Pompeo's dash to Kabul

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo dashed to Kabul in an unannounced visit on March 23, 2020, just one day after hopes for a breakthrough in the stalled intra-Afghan dialogue were raised by a Skype video conferencing exchange between the Taliban and Afghan government. However, despite long meetings with rivals Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, a frustrated Pompeo was unable to heal their rift. Returning to Washington via Doha where he met the Taliban, an exasperated Pompeo announced the US was cutting $ one billion aid to Afghanistan, with another cut of $ one billion in 2021 and further cuts after that. The step marks a devastating blow to a country whose GDP is merely $ 20 billion. The immediate cut alone constitutes 20 percent of Afghanistan's crucial aid from the US. There are indications that Washington now is committed to withdrawing its troops by the agreement deadline of April 2021, irrespective of what happens because of the rift at the top of the Afghan ruling structure, the risks entailed in ignoring continuing and increasing attacks by the Taliban after the agreement, and the added affliction of the coronavirus pandemic that potentially could devastate a poor country struggling with the war.
To recall, the US-Taliban agreement signed on February 29, 2020 in Qatar envisaged a reduction in violence leading hopefully to a ceasefire and a prisoner swap between the Afghan government and the Taliban to pave the way for the intra-Afghan talks between the two sides, scheduled originally to begin on March 10, 2020 in Oslo, Norway. All this was to create the conditions for a foreign troops reduction if not withdrawal, particularly of the bulk of US forces from Washington's longest war abroad. The prisoner swap as laid down in the US-Taliban agreement was intended to free 5,000 prisoners by the Afghan government against 1,000 held by the Taliban. However, the flaw in this arrangement was the exclusion of the Afghan government from the Qatar talks. This led to the perception in the Afghan government that it was being abandoned by the US and thrown under the Taliban bus. Lacking any other leverage, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani initially refused to release the prisoners prior to the start of the intra-Afghan dialogue, particularly since the Taliban consistently described the Kabul government as a US 'puppet'. This 'offer' was in turn rejected by the Taliban, creating the semblance of an impasse in the peace process. With no doubt some pressure from Washington, President Ghani then softened his stance and offered to free the prisoners in groups, 1,500 before and 3,500 after the intra-Afghan talks started. That too was flatly refused by the Taliban. Meanwhile, Taliban attacks against the Afghan security forces have been on the uptick since the Doha agreement, compelling Washington to remind the Taliban of their commitment to reduce violence. This admonition does not seem to have had the desired effect. So the scenario resembles nothing more than a merry-go-round of Afghan government offers through statements and their rejection by the Taliban, whose attacks against the Afghan government forces continue. It is to break this impasse that the US Special Representative on Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad restarted his efforts to get the intra-Afghan dialogue back on track. The solution he suggested was 'virtual engagement' via video conferencing and this has transpired in the presence of the US and Qatar delegations.
Pompeo had his work cut out for him in Kabul. First and foremost, he had to assure the Afghan government that the US is not ditching it or leaving it to its own devices. This was never easy, given the declared intent of Washington to withdraw its forces. Second; Pompeo had to persuade President Ghani to show greater flexibility on the prisoner exchange to remove the roadblocks to a continuation of the intra-Afghan dialogue, which still has many miles to go and many other issues to discuss apart from the prisoner swap. Third, Pompeo had to put the best face possible on the compulsion to have separate meetings with President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, the two rival candidates and claimants of victory in the Afghan presidential elections (both have taken oath of office of the president separately). This was necessary to push both 'incumbents' to work together in the interests of peace. Now Pompeo's ire after his failure to persuade in Kabul has strengthened the perception that the US intends to withdraw no matter what the consequences. That may well end up throwing the whole peace process off kilter.