Subject of scrutiny for sometime on account of safety related issues, Pakistan's nuclear programme came under special spotlight last week when a US- based arms control outfit, the Institute for Science and International Security, released photos to show this country had expanded its two crucial nuclear programme sites.
The expansion, said the Institute, was a part of Pakistan's effort to upgrade its nuclear arsenal. The photo release having coincided with the 11th anniversary celebrations of our nuclear explosions in response to India's, Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani chaired a meeting, last Friday, of the Strategic Planning Division for a briefing on the "qualitative upgrades" in our nuclear programme.
Afterwards, he declared, "we are determined to retain nuclear deterrence at all costs. No compromise will be made on our core security interest." And that there is a complete national consensus on the issue. Many would be shaking their heads in dismay at this somewhat fresher formulation of our nuclear strategy. Indeed, there exists a consensus, except among idealists, on our India-centric nukes programme, we are told, is based on a minimum credible deterrence strategy.
The objectors, inspired by the higher notions of peace and prosperity, point to unacceptable levels of pervasive poverty to argue against acquisition of nuclear weapons. And, of course, weapons of mass destruction are an anathema to all civilised people.
On a practical level, however, the spectre of mutually assured destruction seems to have worked as a credible insurance policy against India's not-so-secret urge to punish Pakistan for challenging its growing power, and also to avenge what many in that country perceive as the wrongs of history.
It is well remembered that there were three occasions - in 1999, 2002 and '09 - when the two sides came close to an all-out war, first because of General Musharraf's dangerous misadventure at Kargil, and the other two following terrorist attacks in New Delhi and Mumbai. Each time India resorted to angry saber rattling, but then decided to exercise restraint.
It pulled back from the brink, it is believed, not because of a pacifist impulse but for fear things might spin out of control, leading to a full-fledged war with its nuclear-armed rival. Some, though, point to the 1971 situation when Pakistan had faced a humiliating defeat on the eastern front, to argue that at the time neither side possessed nuclear weapons, and yet India kept from attacking what remained of Pakistan.
There are three obvious reasons why that did not happen even though the then Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi had described her success in dismembering Pakistan as a revenge for 1000 years of Muslim rule. Going by her spirit, the thirst for revenge, perhaps, would have been quenched even better if it were possible to overwhelm the entire country.
One reason seems to be the Nixon administration's both open and behind-the-scenes maneuverings to keep India from doing so, for which, as per Volume XI of the State Department archives on "South Asia Crisis, 1971" it also sought China's co-operation. The other more compelling reason could be that Pakistan's military might was concentrated in West Pakistan, wherefrom it had also expected to defend the eastern under different circumstances.
And unlike East Pakistanis where the people sought India's help to get rid of what they saw as an oppressive, exploitative West Pakistani domination, India would have met with strong resistance. Thirdly, even if it were possible to vanquish the remaining Pakistan, it would be impossible, in this day and age, for India to maintain longer-term control of a hostile people and their territory.
Whether we like it or not, tensions rooted in history and unresolved issues of conflict have a potential to cause the present mindless arms race to continue. However, if the justification for us to make nuclear bombs is what it is stated to be, namely maintenance of a minimum creditable deterrence to counter India's vastly bigger conventional capability, then the fifty or so bombs we are supposed to have already made should be enough.
Pouring billions into this destructive enterprise, while the same resources could be better used for the provision of health care, education, and other basic necessities of life to this country's teeming poor, to say the least, is vulgar. Also, those given to thinking in terms of regional rivalries only need to understand that nations acquire power and international respectability on the basis of socio-economic progress rather than military prowess.
Defenders of the upgradation programme, of course, cite the advances India is making in modernising both its conventional and nuclear arsenals. In other words, Pakistan will not stop building new nukes unless India stops, and India with its big power pretensions will not stop unless the bigger players in the field do not halt their pursuit of the ever more destructive weapons systems.
Leading the race in this field has been its initiator, the US, which has the singular distinction of actually using weapons of mass destruction against the Japanese people, evidence suggests, merely to test the destructive power of its latest weapon in a real life situation.
It has also kept ignoring with disdain international treaties that ban testing nuclear weapons and developing newer ones as also their delivery systems, to work on all kinds of new weapons - big and small. The Reagan administration had initiated even a 'star wars programme' to deploy nuclear weapons in space.
The truth of the matter is that nuclear arms race will not end unless the big powers are willing to scrap their own nuclear arsenals and stop all ongoing activities in the field. To expect them to do so may sound a bit unrealistic, but the present-day realities appear to have reminded them of their own old commitments.
As it is, US' nuclear arsenal has brought it no advantage in the wars it has been fighting. It did not help in Vietnam, neither in Iraq nor in Afghanistan. Hence, those interested in military matters are saying that non-nuclear modern weapons, especially sophisticated unmanned machines such as drones, are more relevant to and effective in the current and future wars.
The US was one of the five original nuclear weapons states which along with other 182 nations signed the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), committing itself among other things " to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament," and to make "good faith" efforts to attain that goal. The efforts, unfortunately, as noted earlier, remained directed in the opposite direction. The changing challenges now urge a rethink.
There are signs that the US may actually be ready to take a strategic decision to act in "good faith" to rid the world of the scourge of nuclear weapons. The strongest sign is US President Barack Obama's stated stance on the subject. He may have startled many when he said at the recent EU-American summit in Prague, "... So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.
This goal will not be reached quickly-perhaps not in my lifetime ... But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world cannot change." If America changes, the others will need to change, too. Hoping, the US president will back his words with action, we must reorder our priorities. Our national endeavour must be focussed on achieving social and economic progress, rather than participation in a dangerous and useless arms race.
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