The current tensions between Pakistan and India in the wake of the Pulwama suicide attack that killed 44 Central Reserve Police Force (CPRF) personnel are following a familiar pattern. India, relying on the claim of responsibility by Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), has pointed the finger of accusation at Pakistan. Pakistan has denied responsibility, arguing that the suicide bomber was an indigenous Kashmiri radicalised by brutalisation at the hands of the Indian security forces, the huge amount of explosives used in the attack were locally procured, and if India can provide actionable intelligence on the perpetrators, Pakistan will take action against them.
Despite the rejection of responsibility by Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) government has moved to ban Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and its charitable wing Falah-i-Insaniat, both widely known to be replacements for the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba banned by Pakistan in 2002. The government has also taken over the JeM's headquarters in a mosque in Bahawalpur and a madrassa attached to it. JeM too was banned in 2002. Banning has proved in practice to be a fig leaf for reinventing these groups under new names and thereby allowing them to function freely.
India is threatening military retaliation, with the Pakistani military, government, opposition and media giving equal measure to their opposite numbers across the border. Suspicions abound in Pakistan and even in India that Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi is whipping up anti-Pakistan rhetoric in order to get better results in the upcoming elections in that country. Sane voices on either side that counsel restraint seem few and weak, but after the passions of nationalist rhetoric subside relatively, are proving the only ones worth paying attention to. The two nuclear-armed South Asian neighbours cannot even conceive of going to war. It would mean mutual mass suicide and the ruin of both. Alternatives such as surgical strikes are still in the realm of wishful thinking rather than feasible reality.
Going by the track record, passionate denunciations on either side, fuelled by a hyper-patriotic media at both ends, may persist in its irresponsibility until after the Indian elections but, afterwards, and God willing in the absence of actual conflict, are likely to subside. Post-Kargil, the two sides did return to the negotiating table, although in 1999 this seemed an unlikely possibility. Sooner or later, even belligerent states return to rational calculation, or at least we hope so in the current highly dangerous standoff.
India has taken its case to world opinion, including the UN Security Council (UNSC). The resolution adopted in the UNSC condemns the Pulwama attack, advises Pakistan to prevent such incidents, and calls for talks between the two countries to defuse the increasingly dangerous escalation. US President Donald Trump, not known for his perspicacity on international issues, has nevertheless raised the alarm and revealed his administration's intent to hold meetings with Pakistan with which Washington's relations have improved of late since the US-Taliban talks process started. Pakistan too has been pulling out all the diplomatic stops to argue its case before world opinion.
Cleaving through all the propaganda on both sides, some home truths are evident. What we are witnessing is hybrid warfare at its finest. As DG ISPR Major General Asif Ghafoor has succinctly summed it up, media is the first line of defence. How did this concept, practiced with great proficiency by the west in particular in its forays into the developing world to bring about regime change in its favour, come to nestle in our bosoms of late? Some background may be useful. Pakistan's establishment refined proxy war as an art during the long Afghan wars. The success of such warfare against the Soviets and communists in Afghanistan emboldened it to attempt something similar in Indian Held Kashmir (IHK) from 1989 onwards, the very year the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan. But our proxy planners and warriors failed to take adequate account of the very important differences between the two situations. Nevertheless, the insurgency and protest movement persist to this day and have been met by an overwhelming Indian military and security forces presence in IHK and extreme repression of the Kashmiri people. India generally, and the Modi government in particular, refuse to countenance the historically necessary internal rapprochement with the Kashmiri people and talks with Pakistan to resolve the long standing conundrum. With this one-sided heavy-handed approach amidst repression against Kashmiris all over India in particular and Muslims in general, Modi's Hindutva agenda is in action in full force. This tyranny may endure for now, but is unlikely to quell the Kashmiri spirit of seeking liberation.
While the IHK pot now simmers now boils, Pakistan now also stands accused by Iran at the very least of turning a blind eye to the presence of Jaish-e-Adl (JeA) on its soil, from where previous and the latest attack on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards was launched. Iran is now making threatening noises of retaliation if Pakistan does not act itself.
The question is, can Pakistan, under its nuclear weapons umbrella, continue with this high risk strategy of three proxy wars with three of its neighbours without suffering some adverse consequences? The world is watching and listening, and Pakistan's attempts at plausible deniability in all three cases are wearing increasingly thin. It is in our interests to promote a political settlement of the war in Afghanistan, adopt a policy of persuading India to implement an internal political settlement with the Kashmiris and an external one with Pakistan, and desist from even the appearance of condoning terrorist forays across the border with Iran.
Pakistan has to live, survive and prosper in today's interconnected world. Going out on a limb for dubious strategic gains in the region is not in our best interests. Time to introspect.
[email protected]
rashed-rahman.blogspot.com
Comments
Comments are closed.