For all the apparent angst being displayed by Pakistan’s ruling Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) regarding developments in Afghanistan, one cannot but reflect on the ironies that history has thrown up vis-à-vis that long running conflict. The start of the US/NATO forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan on May 1, 2021 has seemingly triggered what appears to be an offensive by the Taliban to surround the cities from the countryside in preparation for a big push once the foreign forces leave. Why has this surprised anyone, especially Islamabad? The writing was always on the wall, the Doha agreement for US withdrawal notwithstanding. Since that agreement confined itself to a bilateral understanding that the US would withdraw, it effectively sounded the death knell, sooner or later, for the Afghan government of President Ashraf Ghani.
The Taliban are concentrating for the moment on the north of the country, far away from their main base in the Pashtun east and southeast. They have had forces in that area for some time. One proof of that is the fact that the northern town of Kunduz, which the Taliban took twice before in the past only to be beaten back, has fallen to them along with the Shir Khan Bandar border crossing with Tajikistan. The casualties since fighting broke out about a week ago include 29 civilians killed, 225 wounded. The civilian population is fleeing. Some 5,000 families have already fled, with the Afghan government hard pressed to provide relief to them. An airstrike on Taliban minelayers in Kunduz province killed six insurgents. But this incident reminds one of the dwindling ability of the Afghan air force in the absence of US air and maintenance support.
In Kunduz’s neighbouring Takhar province, heavy fighting is reported from the Rustaq district. Contradictory claims of victory by both sides need to be discounted as the fighting has yet to abate. The Taliban captured Andkhoy district of Faryab province on June 24, 2021, only to abandon it the next day after a heavy government counter-attack that yielded 25 militants killed. While retreating, the Taliban set 100 shops and 25 houses ablaze. This may well set the template for towns, districts or provinces that change hands because of the ebb and flow of the war. In parallel with Kunduz’s border crossing with Tajikistan, Faryab province connects with Turkmenistan through Andkhoy. It seems clear then that the northern Taliban offensive aims to cut off the northern provinces’ access to neighbouring Central Asian countries while encircling the towns and cities from the countryside in classic guerrilla fashion.
But this northern salient does not mean the Taliban are not active elsewhere in the country. Of Afghanistan’s 400 districts, the Taliban claim control of 90-142, with 170 more contested. Where they have established control, Taliban shadow local governments have been installed. Major cities such as Kandahar or the capital Kabul are in the Taliban sights at some point, particularly after they see the back of the remaining foreign troops. The suggestion from Washington recently that about 650 US soldiers may stay behind to protect diplomatic missions has received a firm rebuff from the Taliban, who see any such move as violative of the Doha agreement, justifying their reaction against any move to retain any foreign troops for any reason.
The course of the Taliban offensive so far indicates the real and present danger that the Afghan security forces, especially in remote areas, will crumble before a determined enemy. Already, reports are pouring in of Afghan government forces deserting or surrendering. This lends little confidence about their morale or confidence, let alone their ability, despite millions of dollars spent on their armaments, equipment and training, to hold off the Taliban. The respective strengths of the contending sides should not befool us. Despite the fact that on paper the Afghan government forces number about 300,000 and their opponents cannot boast of more than 10,000 fighters in the field, it is morale that is critical on the battlefield, especially when the Taliban guerrillas are nibbling away at the government’s hold wherever it appears weakest.
President Ashraf Ghani and Peace Council head Abdullah Abdullah met US President Joe Biden in Washington the other day. Apart from a pledge to continue economic and military support to the Afghan government, Biden did not say anything that may imply reversing the withdrawal plan or schedule. The prize question remains whether such support would prove sufficient to hold back the Taliban wave, assuming it would be available indefinitely (an unlikely prospect). President Ghani is trying to persuade the anti-Taliban militias that dot the country to forge a united front in support of the government forces. However, judging by past experience, it is not certain that such a united front, even if it did come into existence, would be able to hold together and not degenerate into the kind of civil war anarchy witnessed in the past.
It may be jumping the gun to predict an outright Taliban victory soon after the last post has sounded for the remaining US forces on September 11, 2021, but the emerging trend cannot be easily dismissed. A fresh stage of the civil war may well emerge after that date and even drag on for a bit, but there is healthy and justified scepticism regarding the government forces’ ability, solidity and resilience. In case anyone in Pakistan is pleased with this turn of events, they are advised to think again. This (last?) phase of the Afghan endgame may prove bloody but predictable. Eventually, the Taliban will take over the country. Sporadic resistance may well continue, as happened even during the Taliban’s stint in power from 1996 to 2001, but the Taliban seem poised to grab the levers of power once again. Their spokesmen’s attempts at reassuring Afghans that this time their Islamic Emirate will not be as harsh as the previous one fail to inspire confidence, given their well-established fanatical views about women, different ethnic nationalities that constitute the Afghan mosaic, and ideas about democracy that are anathema to them.
Pakistan, which ironically has seamlessly (at least in its own perception) made the transition from intervening in Afghanistan through armed proxies (since 1973 to the present day) to ‘peacemaker’, is about to be hoist by its own petard, once again underlining the double-edged weapon proxies more often than not turn out to be. Brace for a fresh influx of refugees fleeing the fighting, a possible uptick in terrorism once again at the hands of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) resting on Afghan soil since it was ousted from our tribal areas, especially if Islamabad carries through its stated intent to seal the border if the Taliban take over. Such sealing of the most important border for landlocked Afghanistan cannot but be taken as a hostile act by whoever is in charge in Kabul, including the Taliban. The border, despite fencing, is still porous given the terrain, offering temptation to the Taliban to use the TTP card against Pakistan if it does not play ball.
Welcome to a sorry tale of kicking Afghanistan around like a football for almost 55 years, whose wages of all the original sin are about to land in our laps.
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Copyright Business Recorder, 2021