Peace talks with militants

The United States is as much interested in sorting out the Taliban and al Qaeda as in securing a bailout for Pakistan's faltering economy; perhaps more. Of course the visiting US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher's remark at his press conference on Monday that 'Friends of Pakistan' would not "throw money on the table" dominated media coverage.
But that was not the principal purpose of his visit; he was here to warn the government against talking to militants. The reported thrust of the ongoing parliamentary debate in favour of dialogue with the Taliban must have caused ripples of anxiety among the US policy-makers. That he also met PML (N) chief Nawaz Sharif, whose members in parliament are said to be leading the charge for a negotiated solution to tribal militancy is amply suggestive of that growing American concern.
There is nothing new in saying that public opinion in Pakistan is opposed to the military action as the only option in the restive north-west region. There is the worrisome blow-back of the military action in the form of growing number of civilian casualties and large-scale dislocations.
Not that the Taliban are a popular entity, it is the rampant killing of innocent people as collateral damage especially, caused by missile strikes from across the Pak-Afghan border and Predator strikes on so-called suspected militants' hideouts, that is becoming increasingly unacceptable.
The people ask if President Karzai can offer talks to the Taliban and if British commanders in Helmand can negotiate with the local Taliban fighters why the same is prohibited for Pakistan. A multi-dimensional approach to militancy in the turbulence-hit areas has the public support - particularly in light of the widely held belief that suicide bombings had almost stopped when the PPP-led elected government promised a negotiated solution to militancy in the tribal areas. Now that military action has been resumed there are also suicide bombings.
Peace talks with the Taliban fighters should be given the chance. Remember it was President John F. Kennedy who had said: Never negotiate out of fear but never fear to negotiate. There can be no denying the fact that militancy, now buffeting a greater part of the NWFP, has refused to die down in face of possibly the strongest military action by the Pakistan army.
Return of peace in Bajaur may be deceptive; consider the present situation in Swat where the military mission was said to have been accomplished before Ramazan. Once again the possibility of striking a peace deal has emerged, possibly thanks to the so-far toughest action by the armed forces. It should be cashed in on. To insist that talks can be held only when militants surrender is too unrealistic. You don't hold peace parleys with a force that has already surrendered, much less the tribal people who bear weaponry as an ornament.
Is it possible that the American official's continuing insistence that there should be no talks with the Taliban, when viewed in the context of the US presidential election next month, a mere public posturing? The ground reality, both in Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal region, suggests that the United States and its allies in the so-called war on terror are not winning that war.
Recent reports in the Western media say that back-channel diplomacy is in progress, with active participation of Saudi Arabia, to secure a face-saver for the US-led Nato forces in the war-ravaged Afghanistan. But for such a move there should not have been the stunning media disclosures about allied commanders saying that Afghan war is no more winnable. The media campaign dubbing President Karzai's brother as the chief protector of Afghan drug barons may be a part of that move.
The cost of war for Pakistan is phenomenally high. The country has paid more than any other country in this war on terror. When rights clash, there is always an hierarchy of rights that can guide both US and Pakistan in deciding which rights should override others. Therefore, Pakistan has the first right to decide to keep fighting or strike deals with the militants, which should prevail over others'. It must be Islamabad's sole prerogative to determine whether and when the Taliban should be engaged in peace parleys.