Having nearly succeeded in defanging Iran's nuclear programme, the West is now set about neutralizing Pakistan's nuclear weapon capability. To undermine Pakistan's nuclear programme, a media campaign was launched as soon as the P5+1 clinched the 'framework' understanding with Tehran. The opening shot was fired by The New York Times which proposed 'attention be turned to constraining Pakistan's nuclear and strategic capabilities'. But now the storyline is different, and not the old harangue that Pakistan's nuclear assets were at the risk of falling into the terrorists' hands. Now, as reported by The Sunday Times, the Saudis have taken the 'strategic decision' to acquire 'off-the-shelf' atomic weapons from Pakistan. And its sources are the same, which fed the NYT: 'unnamed American officials'. That the atom bombs are market commodity and you can buy them off-the-shelf is a claim that the report made twice. It's the nuclear technology that is transferable, but not the bombs. As of now Saudi Arabia has neither acquired technological infrastructure nor the skilled expertise to exploit it. Yes, Pakistan is now a recognised nuclear weapon state, but its nuclear assets, both weapons and technology, are not for sale. No wonder then, the Foreign Office spokesman has rubbished The Sunday Times story. 'An entirely baseless and mischievous campaign was being carried out in the international media regarding Pakistan's nuclear programme,' he said at a media briefing on Thursday. Pakistan remains committed to its consistent policy that its nuclear programme is for its own legitimate self-defence and is being maintained as a credible minimum deterrent. That it can be stolen or is available for sale is an impressive that can be effectively countered by the argument that the buyers of this humbug have long gone into oblivion.
One expected The Sunday Times to say something else which is close to reality, and that reality is that President Obama's nuclear deal with Tehran is not acceptable to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and that means to all comprising the Arab coalition now at war with Iran's purported proxies in Yemen, the Houthis. And that has been conveyed to the Obama administration in so many words - earlier when the 'framework' was agreed and now again at the Camp David meeting. According to the Arab coalition leadership, what the framework takes from Tehran with one hand it returns by the other hand. They claim, in essence, it concedes the Iranians the right to make nuclear weapons after one year of the deal which is expected to be signed by June 30. The American offer of latest conventional weapons to Saudi Arabia hardly makes for the sop the White House would like the Kingdom to lap up.
We are not here to project how the ensuing clash of strategic perceptions would play out and how it would inevitably impact economic interests of the West in the Middle East. But we do feel concerned about the campaign now in full flourish in Western media against Pakistan's nuclear programme. And we also notice its coincidence with Pakistan's growing strategic partnership with China which doesn't fit well with most of the powers in the West as well as India the West is now cozying up to. How this deal with Iran will be used against Pakistan's nuclear programme seems to have found a plausible answer in a recent op-ed by one of the country's most astute strategic analysts, retired ambassador Munir Akram, who spells out some basics of the stratagem. According to him, first there would be a media campaign expressing concerns about Pakistan's programme, which we have now, followed by pressure to give assurances and accept constraints. Next, efforts would be exerted to actualize these assurances and constraints into 'binding commitments' made to Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA and the UN Security Council. If violated there would be unilateral and bilateral sanctions. And, through diplomatic channels Pakistan would be advised not to be "obsessed" with India. Pakistan got to take up the emerging challenge in all its seriousness, and fight it at all levels, particularly diplomatic. Its nuclear programme is backbone of its defence and security, and this cannot be bartered away under any pressure or persuasion.