Narrative varies between individuals including those within a family unit facing common issues however this divergence is all the more marked between nations with or without common geopolitical interests and considerations. After an absence of over a month the most noticeable divergence that a return to Pakistan brought to the forefront is not only its continuation between Pakistan and the United States, a relationship that analyst after analyst has described as transactional, but its practical outcome/actual implementation with the announcement of cessation of US military assistance to Pakistan.
That Donald Trump has changed the narrative of US relations with a host of countries, including those that he particularly favours (an example being the decision to shift the US Embassy to Jerusalem that left some of the country's Arab allies on the wrong foot) is not in dispute. UK Prime Minister Theresa May, the first foreign head of government to visit the US after Trump's inauguration to reaffirm the 'special relationship' between the two countries, was forced to directly condemn Trump's support for the anti-Muslim videos uploaded by the far right UK party Britain First by stating on 1 December 2017 that she is "very clear that re-tweeting from Britain First was the wrong thing to do". And while other heads of government have been caught on camera visibly amused at Trump's antics during his foreign visits yet the general perception both within numerous administrations around the world and their public is one of amusement at best, serious concern at worst.
Concern however is not limited to the change in Trump's geopolitical thrust but has transcended into decisions relating to the economy. German, French, British, Spanish and Italian finance ministers cautioned the US treasury Secretary in a letter that was made public on 11 December 2017 that "it is important that the US government's rights over domestic tax policy be exercised in a way that adheres with international obligations to which it has signed-up." More specifically the five finance ministers referred to the new 20 percent tax on payments from US-based multinationals to their foreign affiliates, which, they argued may "discriminate in a manner that would be at odds with international rules"; and may tax the profits of foreign businesses that do not have a permanent base in the US to boot.
The decision to withdraw payments under the coalition support fund (CSF) or any other military assistance and to place Pakistan on the watch list of 10 countries where there are severe violations of religious freedom reflect the new ground realities of the almost one-year-old Trump administration that not only Pakistan but other countries are having to grapple with. What is however significant is the outpouring of Pakistan's anger - official, as well as on the traditional and social media - against these two decisions which, by and large, reflect Pakistan's old narrative that had persistently failed to convince even the what is now believed to be the more restrained Obama administration: Pakistan is and has always been a front-line state in the fight against terror and has paid a very heavy price both in terms of loss of human life and assets with the Foreign Office estimating a loss of as high as 120 billion dollars; and that attack against individuals of other religions reflect a misuse of our laws while the most recent terror attack on 18 December in Quetta targeting the Christian community killing 9 and injuring 56 was a terror attack as opposed to a violation of religious freedom.
Major-General Ghafoor, DG ISPR, on 28 December 2017 also reaffirmed the same narrative in his press talk: "No organised infrastructure of any banned organisation is present in Pakistan. We have fought an imposed and imported war twice in Pakistan and now we cannot do any more for anyone. Whatever we are doing, and we will do, is solely for the people of Pakistan. The aid we received (from the US) was reimbursement for the support we gave to the coalition for its fight against al Qaeda. Had we not supported the US and Afghanistan, they would never have been able to defeat al Qaeda. There are no facilitators [of terrorist groups] in Pakistan and we have gone a long way towards supporting peace in the region."
There are therefore four major flawed assumptions that are possibly being made by our government/establishment and mainstream/social media. First that the Trump administration would desist from taking even more extreme measures to ensure that it remains engaged with Pakistan given our relevance in the region. This hardly seems likely given that Trump's policies/actions are ruffling feathers of even traditional/long term US allies. The exception is Israel and India - countries whose governments openly endorse his anti-Muslim rhetoric. Second, that the money that the US was remitting to Pakistan under CSF was our due, a view premised on the fact that CSF is paid from the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) to be used to reimburse coalition partners for logistical and military support to US military operations. If Pakistan is no longer regarded as a coalition partner for failing to "do more" then we become ineligible for payments under CSF. In this context it is also relevant to note that Pakistan's bills under CSF were increasingly being scrutinized for their misuse which came to US attention after former President Musharraf publicly stated that money meant for use on our border with Afghanistan was used on our border with India.
Thirdly, US non-military assistance to Pakistan is not in the form of loans but grants - be it for supporting the energy sector or education/health sectors. Linked to this is the fact that US support for Pakistan from its seat on the board of directors of multilateral institutions played a critical role in the past in the release of funds for project and programme support that was required given Pakistan's routine circumventing of implementing the stipulated reform conditions. This was also applicable to the completion of the last International Monetary Fund loan (2013-16) given the level of appallingly poor governance in our tax and energy sectors today. And finally that Pakistan holds some trump cards (as the cheapest exit route of US forces and equipment from Afghanistan, withdrawal of tacit support for CIA led drone strikes within Pakistan, and in dealing with Afghan terrorists); in this context it is relevant to note that Trump has been and continues to be engaged in an escalating personal spat with the North Korean leader reflecting a level of engagement with even rogue regimes that Western heads of government have typically desisted from till date.
To conclude, Pakistan's response has been long on bluster and short on detailing an alternative plan with the capacity to deal with the distinct possibility of US ending the transactional relationship with Pakistan which requires an economic road map that would change the extremely disturbing ongoing economic strategy: increasing indebtedness (domestic and foreign) at whatever cost (rate of interest).