First meeting with Arafat, 1973: Arafat summoneed me to give me a dressing down on the harm the Pakistani elements in Amman had done to the Palestinians in September 1970. They had started to suspect that this time too Pakistan might join the 'conspiracy' against them in Lebanon.
Palestinians got worried in this period over two appointments to Beirut, of Mansour Ghadder, a Savak General, as Iranian Ambassador and of Godlay, as American Ambassador, whom the press described as a CIA operative. Ghadder had come straight from Jordan where he was on post during the 'Black September' events. Shah was a great friend of Israel, South Lebanon was Shia, and Shah had his influence there. PLO had its base against Israel in South Lebanon and a major commando area.
Syrian or Lebanese control in the South did not extend beyond the Litani River; all are beyond was called Al-Fatahland. Palestinians suspected that these two ambassadors had been sent to foment another conspiracy against Palestinians Coming so close after Lebanese Army crack down these two appointments reinforced this impression. Some leftist Palestinians might have feared that Pakistan was going to be a party to the new scheme. This was the situation in which Arafat summoned me to meet him.
After my arrival in Beirut I had avoided to meet Arafat. In 1973, Pakistani ambassadors were not permitted to meet Arafat or PLO. Only the Second Secretary of our Embassy in Damascus by rank, who at that time was Afzal Akbar, was authorised to have contacts with Palestinians. In non-technical language it meant that Pakistan did not recognise PLO and Arafat both.
I was well known as a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause. Grand Mufti of Palestine, Al-Haj Amin el Hussiani was one of the first persons on whom I called in Beirut. Arafat was an el-Hussiani from his mother's side and as such Grand Mufti's nephew - Grand Mufti's son, Salah el Hussiani was my close friend in Tokyo when he was in Saudi Embassy (he succeeded his father as Grand Mufti of Palestine, on the latter's death).
Arafat used to call on the Grand Mufti quite often. He must have known from them of my pro-Palestinian sentiments, wondered why for one full year I made no contacts with Arafat or PLO. PLO had won recognition of Arab League, NAM and OAU too as the solo legitimate representative of Palestinians. Among the Arab masses Arafat was a hero but OIC and Pakistan and quite a few non-Arab Muslim countries had avoided Arafat and PLO. My meeting with him became the first ever ambassador level contact between Pakistan and Arafat/any Palestinian leader.
One day in summer May 1973, when tension was building between the Palestinians and the Lebanese Army, Salahuddin Khurshid, came to me and said that so and so, whom he described as number two of the Black September, was sitting in his office and had come to take me to meet Yasser Arafat. In view of the Government prohibition on contacts with PLO, I thought of tactfully excusing myself from going with him. I went down to meet the PLO official, received him fraternally, and said that as Brother Abu Ammar (Yasser Arafat) was too busy a person, I really did not want to waste his (Arafat's) very precious time. The caller left me.
Next day again Khurshid came to me at the same time in the morning and said that so and so was again in his office. I called him in and he said that he had come 'to take me', as Brother Abu Ammar was 'waiting to see' me. I realised that I had no choice but to go with him. Spurning Arafat's call would have had grave complications. I thought I would explain to the Foreign Office that it was impossible to refuse Arafat's 'summon' while living in Beirut.
So, along with Khurshid, Press Counsellor and the caller, I drove in my car to Sabra with Pakistani flag flying on it, to indicate that I was not going on a clandestine visit. The PLO car followed us. As I was being taken to Arafat the Camps were being encircled by Lebanese Army. A few dead bodies were lying on the road. My escort, Abu - - - pointed his finger at the corps to draw my attention to the Army's atrocities against the Palestinians.
The PLO offices were located at the end of the Arab University, in a small lane, in a dilapidated three-floor building, in Sabra, a slum. There were Kalashnikov-bearing gunmen all round, discretely placed, some looked like Black Africans, powerfully built. We were taken in the old lift, small and moving with difficulty. As it stopped, we passed through a dark, small corridor, with Kalashnikovs bearing guards on all corners. At the end of the corridor was a strong steel door it was opened, by a Kalashnikov bearing guard and immediately after we entered it was closed. We were led to a small room, about 8x8, with no floor covering, a very small office table, two small rickety chairs which seemed to have outlived their life, two or so easy chairs, of which the leather had torn from places, and a frame containing some prayer from the Holy Qur'an hung on the well. We waited for Arafat to come.
As Arafat entered the room, he went straight to the chair in this office, without even shaking hands with me. Stern faced, looking straight into my eyes harshly, hammering each word he said: "Ambassador, I have called you here to tell you what your army did to us in Jordan. I asked my people to forgive Pakistan we have forgiven but not forgotten it. I told my people that Pakistan has always supported Palestinian cause. Therefore, we should forgive it." Thereafter, he waited as if he wanted me to reply. I understood the purpose of his summons to me. Obviously he wanted to assess me personally also, and that is why he had said just a few words, stopped there and given me an opportunity to reply.
