISAF mandate which is limited to Afghanistan alone. The recommendation of the US / ISAF Investigating Report stating, "train and practice procedures for cross-border and near-border operations including time-sensitive procedures" is maleficent. Investigating an incident which involves breach of Pakistan's territorial integrity and sovereignty and putting in a recommendation of how to do it better next time is potentially troublesome for any future co-operation and border co-ordination.
The ISPR demands full and complete classified version of the US Investigation Report be made available to Pak Military. "Provision of Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance picture of the complete incident along with all aerial platform videos and record of radio transmissions and communication between the crew(s) of the aerial platforms involved in the incident should also be provided," the report maintains.
The US/Isaf Investigation Report into November 26, 2011 incident, apart from being factually incorrect, also brings to fore the larger issue of lack of trust of US/Isaf towards the Pakistani Military. Unfortunately, this was not the first incident of this kind as US/Isaf/Nato have been involved in at least four similar incidents in the past.