Pervasive maladministration, that now plagues Pakistan, is rooted in governments' quest for absolute power, and the chosen route there for is politicisation of the bureaucracy, not delivering on administrative and moral obligations of the state. As the logical consequence thereof, Pakistan's rating on every global indicator of governance quality is on a slide.
The recent decision of the Lahore High Court invalidating the Punjab government's appointment of Vice Chancellors of four universities in the province, and instructing that these appointments be made by the Higher Education Commission, is another example of how governments politicise the bureaucracy which erodes administrative competency and tarnishes Pakistan's image.
Undeniably, politicising the bureaucracy is a mega (though unpunished) crime, as portrayed by the current profile of Pakistan, which was governed by regimes that, on the one hand lacked competence for fair and futuristic legislation, and on the other used their power to mould governance for self-benefit which remained their prime consideration.
Before the 1988 elections in Britain, the daily Guardian had voiced the opinion that while governments come and go, a committed and forthright bureaucracy alone ensures sustainability of the state. Defying this idiom, daily exposures of corruption in state offices prove that successive regimes in Pakistan politicised, ie, corrupted its bureaucracy.
General Ayub Khan initiated this process by sacking 303 forthright bureaucrats - many of them ICS officers - because they posed a challenge to his political ambitions. Thereafter, Prime Minister Z A Bhutto sacked 1,300 bureaucrats. The message conveyed down the line was that if bureaucrats don't materialise a regime's political agenda, they would be shunted out.
This trend continues unabated. An event last month that went largely unnoticed by the media (focused on the Panama Leaks) was the promulgation of the Companies Ordinance-2016, amending its 1984 version. Oddly, while our parliamentarians keep claiming their 'supremacy' they didn't object to promulgation of this ordinance without scrutiny by the parliament.
What is more amazing is the fact that the PML-N regime, which already confronts a variety of threats to its survival on account of misusing and exceeding its authority, bypassed the parliament (despite having the majority therein) on this vital issue. Only after the promulgation of the ordinance did some parliamentarians raise objections to its controversial clauses.
This ordinance again reflects PML-N's monarchical conduct - criticised very aptly by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Given PML-N's majority in the National Assembly, it seems unlikely that the dissenting parliamentarians will succeed in rationalising the amendments to the 1984 ordinance. But at a press conference SECP Chairman's promise to draft new rules for the State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) builds some hope.
The area wherein changes in the ordinance appear politicised concerns the governance of SOEs. While the ordinance augments the powers and autonomy of the SECP, its authority to exercise its autonomy in the context of SOEs will lie with the "minister in charge" of the sector wherein the SOE operates. Impliedly, SECP could make regulatory compromises on politically motivated demands.
Strong and independent profiles of regulators is one of the pillars whereon rests investor confidence. Regulators appear credible if they are allowed to fulfil their obligations impartially ie without being influenced by the government, and are shielded legally from government interference. The above-referred amendment could damage that vitally important pillar.
This amendment renders SECP subordinate to the government. Keeping in view the criticality of encouraging investment, this ordinance should have been debated, firstly in the stakeholder fora to build a consensus on the fairness of its clauses, and then in full detail in the parliament to finally become a law that appears fair, unbiased and implementable credibly.
The Companies Ordinance, 1984 didn't give the government or the Prime Minister the authority to remove the chief executive officer (CEO) or managing director (MD) of an SOE, and thus ensured management of the affairs of the SoEs by their CEOs or MDs in the best interests of these entities, instead of serving the interests of in-power regimes or other interested elements.
This independence and resistance to state interference - that was backed by judicial verdicts - forced the PML-N regime to revise the ordinance because under the 1984 ordinance, only a resolution passed by not less than three-fourths of the total number of directors of an SOE could remove a CEO before the expiry of his/her term of office.
Under the Companies Ordinance-2016, the terms of appointment of the CEO of an SOE will be decided by the board of the SOE (wherein majority of the directors are nominated by the government) at a general meeting of the shareholders "or by the government". Given this condition, a nominee will hold office as long as he/she serves government interests.
The Companies Ordinance, 2016 ended the protection earlier available to the CEOs; a sub-clause has been added to Section 191 of the Companies Ordinance-1984 according to which the protection provided to the CEO via Sections 186 and 187 shall no longer apply to a CEO nominated by the government. Won't this make the CEO fulfil the government's wishes?
If the Companies Ordinance-2016 becomes a law as per its current draft, for their survival, CEOs of the SOEs will have to fulfil the self-serving desires (often conveyed verbally) of the concerned ministries. The current state of PIA and PSM foretells what even the better managed SOEs could become if government interference is not forbidden under this ordinance.
The re-configuration of CEOs' powers could politicise them, and may stigmatise their actions as being 'politically' motivated. Taking such a questionable action at a time when the PML-N regime faces a variety of allegations of mis-governance, is simply baffling. It makes you wonder about the real intentions of the advisors of the PML-N regime.
Even if re-configuring the Companies Ordinance along these lines is necessary, shouldn't these changes be justified by factual evidence that mandates them? In the absence of convincing evidence (which obviously isn't there) that justify these changes, will the re-configuration the Companies Ordinance have any credibility at all?
SOEs progressively became loss-making entities not just due to the poor performance of their CEOs; this mess is attributable to the government's prolonged refusal to re-structure and revamp the SOEs - a failure repeatedly highlighted (even by the IMF that has been over-friendly towards the PML-N regime) that keeps escalating the fiscal deficit.
While refusal to re-structure and revamp the SOEs is one side of this tragedy; the more damaging side is cronyism, which could now become legal, courtesy Companies Ordinance, 2016. Besides, hasn't politicisation of the investigative agencies made regime-friendly white elephants, as proved by their self-admitted incapacities for investigating the Panama Leaks?