Emphasising that no country has made its uranium enrichment programme as transparent as Iran, former Head of Verification and Security Policy, IAEA, Tariq Rauf on Thursday said that according to the IAEA there was no indication of presence of enriched uranium in the Fordow FEP [fuel enrichment plant] of the country.
He was speaking at public talks on Iran's Nuclear Programme organised by Strategic Studies Institute Islamabad (SSII) here, which was chaired by Pakistan's former Ambassador to the US, Dr Maleeha Lodhi. Speaking on the subject, Rauf separated the political issue from technical ones because the former he said were based more on intent while the IAEA could not decipher intent and based its findings on technical verifications.
He explained the technical aspects of the Iranian nuclear programme which commenced at the time of the Shah and explained why verification issues arose with the IAEA. On the technical side, he did convey that a number of these issues had been resolved. He explained the concept and process of IAEA verifications and State Evaluation Process - premised on the flow of information from a variety of sources as well as IAEA inspections.
He also pointed out the difference between states with IAEA safeguards agreements and those with comprehensive safeguards agreements plus additional protocols. Rauf went on to give details of the declared nuclear facilities in Iran under safeguards where the IAEA continues to verify the non-diversion of declared materials and especially focused on Natanz and Fordow facilities, explaining how according to the IAEA the Nantanz FEP was operating as declared - less than 5 percent U 235 enrichment. At Fordow FEP, also according to the IAEA, there was no indication of presence of enriched uranium.
In conclusion, Rauf did highlight possible military dimensions, or what they could be, highlighting seven areas of concern. He then ended by asking "what next" and felt Iran should engage with the IAEA on substance, provide access to documentation, locations and individuals; provide access to Parchin and other locations; address all aspects of possible military dimensions; work out modalities for protecting sensitive information. He emphasised that no country had made its uranium enrichment programme as transparent as Iran.
After an intensive question and answer session, wherein Dr Shireen Mazari, director general SSII, pointed out the contradictions in the US approach to Iran and North Korea as well as the political bias of the present DG IAEA Amano, Dr Maleeha Lodhi concluded the session by pointing out that both Iran and the US had moved somewhat from their original entrenched positions. She talked about the possible outcomes through a grand political bargain between Iran and the P 5 countries.
However, she reiterated the consensual view that unless there was a dialogue and political rapprochement between the US and Iran, the Iranian nuclear issue could not be resolved. Through a political understanding technical issues could be resolved amicably.