The proponents of various ethnolinguistic vitality models plausibly argue that 'the Punjabis are the most powerful economic group in Pakistan' and that `Punjab is the most populous and prosperous province of the country, notorious for its dominance in army and bureaucracy'.
"I have barely slept three hours a night this week," Caretaker Punjab Chief Minister Najam Sethi tells this writer about the enormity of workload that he faces in his home province ahead of May 11 general election. Security, according to him, is his topmost priority in order to contribute towards efforts aimed at holding fair, free and transparent elections in the largest province of the country. Although, his province has been able to represent a largely safe and secure environment thus far, the incidents of terrorism in other provinces do cast shadows over election race in Punjab in an equal measure. In addition to the complexities and "hardships" caused by Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution for the prospecting candidates, the presence of Musharraf in Pakistan weeks before elections and the nature of the cases that he faces in different courts, particularly the hearing in Supreme Court of identical petitions seeking his trial under Article 6 of the Constitution for allegedly committing high treason, and the overt reluctance of disgruntled Baloch nationalists to take part in elections add to doubts about the first-ever civilian-to-civilian power transition in the history of Pakistan. A growing sense of anticipation among people has therefore somehow dampened election fever. In short, doubts still hover over elections.
Forecasting future should not be anybody's job. This brings to one's mind the words of famous scholar of Middle Eastern studies Prof Bernard Lewis. According to him, "[I] don't think the historian can reasonably be expected to predict the future but there are certain things that the historian can and should do. He can discern trends. He can look at what has been happening and what is happening and see change developing. From this he can formulate, I will not say predictions, but possibilities, alternative possibilities, things that may happen, things that may go this way or that way, in evolving interactions. It is of course much safer to predict the remote rather than the immediate future."*
As far as May 11 general election is concerned, it is indeed a matter of immediate future. Enormously piqued by the rising prospects of his main rival in Punjab and KPK Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif and his younger brother Shahbaz Sharif are showing no complacency or any instance of contended self-satisfaction towards elections. A visit to Model Town neighbourhood where the Sharifs have their residences-cum-offices shows hordes of "electables" and "potential electables" entering and leaving these premises in regular intervals. As soon as they conclude their meetings with the two brothers or other PML-N leaders entrusted with the task of awarding party tickets and leave them to get to their cars, they either show some clear signs of well-being characterised by emotions ranging from contentment to intense joy or being upset or annoyed, especially because of their inability to change or achieve what they had desired.
In the case of Lahore in particular, the real contest appears to be between Nawaz's PML-N and Imran's PTI. One of the main arguments advanced by PTI supporters is that the PPP which, according to them, was able to "perpetuate" itself for full five years at the Center due to an alleged sinister Zardari-Nawaz deal through which the latter secured a largely unchallenged space for his party in the largest province of the country. That "friendly opposition" became a popular euphemism for PML-N's role that it played at the Centre was a reality that found its best expression in the remarks of one of the most popular Lahore-based PML-N leaders and a former MNA. According to him, their strategy not to contribute towards efforts aimed at weakening the democratic process or derailing the system with a view to drastically scuttling the prospects of army's re-entry into politics enabled their detractors to describe them as a "friendly opposition". This allowed Imran Khan to encroach upon the space that they had lost due to their inability to present an oppositional idea or critique of the dominant order or the PPP-led coalition to manifest itself and open up new revolutionary possibilities to take the country out of the woods.
"Yes, massive development work, particularly the 22-km mass transit track, carried out in Lahore by Shahbaz speaks for itself. But what about chronic power outages, joblessness, rising economic and social inequalities. Yes, we know that the Punjab chief minister or the provincial government cannot be held responsible for each and every woe that blights people, but they did little or nothing to help arrest the rot at the federal level; they were in fact Zardari's coalescing partners in the loot and plunder of the country," allege many who, according to them, have been greatly alienated by the PML-N drift towards politics in the last five years.
Though Nawaz and his principal spokespersons appear to be highly dismissive about Imran's chances in the capital of the province, their body language betrays their growing sense of anxiety. Nawaz knows in his heart of hearts that something is wrong, but he just isn't ready to effectively deal with it. He also knows that showing indifference or disregard won't work. It is therefore needless to say that the PML-N leadership is required to reach out to people to reclaim the ground that they have conceded to Imran because of their "key role" in the "politics of reconciliation" conceived, planned and articulated by President Zardari. But the incumbency factor appears to be the main stumbling block towards the resolution of this objective. In short, they are required to do too much with too little in too short a time. The question whether or not Nawaz will be able to neutralise Imran's impact in former's own backyard in particular will find the most plausible answer only on May 11 although his party, PML-N, still appears to be the dominant force in the 13 National Assembly-seat Lahore.
