Better late than never

Deposing before the House Armed Services Committee the other day, US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz had some pertinent things to say in the context of US-Pakistan relations, particularly with regard to the Pakistani military.
Wolfowitz admitted that the US made a major mistake when it severed its ties with the Pakistani military in the early 1990s, thereby depriving itself of one of the most important instruments of influence.
He argued that in a country like Pakistan, where the military is one of the most important institutions, severance of the contact between the US military and the Pakistani military was a grievous error because economic assistance for reform was no substitute for military reform, which could not be promoted by cutting off education and training for Pakistani military officers in the US and pushing them into the other alternative, Islamic extremism.
The Bush administration, Wolfowitz said, realised the importance of restoring relations with Pakistan after 9/11. Pakistan had been under nuclear-related sanctions since 1990 and democracy-related sanctions since 1999. Restored relations meant increased economic and military aid in order to bolster the capability of the Pakistani government and military to assist the US in its war on terrorism, particularly in the "ungoverned" area of north-western Pakistan, where the control of the government was fairly limited.
Wolfowitz made a strong case for a substantial increase in economic assistance and co-operation with the Pakistani military, including sharing intelligence with the Pakistani security forces.
Pakistan-US relations have had more than their share of ups and downs. The 'most allied ally' of the US in the 1950s and 60s became a pariah in US eyes starting from the 1970s when Pakistan embarked upon the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Notwithstanding the period of co-operation in the struggle against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, it did not take the US long after the Soviets quit that country to revert to its sanctions oriented approach towards Pakistan, absolving at the same time India from any such strictures for already having acquired nuclear weapons capability as long ago as 1974.
This discriminatory policy on nuclear issues was further strengthened by the imposition of democracy-related sanctions after the 1999 military coup in Pakistan.
Had 9/11 not happened, it is unlikely the wisdom we are hearing from Wolfowitz would have dawned any time soon.
While the belated recognition by the US of its interest in better relations with Pakistan is in our interests, the track record of fickleness and about turns in US policy still arouses suspicions about how permanent or long lasting the present honeymoon is likely to be.
Given the context of the war on terrorism, this closeness is understandable. But when this tactical need is gone, would the US see beyond these expedient concerns to a more permanent close relationship with Pakistan? On that question, the jury is out, and only time will tell.