The World Bank (WB) in a recent letter to the federal government has identified the reasons behind water-sharing disputes. It has suggested development of a more effective inter-provincial infrastructure to deal with the problem.
World Bank says the provinces seldom receive their full share and face shortages even when there is no dearth of water.
The operations of the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), the WB points out, are hampered by political interference and bickering amongst the provinces and its functioning lacks transparency. No credible information is available about the location and timing of flows and there is a lack of storage and diversion capacity to fully utilise the available water in the Indus basin, according to the Bank.
WB sees the 1991 water accord as an ad hoc quasi-legal framework for dividing Indus River flows on the basis of historical use since 1970.
The Bank calls for introducing a formal legal system of secure, tradable water rights based on the total availability of water in the basin. It sees the need for a mechanism for dispute resolution, recourse to the justice system and a mechanism for adjustments to account for seasonal and annual variability of supply or quotas.
Such a shift would not in World Bank's view, endanger customary diversions at canal head-works, particularly on the Indus tributaries, and would give IRSA greater operating flexibility in allocating flows to ensure that seasonal water quotas are fulfilled on time each season.
This would, the Bank argues, put a premium on good planning and water management in the provinces.
In revising the water accord (which has been practised more in the breach), WB suggests, IRSA should be given the necessary responsibilities, functions and powers to administer the water rights system, regulate inter-provincial use and operate the inter-provincial infrastructure.
The present accord should be clarified and sharpened in terms of regulatory and operating authority to minimise ambiguity and conflict.
IRSA's internal structure should ensure its autonomy as well as its responsiveness to the political leadership and civil society.
Since 1991, WB emphasised, a diversion equal to the total allocation of 114.35 MAF had never been achieved as it is 9-10 percent higher than the average historical use of the Indus basin, which prior to the accord was 103-104 MAF.
World Bank has rightly underlined the lack of reliable data about total availability of water in the Indus basin system. It has also taken to task the structure and functioning of IRSA, whose track record rests on internal lack of consensus and inability to translate its deliberations into meaningful management of the country's water resources. Irrigation is crucial for agriculture.
This sector still employs the overwhelming majority of the workforce. Improvements in agricultural incomes therefore are a sine qua non for making a dent in the mass of poverty that afflicts the country.
An autonomous and powerful IRSA is critical for optimal water management and its just distribution. How can such an IRSA be brought about?
First and foremost, the present dispensation, in which members serve at the will of their respective provincial governments, should be replaced by tenure appointments.
After a member's tenure is over, he should simply retire and not be offered a sinecure elsewhere in the bureaucracy's labyrinth.
Second, it goes without saying that the members appointed by their respective governments should be the best qualified in the field, or at the very least have a working professional knowledge of the problems attending the sector.
Since it would be difficult to get the provinces to accept a system of decision making by any kind of majority vote, the lack of consensus that has dogged the footsteps of IRSA in recent years, particularly during years of drought, should be amenable to arbitration through a judicial forum set up especially for the purpose. Such a mechanism would alleviate the logjam in IRSA's decision making process.
If there are Doubting Thomases out there who regard WB's analysis of IRSA to be incorrect, all they have to do is read the reports that have resurfaced about the flow of water downstream Kotri.
The 1991 water accord conceded the need for a minimum 10 MAF to flow south of Kotri pending studies to ascertain the required flows.
This minimum flow has seldom been achieved, especially during the last four or five years when the entire country was gripped by a severe drought.
The upper riparian Punjab's partisans in IRSA have started castigating the lower riparian Sindh for exaggerating its water losses and using this ploy to release excessive quantities of water below Kotri while the country suffers a 15 percent shortage of water overall.
The fact that the river bed south of Kotri has become a virtual sand desert because of years of no flows never enters the calculations of the upper riparian vested interests, who regard any flow south of Kotri as 'dumping water into the sea', thereby ignoring the drinking water and irrigation needs of the populace and environmental conservation of the Indus Delta.
The problem is that since statistics about water availability and flows are unreliable, and they can be twisted to suit any thesis.
The resignation of A.N.G. Abbasi, chairman of the Technical Committee on Water Resources, is also believed to have been triggered because of the skewed working of the water bodies in the country.
All the more reason to listen to World Bank's advice to ascertain scientifically total availability of water in the Indus system and control its distribution and usage through legally established, tradable water rights, regulated and operated by an IRSA independent enough not to be swayed by partisan political considerations.
Only such a system has any chance of turning the corner from the constant and unending bickering and quarrelling amongst the provinces on water issues. 'Peace' on the water-front would also provide the beneficial by-product of national harmony and a stronger bond between the federating units.
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