Vehicle hijacking in Karachi

Karachi is infested with vehicle snatchers and there has been no tangible decrease in figures. These vehicles are also used for criminal activities as is evident from the press reports.
The van used in the ambush of the Corps Commander's convoy is one such example. It is also reported that a substantial number of two-wheelers are smuggled into Afghanistan and these are used in nefarious activities against Pakistan. The average vehicle snatching at present is 15+ for 4-wheelers and 20+ for 2-wheelers.
Thus at least 35 citizens/organisations face this menace every day. It should be noted that due to heavy insurance costs, many people/organisations have discontinued insurance.
One factor that has affected the smooth and formidable functioning of the Anti-car lifting Cell is lack of co-ordination between the traffic, operations, and ACLC branches of Police. This resort to protecting one's turf and maintaining an impassive position is the bane that this country's governmental efficiency suffers from. This attitude results in needless complications.
There is an imperative need to re-profile the organisational chart of ACLC. An immediate creation of a post of SP (Operations) ACLC is essential. This officer would directly report to CCPO and would micro-manage the Operations wing of ACLC.
Thus the ACLC hierarchy would concentrate on investigations, arrests, and conviction. It should be noted that in Lahore a post of SP Emergency (SP Shaheen Force) is functional while not so in ACLC Karachi.
The sad vehicle-snatching scenario is due to the non-regulated and lackadaisical approach towards this growing menace. To curb this crime, it is suggested that the 27 check posts at the periphery of Karachi be handed over to the army for monitoring and control. They would be responsible to check every vehicle and in this way, the movement of snatched vehicles out of Karachi could be discouraged by a formidable number. Secondly, the traffic kiosks manned by the traffic police should be properly staffed and made efficient. There are 62 such traffic sections in the prime locations alone. More personnel are required in this respect and there should be unannounced and periodic checks on vehicles. At present, the traffic police are not eager to devote their efforts with total concentration.
The position now is that the activities of the traffic police are more intimidatory, bordering on harassment and graft-grabbing. Furthermore, fast moving motor bikes and portable wireless equipment must be provided to the traffic police who are mobile and on the move. A well-planned, well-trained, and well-manned environment is imperative to curb this menace.
ACLC is short of mobiles and motorcycles for its personnel. These are necessary to maintain strict vigil while in a mobile mode, and thus reporting could be done in a fast track form. The immediate requirement is estimated to be at least fifty motorcycles and five mobiles.
The motorcyclists would be on patrol in a well-planned formation concentrating more on sensitive areas and maintaining direct contact with the check posts, while the mobiles would serve as back up and rapid support.
The conviction rate is dismally low. Only a miniscule 0.11% of the 1100 apprehended snatchers in 2003 have been convicted. This low and dismal figure gives impetus and courage to the criminals. The judicial benches must be pro-active and must ensure that decisions are given swiftly.
Criminals must be punished severely and a strong message sent to them that the law enforcers mean business. The conviction rate has to be systematically improved.
The ACLC, like any other branch, utilises the services of inspectors and sub-inspectors to represent the Cell in the courts of law. Due to their lack of full judicial knowledge, due to their lower status, and due to the inability of the Cell to provide extra incentives, the prosecution angle is profoundly inadequate. This ensues in the non-conviction of the criminals. Therefore, it is proposed that the services of capable, sincere, and dedicated attorneys must be harnessed to defend the Cell and to pursue the cases leading to conviction. However, these lawyers command higher fees and this is a severe handicap for ACLC that already is strapped for financial resources. In order to defray this additional cost, it is further proposed that the concerned insurance companies or the owners of vehicles be convinced to subsidise the lawyer's fees. This is a practical move, and would help in the attainment of convictions and be a deterrent to the criminal elements of the society. The CPLC and community-based organisations could also assist in providing financial resources from the funds they collect from citizens and corporations.
One proposal that could be considered and deliberated in particular is making the ACLC a tripartite body, consisting of representatives of private sector, police, and the army. The Chief of ACLC could be from the private sector with full personnel, logistics, strategic support, co-operation, and assistance from the army and the police hierarchy.
This would make the ACLC a prime example of private-public partnership in dealing with crime and becoming one very vital channel in bringing back peace and safety for the citizens of Karachi.