Revisiting Afghanistan’s ‘graveyard theory’—II

Metaphorically, Afghanistan may be termed a ‘graveyard’ as some invaders did face stiff opposition and relinquished ambitions to stay on due to the hardy warriors and forbidding terrains. The British fought three wars with Afghanistan. First, from 1839 to 1842; second from 1878-1880; and the third in 1919. At issue for the then British Empire was the Indian subcontinent, with possible Russian influence coming from northern Afghanistan.

The most iconic moment of the first Anglo-Afghan war was the annihilation of 4,500 soldiers and 12,000 civilians under the command of Major-General Sir William Elphinstone. In January 1842, they retreated from Kabul, heading for the British garrison at Jalalabad. But that’s not the whole story. “Six months later, the British returned. The army of retribution marched into Kabul, killed every Afghan they could get their hands on, burned down the bazaar, and then put their man on the throne,” said Hopkins. What you see is a tactical defeat, yes temporary, and, ultimately, a strategic victory by the empire,” says historian Hopkins.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War saw the British representative, Sir Louis Cavagnari and his compatriots massacred in Kabul, plus a British contingent defeated at the Battle of Maiwand. In the end, though, the British won. In the Third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919 Afghanistan won independence and control over its foreign affairs.

Says Hopkins: The British “by that point in time basically wanted to get rid of this ‘imperial appendage’ that is costing them too much.”

Likewise, Russian economy and military expenditure were overwhelming. Again, to say that it was the Soviet Union that cracked up because of Afghan war is a partial explanation.

Nivi Manchanda, a lecturer at Queen Mary University of London, argues that the ‘graveyard theory’ does not accurately reflect the history of the region or motivations of the failed colonial expeditions. The Soviets withdrew because Afghanistan became an increasingly expensive proposition for an empire that was crumbling from within,” Manchanda writes in her book Imagining Afghanistan.

She adds that history of Afghanistan can often be overshadowed by placing too much emphasis on isolated events and short- term victories. Since the dawn of pre-history, Afghanistan has been a land which was traversed by different tribes and peoples. The first great empire in human history was of Iran’s Cyrus the Great, two and a half thousand years ago. He was the first king to take the title of emperor — the king of kings. Under the Achaemenid Empire the present Afghanistan was a province enslaved by the then Iranian empire.

Afghanistan is a remote, sparsely inhabited, mountainous and impoverished country. Luring in, fighting and then ejecting foreigners is one thing, but nurturing, consolidating and sustaining positive institutions is quite another. The Afghan nation has also been adept in playing off one power against the other when and where it suited its interests.

In this regard, Taliban 2.0’s new dispensation since mid- August 2021 is viewed by some optimists with a modicum of positivity —given Taliban’s peaceful overtures, yet deep distrust persists about their intentions and capacities. An astute observer of Afghan affairs, Rashed Rahman, darkly opines about Taliban’s inability to change their psyche saying that with their past record is like a “leopard [unable] to change its spots.”

Burdened with a poor economy, lingering tribal and ethnic feuds, awash with weapons of all kinds, lack of broad-based government, etc. — cannot stabilize a war-torn and frail society afflicted since many decades.

The incumbent Taliban have to drastically change their mindset in accordance with present times. Most of the tribal societies have evolved in Central Asia, Africa and other places, incorporating modernistic virtues and traits. If representative and inclusive institutions remain underdeveloped, gloating over ejecting outsiders and turning empires into ‘graveyards’ connote tribal rhetorical flourish and chauvinistic pride.

Today the Afghans have some assets: they are endowed with a large young population that needs education, respect for human rights, ideological moderation, acquisition of science and technology, regional connectivity through (trade and external help)—as pathways to development and progress.

Ultimately, it is Afghans themselves who have to take charge of their destiny after decades of infighting and murderous wars. Regional neighbours and international community could and should nudge the new government toward path of attaining normal statehood. There are examples where countries like Vietnam with two million dead and 50,000 American casualties (compared to 4,000 US dead in Afghanistan) have decided to break the vicious cycle of revenge and retribution. It is now a member of thriving ASEAN community.

This is the only way to transition the troubled Afghan nation into a normal functioning state — which at peace with itself, its neighbors and the global community.

(Concluded)

(The writer has been Visiting Faculty, Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Chairman Department of IR, NUML, former Adviser COMSATS, and President Islamabad Policy Research Institute)

Copyright Business Recorder, 2021