The Islamic Military Counter-Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), thought up by the impetuous Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman two years ago, was formally launched the other day at defence minister conference he hosted in Riyadh. The stated objectives of the alliance, though, remain as ambiguous as at its 2015 inaugural.
The declaration issued at the end of the Riyadh meeting talks about the "importance" of the role of military in combating terrorism; "importance" of necessary military capabilities to ensure terrorist organizations are weakened, dismantled and deprived of opportunity to reorganize; and "importance" of the role of IMCTC Counter-Terrorism Centre in coordinating and integrating military efforts through exchange of intelligence information, training courses and joint exercises. The working mechanism is to be controlled by the Crown Prince who would make the top appointments and decide the Centre's rules and regulations and, of course, take care of all budgetary requirements.
It is hard to comprehend the 'importance' of military's role in combating terrorism. For it is not conventional warfare. Militaries are trained to fight a clearly identified enemy on battlefields. Terrorists don't wear uniforms, nor are restricted to a particular area. They have the freedom of selecting their targets and are helped by nameless facilitators and sympathizers among civilian populations. True, in Pakistan the armed forces have been carrying out successful operations against violent extremists, but mainly in tribal areas where the TTP terrorists were known to have their operational bases. Militaries are not prepared to battle terrorists. Precisely for that reason, a political consensus-based National Action Plan has been devised to counter the scourge of terrorism.
There are at least two other vital issues causing concern. First, who is going to man the IMCTC? A vast majority of the 41 countries who sent their representatives to the Riyadh conference are unlikely to contribute troops to it. In fact, the declaration gave them a leeway, saying participation in the coalition will be in accordance with each country's capabilities and resources, as well as their desire to take part in a given military operation. The only countries happily willing to join the coalition activities would be the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, with the probable exception of Qatar (which, for obvious reasons, stayed out of the defence ministers meeting) and General el-Sisi's Egypt. Apparently, this country is under immense pressure to do likewise. The official position is that we will not contribute any ground troops to this military alliance. In case any attempt is made to integrate into it the contingents that already are in the kingdom under a long-standing commitment to "defend the security and sovereignty of Saudi Arabia" that will lead to serious repercussions at home and the external policy front. PPP Senator Farhatullah Babar has already been demanding that the government take Parliament into confidence regarding the terms of reference of the "pan Islamic" coalition. Parliament had stated its intent on the subject in a resolution passed at the time of troops request for the Yemen war, telling the government to stay out of the Gulf region's conflicts.
The second issue is this, who is to determine the target? He who pays the piper calls the tune, of course. And his bête noire is Iran. Mindful of the apprehensions at home that the coalition could drag this country into the Saudi-Iran power struggle, speaking at the defence ministers' meet commander of the IMCTC our very own former Army chief General Raheel Sharif took great pains to emphasize that the sole objective of the military alliance "is to counter terrorism, and it is not against any country or any sect." Which merits the question, why the three Muslim countries - Syria, Iraq and Iran - at the forefront of the war against terrorists like the IS, al Nusra Front - an al Qaeda offshoot-and certain other Salafist groups, were never invited to join the alliance? As a matter of fact, the kingdom has been backing some of the extremist groups, including al Nusra, fighting the Assad government in Syria. It also labels the Lebanese Shia militia, Hezbollah, as a terrorist organization. Aside from financing and training the rebels and other combatants to take on the Syrian government forces, the kingdom has opened other fronts to counter its rival power's influence, albeit unsuccessfully in each case. The tide in Syria has almost turned in the Assad regime's favour. After two years of incessant bombings in Yemen, the Arab world's poorest country, the war against the Iran-backed Houthis remains unwinnable whilst the humanitarian disaster it has created is raising a huge international outcry. The attempt to punish a fellow GCC member, Qatar, for its friendly relations with Iran has failed badly. Buoyed by formal launch of the IMCTC, the kingdom's next target could be the 'Hezbollah terrorists" or some other adversary in the region. What General Sharif is to do in such a situation as the coalition commander is a question not only for him to decide but the country he represents.
Notably the day after the Riyadh event, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi visited Saudi Arabia accompanied by the Army chief and other civil and military high-ups to meet with King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Although as per an official statement they "reviewed the entire spectrum of bilateral relations in addition to the regional and international issues" it is not difficult to figure out that the focal point of their conversations was warming of this country's relations with Iran. In fact according to a press report, the Pakistani leadership was invited to 'explain' the nature of its growing nearness to Tehran. Pakistan surely needs to preserve its special relationship with Saudi Arabia, though not at the cost of its vital interests. The last thing this country needs is another hostile neighbor. Iran is a next-door neighbour with which this country has no issue of contention. Shifting international alliances are pushing the two towards a loose regional security and economic cooperation framework. Both also have a common interest in resolving the Afghan conflict. It remains to be seen if our foreign policy establishment has what it takes to maintain a delicate balance that the situation demands.
saida_fazal@yahoo.com