Joshua White is a Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the US Institute of Peace. He recently completed his doctorate in international relations from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington. His research focuses on political stability, Islamic politics, and security in South Asia.
He has spent extensive time in Pakistan, including nearly a year living in Peshawar in 2005-06 as a fellow with the Institute for Global Engagement, a think tank at which he was previously the director of research. Since 2005, he has visited South Asia several times a year, and has held visiting research appointments at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and the International Islamic University in Islamabad (IIUI).
He has presented his findings in numerous academic and policy fora; has testified before the US Congress; has been interviewed on Al Jazeera, BBC, Voice of America, and Geo News; has participated in several high-level US-Pakistan Track II strategic dialogues; and has served on US-sponsored election observer delegations to both Pakistan and Bangladesh.
BR Research: How much influence do you consider, the religious political parties exercise in the national politics of Pakistan?
Joshua White: I have conducted detailed interviews with leaders of most of Pakistan's prominent religious political parties including Jamaat-i-Islami, JUI-F and JUI-S, with a particular interest in their democratic role. I have been particularly interested in how these parties balance their interests in democracy with their ideological interests.
I have researched how these parties identify their political priorities, how they make decisions; to what extent their decisions are based on Shariah and how decisions are reached within the party hierarchy. Unsurprisingly, I have found that many of their decisions are grounded in political realities and the vulnerabilities that they content with in relation to the state, other political parties and their own supporters.
Another noteworthy characteristic of such parties is that though they have had a relatively small electoral footprint in Pakistan since the country's independence, they have a very loud voice given their street power. In the development of politics, law and social custom their influence has been vast. For example, Jamaat-i-Islami has not been electorally successful, especially in recent years. But the arguments put forth by Maulana Maududi regarding the nature of an Islamic state and the laws it should implement, have essentially carried the day in this country.
So they operate in this paradox of being electorally weak, but having their message incorporated into the political manifestos of each and every political movement of the country. Even the Pakistan People's Party, Awami National Party and other seemingly secular political parties borrow from his language.
BRR: What do you consider to be the basis of popularity of religious political parties in this country?
JW: The Jamaat-i-Islami and the Ulema were able to communicate a clear vision. In my view, this vision is not completely consistent, but it must be admitted that they have been able to bring a level of clarity that in my view, the secular elements remained unable to achieve. So in part, their popularity is a function of the simplicity of their message.
Secondly, a lot of historians have documented that the Pakistani elite; civil and military, have also found advantage in promoting a certain vision of religion and the state. So the ideology of Pakistan as an Islamic state did not emerge as mere coincidence; rather the idea gained traction among the elite and the masses alike.
Quaid-e-Azam himself was not an Islamist. He had a pluralistic vision of Pakistani polity. Consequently, I expect that Pakistanis will continue to debate over the ideology of Jinnah and its consistency with the ideology of an Islamic state which appears to have emerged later. The liberal voices in the country reverberate with references to Jinnah's speeches and ideals while the religious parties make only sparing references to him. However, it is clear that Jinnah shall remain the touchstone in Pakistan's debate over the ideology of the country.
As far as the popularity is concerned, it has to be acknowledged that the ideology of Pakistan as an Islamic state is not something that has emerged only in the 1970s under the Zia regime. Rather it traces its roots back to the independence of this nation and has held sway with the people since that time. It may have come of age in the latter period that has just been mentioned, but it certainly didn't start then.
BRR: Given that the JI is very democratically organised, do you foresee it developing strength at the ballot box in the foreseeable future?
JW: The Jamaat-i-Islami is, undeniably among the most organised, sophisticated and coherent political parties in Pakistan. They have developed a cadre system that privileges ideological purity and ideological accountability. Ironically, it is this very system that makes it difficult for them to succeed at the ballot box. Ideological cadre parties face difficulties all over the world, especially in places where politics is dominated by patronage and political dynasties as is the case in this country. There may come a time when they have to decide whether to be an electoral party at all, but for the time being, there are still trying.
BRR: In your opinion, what are the chances that an Islamic revival led by the religious political parties may emerge to challenge the status quo in Pakistani politics?
JW: It seems highly unlikely to me that the religious political parties will succeed electorally in the foreseeable future. However their narrative has permeated the rhetoric of the other political parties that do hold sway in the general elections. Anyone that believes that Pakistan will be taken over by extremists or hard-liners does not know Pakistan. But it is also important to see the influence of these parties in creating an environment where even the most liberal parties, speak in their rhetoric.
BRR: As the United States and its Nato allies prepare for their exit from Afghanistan, a power vacuum appears to be emerging in that country. How do you expect the state of Afghanistan to fare in the immediate aftermath of this exit?
JW: Predicting the future of Afghanistan over the next five or 10 years is very difficult at this point, but we can hypothesise some possible scenarios that may emerge going forward. The first possibility that we may consider is a continuation of the status quo albeit with a weaker central government but with Karzai or his successors remaining in control while the Taliban make only limited gains in terms of the territory that they control.
Another possible scenario could entail informal devolution of power where the Centre weakens while regional power brokers emerge, without the assent of Kabul. In that case, funding from Kabul would diminish while other power structures would emerge.
A third possibility is that the same devolution of power takes place but with a form of political sanction; either through a deal with the Taliban or more broadly a deal between Pashtuns and other ethnic blocs. Under that scenario, there could be legal or constitutional revisions that recognise a decentralised system of government as being more practicable for Afghanistan.
Finally, the fourth possibility is that civil war may break out in Afghanistan, either in the form of localised conflicts or a bigger fight across the different regions of this country. In my opinion, that is not a strong likelihood in 2014. The US forces will, in all likelihood, maintain a significant presence in Afghanistan beyond the announced date for the withdrawal of troops from that country.
Political scientists believe that the devolution of power reduces the likelihood of armed conflict as it creates political space and identity for different groups. It is premature to assume that a civil war is in the wings after 2014. I believe that it is not too late for a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan; in fact that is what must be concentrated on. Be it the United States, Iran, Uzbekistan, India or Pakistan, no one would benefit from the outbreak of a fresh conflict in Afghanistan.
The regional stakeholders and Nato may have disagreements on the nature of the political settlement that should be ideal for Afghanistan, but they must appreciate that peace in that country is vital for the interests of the whole region.
Anyone trying to reach a political dispensation that runs contrary to the interests of Pakistan is simply wasting time. Pakistan must be relatively at ease with any political dispensation in Afghanistan; that is a basic political reality.