That Nawaz continues to remain the most formidable challenge despite Imran's unprecedented showings since October 2011 is a fact that has found open acknowledgement from many a PTI supporter. These PTI supporters link their success in Lahore where both Nawaz and Imran are candidates from two different constituencies to the ushering in of a "PTI revolution" in Punjab and KPK. If this "revolution" does not take place in the remaining 35 districts of Punjab and KPK's Hazara belt in particular, Imran would find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to win a single seat from Lahore. What Imran needs on May 11 is significantly high turnout (as high as 60 percent). Anything short of that could badly hurt his prospects. He will be required to replicate in Lahore and elsewhere his Mianwali victory of 2002 to confirm the veracity of his success in 2013. Speaking to this writer after his party's lone success in the 2002 general election, Imran had said: "I won my seat only because there was a popular revolution in Mianwali. Even though all the traditional political houses that have fought each other for thirty years combined to defeat me. That was done by the agencies, but the popular will supported me... My opponent who was supported by the establishment had secured 30,000 votes in the previous elections. In the October election, the agencies got him 61,000 votes. I guess they [the agencies] thought that was enough. But the common man returned me with record number of votes."**
Nevertheless, Imran has created a climate of fear for the PML-N strategists. The other major parties, particularly PPP and PML-Q that have formalised seat adjustments between themselves in recent days, have received this highly charged Lahore atmosphere as a gracious blessing. They seem to be deriving a sort of pleasure out of growing Nawaz-Imran tussle. Their strategists believe that even if Imran does not win on all or majority of seats he would definitely end up badly battering and mutilating PML-N. A close fight between these two parties would definitely improve their prospects in the final count of votes, according to them. This would allow them to return successful on quite a few NA and PA seats as victors, albeit with narrow margins (PPP secured one NA seat from Lahore while PML-Q none in the 2008 election).
PML-Q, therefore, looks more confident viz-a-viz Lahore than PPP does. Unlike other parties, including PML-N, it chose Lahore as a venue to unveil its election manifesto. Its leadership including Chaudhry Shujaat Husain, S.M. Zafar, Kamil Ali Agha, Nasir Mengal and Mushahid Husain Syed, tried to drive the point home that no other city was more important to them than Lahore, although they cited the adoption of Pakistan Resolution of 1940 as the reason behind their decision in relation to the importance of Punjab capital. In answer to this writer's question whether they would be able to sell successfully their manifesto or a compendium of promises and pledges despite the fact that they carried an over a decade-old baggage of incumbency, they offered no plausible answer. Their strategy seems to be aimed at grabbing "sufficient" number of seats from various parts of the country to ultimately become part of the next coalition government.
Nowhere in Punjab has the PPP better prospects than in southern Punjab. Lahore Division, Faisalabad Division, Rawalpindi Division, Gujranwala Division, Sahiwal Division and even Seraiki parts of Sargodha Division offer it no such prospects. This area does provide it with a legitimate basis for hope in relation to formation of post-May 11 government. PPP supporters point out that their party emerged as the single largest party in this part of the province by securing 24 out of 50 National Assembly seats. By raising the bogey of a separate Seraiki province the party has consolidated its power base in areas that historically look at Central and Northern Punjab with recrimination and suspicions because of a variety of reasons. The PPP leaders believe that their move has been able to wean a large number of PML-N supporters always although the latter party made a 'smart' move, albeit unsuccessfully, to halt the slide of its fortunes in these mainly feudal-dominated areas by raising the demand for the restoration of Bahawalpur province alongwith the creation of a separate Seraiki province. The PML-N won on nine out of the 50 south Punjab seats in 2008. It appears to be the strongest contender in most parts of rest of Punjab constituencies numbering over 100 NA seats. It also seeks to improve its prospects in southern Punjab. Although, its move has clearly earned it a lot of goodwill in Central and Northern Punjab, the May 11, 2013 results would conclusively prove whether or not this game-plan that his party has employed to forestall the division of Punjab has really worked in the context of southern Punjab. It is also to be seen whether or not the people's participation in the election would be based on one of the key traditional patterns of voting: the Arains of Toba Tek Singh would only vote for the Arains while the Jats of Gujrat would only vote for the Chaudhrys. But one thing could be said with a reasonable degree of certainty: sectarian and ethnic polarisation is writ large all over the socio-political landscape of Punjab.
This was the fourth part of multi-part series "Election Outlook". The next part of this series "Hazards in the Hazara belt" will be carried by the newspaper shortly. The writer is newspaper's News Editor. He previously worked for various publications, including Daily Times, Dawn and Khaleej Times, on different positions. (news.editor@br-mail.com)
*http://m.asharq-e.com/content/ 1364222095209972500/Published%20-%20Features
**http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_15-6-2003_pg3_7