On Pakistan's 60th independence anniversary: search for democracy still continues

That a country created through political and legal means had to undergo long spells of unrepresentative and military rules seems to be a big paradox that needs to be analysed at an occasion when Pakistan is celebrating its 60th anniversary.
Before the creation of Pakistan it would not have occurred in the wildest of the dreams of the Muslim leadership, as well as the masses that the country they were aspiring for would remain for decades an arena of civil-military conflict with the latter becoming more and more powerful.
Of the fifty-nine years of independent existence Pakistan has remained under direct military rules for 32 years while in 27 years there have been dispensations which at best could be described as civilian but hardly democratic. In the civilian phases, too, the internal balance within the state institutions by and large tilted towards the administrative and the defence organs. Not only this, no prime minister, except one, could complete his/her term.
Parliaments were dissolved either through martial laws or on the discretion of presidents enjoying authoritarian discretionary powers. The first two constitutions were abrogated while the third and the last, approved in 1973, was, once in 1977, subjected to suspension, and was later, in 1999, put under abeyance by the military rulers. Bonapartism became a rule rather than an exception in the country's history.
Looking back at the past six decades one can trace the emergence and strengthening of the extra-political forces, undermining the democratic potential of the country. In the first decade of independence, Muslim league's weaknesses as a political organisation compounded with the circumstances in which partition took place and an archaic social structure with its primordial loyalties paved the way for bureaucracy's emergence as the actual power holder. Towards the middle of the 1950s, the military also became a partner in the power structure, and the two came to determine the major policies of the State.
HAMZA ALAVI OBSERVES THAT KARACHI WAS THE CAPITAL OF TWO GOVERNMENTS: behind the socalled civilian government there operated the government of a strong group of bureaucrats who in collaboration with the military top brass took the basic decisions to be implemented by the civilians.
The façade was brought to an end when the military took over the reigns of power in 1958 and demonstrated its supremacy.
However, the martial law was a joint venture of the military and the bureaucracy. Thus, while Ayub Khan became the chief martial law administrator, Aziz Ahmed, secretary general in the civil service was appointed as the deputy martial law administrator. With the imposition of martial law, the 1956 constitution was abrogated and in 1962, Ayub gave his own constitution which lasted till the end of his rule in 1969.
The second martial law under General Yahya Khan ended in December 1971 on the break-up of the country upon which a civilian regime was installed. Under Z.A. Bhutto, the 1973 constitution was devised which was suspended in 1977 on the imposition of martial law.
General Zia-ul-Haq's military rule lasted till 1988 when he died in a plane crash. The subsequent civilian regimes of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif operated under unusual conditions when the country was governed under a troika comprising the president, the chief of the army staff, and the prime minister with the last being the weakest.
The Eighth Amendment had given to the president the discretionary power to dissolve the assembly and the cabinet, suggesting the effective presidential character of the system.
During Nawaz Sharif's second government, president's discretionary powers were repealed through the Thirteenth Amendment, shifting the balance from the president to the Prime Minister and refurbishing the parliamentary character of the constitution. This did not last longer as Nawaz Sharif was removed some two and a half years later.
The military rule established in 1999 implemented its own political programme - the devolution of powers scheme, elections in 2002, incorporation of the LFO in the constitution and the Seventeenth Amendment. The president even in his seventh year of rule and the constitution being apparently restored, still holds the office of the Chief of the Army Staff.
He has all along kept his cards closed to him and has declined to tell when he would relinquish his responsibilities as the COAS. The opposition parties continue to pressurise for the restoration of democracy.
A narration of the above all too well known details have been referred to address the question why democracy does not take roots in the country and why is it that the civilian regimes - whenever they are given a chance - do not transform into sustainable democracy.
One would argue that behind the civil-military disequilibrium in Pakistan there operates the fundamental contradiction of the civil society and the State.
Historically, in Pakistan the State emerged in circumstances, where its two major organs, the bureaucracy and the military, were already in a dominant position and could manoeuvre the differences of the various segments and classes present in the society.
In the last six decades neither effective land reforms were introduced which could break the political backbone of the feudal class which facilitates the State's control of the society in the vast rural areas, and in turn, looks to state patronage for its privileges, nor industrialisation could begin on a big scale producing an independent entrepreneurial class as well as a substantial working class aspiring for real democratic rights.
Second, Pakistan's strategic interests as defined by its State's power holders, facilitate the idea of the country being a national security State. Consequently, it is a national security paradigm in which all national policies - economic, social, or foreign - are determined.
This has also given to the military an upper hand in the matters of statecraft. As this factor has continued to exist throughout the last six decades, the military's power and initiative have progressively increased.
Third, Pakistan's decision to ally with the West and particularly with the US in its geo-political strategy, has also in the long run adversely mitment to the US to the extent that it offered bases to the US for anti-communist clandestine surveillance.
Towards the end of 1970s Pakistan accepted to become the frontline State against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Since 9/11 Pakistan is playing an important role in the American war against terrorism and has again adopted the posture of a frontline State. In all these events the actual beneficiary of Pakistan's close alliance with the West has been the military.
On the last two occasions mention above, military was already in power and the Western support came to it as an approbation of its rule. Therefore, from the point of view of restoration of democracy in the country, an independent and non-aligned foreign policy holds a key position.
A fourth factor, which has worked against the prospects of democracy in the country, has been the inherent weaknesses of our civil society.
In the first place, it has been small in size and even smaller in its democratic content. Moreover in the last 25-30 years the society at large has been overly depoliticized owing to a number of factors like long spells of military rules, dismemberment of the labour and student unions, a culture of consumerism etc.
As a result of this, a vast section of the society has dissociated itself with the politics and culture of rights. The political parties have also adjusted themselves to the limited scope of operation available in a depoliticized society.
They have confined themselves to electioneering or holding birth and death anniversaries of their leaders. One hardly sees them addressing people's grievances, mobilising the people for their rights and transmitting them for policy implementation.
The dismal picture of the last six decades, as well as the not too encouraging prospects for the future, need to be taken seriously. Concerted efforts need to be made particularly at the level of the conscientious segments of the society to highlight the causes behind our failure to establish a viable democratic system and to suggest means to address them. Without massive socio-economic and political restructuring we would not be able to see the realisation of our democratic aspirations.
(The author is professor of politics and history in the Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi.)