Zalmay's admonition

The American Special Envoy to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad's speech to a think tank in Washington the other day has created a mini-furor.
Khalilzad asserted that Pakistan has been told that the US-led forces in Afghanistan could move into Pakistani territory to destroy the Taleban and other extremist groups if Islamabad could not do the job itself.
Although he added that the US would prefer that Pakistan take the responsibility, and the Pakistan government has agreed to this, Khalilzad has been roundly attacked by the MMA for what they perceive is a threat to Pakistan, while the Pakistan government has registered a relatively measured response.
Government spokesmen have reminded Khalilzad that his own government's attitude, approach and policy towards the problem he has highlighted are at odds with his views.
The US government too has come out with a denial of any intention to intervene militarily on the Pakistani side of the border.
This is not the first time Khalilzad has sounded off about his perception that Pakistan is not doing enough to combat the Taleban and other religious extremists on its side of the Pak-Afghan border.
Last month he had charged that the Taleban and Al-Qaeda were launching attacks into Afghanistan from Pakistani soil. Pakistan took umbrage on that occasion too.
This time round, after what appears to be a rap on the knuckles from his bosses in the State Department, possibly following Pakistan's protest to the US government, Khalilzad has tried to backtrack and argue that his remarks had been misunderstood.
He reiterated his preference for Pakistan itself to tackle the problem.
Wisdom demands that instead of flying off the handle at the Special Envoy's 'indiscretion', we should coolly assess the situation.
The fact is that no matter who is saying it, Taleban and other religious extremist elements are definitely present in our tribal areas.
Why otherwise was it felt necessary to mount the Wana operation and, if reports are to be believed, make preparations for 'Wana II' in North Waziristan?
The military and paramilitary forces have not come out with flying colours in the first operation, underlining the difficulties inherent in venturing into what hitherto was a no-go area for the security forces.
The special dispensation in FATA and local sympathies with their co-ethnic Taleban are what allowed the Taleban, Al-Qaeda and elements from various Central Asian countries and even Uighurs from China to find refuge in the tribal areas.
Those sympathies have not abated, and may even have been strengthened in certain quarters by the inevitable collateral damage to innocent tribals caught in the crossfire between the religious extremists and the security forces.
Any further operations to root out such recalcitrant elements must not ignore the lessons learnt from Wana, particularly the crucial importance of on-ground intelligence and securing the routes the security forces use for their entry and deployment in the rugged mountainous terrain.
There is little disagreement that the die was cast after Pakistan reversed its policy of support to the Taleban following 9/11.
Co-operation with the US-led war on terror inevitably produced a blowback in the form of numerous terrorist attacks on Pakistani soil, including repeated assassination attempts on President General Pervez Musharraf.
It is in Pakistan's vital interest, no matter how sticky the task, to root out the Taleban, Al-Qaeda and all their foreign friends from Pakistani soil to preserve Pakistan's sovereignty and stave off any threats, veiled or open, even from the recently rediscovered friends such as the US.
Even if we do not like Khalilzad's way of expressing his views or even the purport of his views, we need to rise above merely shooting the messenger and take a long hard look at what may be a thinly disguised message echoing for the moment, admittedly, the views of dissenting observers rather than the US administration itself, but which has the potential of gaining the ear of policy-makers if the frustration in not being able to crush the insurgency in Afghanistan grows.
Long before that, Pakistan would be best served by cleaning up its house on its own, combining military operations with economic and social development in the tribal areas to wean the local residents away from religious extremism.