Discourse in Pakistan’s mainstream media is dominated by Lahore-Karachi urban intelligentsia. One casualty of this bias is a casual indifference to developments west of Indus. Take for example our national obsession with Indian dam building in upper riparian region of Kashmir.
Contrary to popularly held belief, there is general recognition in academia that dams such as Baglihar and Kishanganga are run-of-the-runner hydroelectric projects with only bare minimum storage capacity. Nevertheless, the reduction in waterflow downstream in recent years, primarily caused by erratic precipitation patterns, is often spun as a consequence of relentless Indian dam-building, and motivated by its perennial desire to render Pakistan’s agriculture dependent economy water insecure.
Yet, compared to India, Pakistan’s diplomatic arrangement over waters with its “strategic backyard”, Afghanistan are much more perilous. While the Indus meanders through KP, it is the (relatively) smaller Kabul River, originating from Hindukush range in central Afghanistan that is the sole source of drinking water for almost 3 – 5 million Pashtuns of Peshawar, Nowshera, and Bannu valley.
Consider this: though much maligned, the Indus Water treaty provides a solid mechanism for any water-related dispute resolution between India and Pakistan, surviving the diplomatic test of time for more than half century. In contrast, Pakistan shares no such arrangement with Afghanistan, which, under international law as upper riparian, has the theoretical right to control all of Kabul’s river flow downstream.
This has mattered little until recent past, when the war-torn Afghanistan neither had the willingness nor the financial muscle to pose any threat to river flow into KP. However, one unintended consequence of Taliban-led civil war in the country has been a population influx into the capital, Kabul, which has recently swollen to over 5 million.
Another obvious consequence of war is destruction and lack of rehabilitation of any sound water storage and reservoir infrastructure, making Afghanistan’s primarily agrarian economy ever-dependent on groundwater abstraction.
Except, groundwater levels are strongly correlated with recharge through precipitation. Located in a mountainous landlocked region, most of Afghanistan is arid and receives 350mm of annual rainfall on average. This means that water requirements of postwar Afghan economy are growing by leaps and bounds. Yet, with a population growth rate averaging at 3 percent, Afghanistan has precious little secure water-supply to depend on.
In this context, our Western neighbour has embarked on a storage building spree, with up to 12 hydropower projects announced in recent years. In absence of any water sharing treaty or mechanism, there is a natural risk of disturbance/reduction in waterflow to lower riparian even under perfectly normal diplomatic conditions.
Experts agree that given the near-complete absence of water reservoir infrastructure in the country, Afghanistan’s plans are driven primarily by self-interest, with little motive to harm Pakistan. Moreover, if Pakistan hopes for any meaningful return of Afghan refugees in foreseeable future, it needs to give Afghan economy a chance to support a growing population. Ensuring Afghanistan’s water security will play a critical role in letting its economy find its own two feet.
However, given Pakistan’s fraught diplomatic relationship with Afghanistan, coupled with strategic Indian interest in financing hydropower projects in the country, water supply to KP from Kabul river will be rendered forever at risk. While Pakistan may have also commissioned smaller projects on eastern tributaries of the river, dam building is a race-to-the-bottom under changing climatic patterns and no-sharing mechanism. Surely, dams don’t create their own water supply.
It is telling that the only water-treaty Pakistan has managed to enter with any of its neighbours was signed under the auspices of a multilateral bank. Unlike Indus basin in 60s, irrigation networks in Kabul basin are well-developed and investing itself in a financier-guarantor role in a diplomatically fraught region such as Afg-Pak does not offer sufficient upside given the risk-return profile of the undertaking.
Thus, it is up to the two countries two find an amicable solution. As the lower riparian, Pakistan is in a naturally weaker position, and thus should not wait for Afghanistan to initiate dialog. Pakistan cannot afford the diplomatic embarrassment of going to war with an already broken country over water.
If Kabul river east of Durand goes dry, it might not spell immediate disaster for KP economy. This makes it easier for the Lahore-Karachi dominated mainstream media to ignore the sufferings west of Attock. But if the lessons from decade-long war against terror are any guide, KP population makes the natural choice of internal migration when living conditions within the province become more painful.
Any increase in rates of internal migration from KP to Punjab and Sindh will mean increased population pressure on already scarce supply of water in Indus basin. If the media pulse is any guide, urban Pakistan feels very strongly about securing a sustainable future for Indus basin. But if it is to solve the challenges to water-supply posed by the hegemony on the eastern border, maybe it needs to look westward. The time for a water-sharing mechanism with Afghanistan is now!