I knew what had happened in Amman in 1970 from Major General Nawazish Ali Khan in 1972 of how our troops based in Amman participated in the bloody events in Jordan in September 1970. Nawazish had been the commanding general of the Pakistani Division which was sent to Jordan for training of the Jordanian forces on the request of King Hussain. Nawazish was returning from Jordan to Pakistan at the end of his assignment in 1971 to take over command of a Division on Kashmir front. I was going to Karachi from Lagos for some family matters. We travelled together from Beirut to Karachi in the same PIA flight, sitting side by side. We knew each other well from the days of my posting in the Foreign Office when Nawazish was Director General Military Training at General Headquarters. We were old boys of the same College.
During the travel he narrated to me the entire episode, which had caused the misunderstanding between Pakistan and Palestinians. Nawazish was very bitter about Rahat Said Chhatari's personal role in this episode. Chhatari was ambassador at Amman during his tour of duty in Jordan. I would omit Nawazish's version of Jordan events.
I replied to Arafat that I could tell him with certainty that Government of Pakistan had nothing to do with whatever happened in Jordan, and was not involved in the Black September events in Jordan (which was true) Mine was a long monologue. Arafat did not interrupt, which was his intention by attentively listening to me. The substance of what I said was that had Pakistan not supported the Palestinians cause in the UN when it started in 1948, it would not have become an international issue. There were about 14 African-Asian UN member out of a total of 52 or so. After Pakistan supported this cause, India also had to do it to compete with Pakistan to get Afro-Asian leadership. There were only three non-Arab Muslim UN members at that time, Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indonesia joined UN subsequently. Pakistan opposed Israel's membership of the Commonwealth and it vetoed Israel's membership of the CENTO, Pakistan has been attacked for its CENTO membership, but it was because Pakistan joined this pact that no military plans aimed against the Arabs and Nasserism were allowed to be made by CENTO. I said that Pakistan never questioned why the Arabs went to the Soviet Union to obtain arms, then why Arabs criticised Pakistan for obtaining arms from America. Of course, we support Palestinian cause to the hilt, because of which we have been penalised several times by Zionist controlled American circles. We look at the Palestinian struggle as just and are proud of Arafat for leading it, playing the role of a modern Salahuddin Ayubi. Arafat continued to look at me closely as if he was trying to size me up, and determining the sincerity of my explanation. I repeated Liaquat Ali Khan's remark in 1950 when he visited US and was asked that if Pakistan recognised Israel, it would be given arms and financial aid, he had replied: "Gentlemen, our soul is not for sale". In summarising the conversation, the diplomatic nuances and their softness might have been lost here, but my tone was that of a friend who stood with cause not for the oil wealth, in fact, in 1948 to 70, it was not there. I left him in no doubt that our support to the Palestinians was on a principle and not because of Arab oil wealth, as some section of Beirut press had then cynically been claiming. When I left, the atmosphere had changed, and we kissed each other on cheeks in the usual Arab style. This was the beginning of my long and warm personal friendship with Arafat. Long time thereafter the person who had taken me to Arafat told Khursheed that when I left, Arafat fold his associates that we can trust this man.
I sent my report on this meeting direct to Prime Minister ZAB, repeating it to the Foreign Office, since I had acted beyond Government restriction on contacts with Arafat. I did not receive any reprimand!
It was a little too cheeky for me to ignore Government's prohibition on meeting Arafat In 1973 it was a risky assessment that Arafat was the only Palestinian leader who could keep all Palestinian commando organisations together with different ideologies, under his umbrella. In 1972-73 PLO had just rooted itself in Beirut, while powers that be were determined to eliminate it - and each Arab country was backing its own favourites among Palestinian leaders. Habash, was also quite popular. While Arafat was a hero to the Pakistani public, the official circles stuck to their boycott of PLO, only ZAB appreciated the people's feeling about Palestinians heroic struggle under Arafat. At that time, there were five major Palestinian leaders and their groups. Three of them were revolutionary and ultra radical. (Dr) George Habash and his PLF (Palestinian Liberation Front), Naif Hawatmeh and his PFLP (Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine), and Ahmed Jibril's PLF (PFLP-General Command) - in addition to Al-Fatah led by Arafat. Marxist Habash's, and leftist Hawatmeh's were purely revolutionary guerrilla organisations, Habash, a medical graduate of AUB, a Marxist, was considered the brainiest of all Palestinian leaders. He was said to be the only Palestinian leader who travelled under his real name and genuine passport. Ahmed Jibril's was an ultra revolutionary organisation with base in Syria; the only two largest organisations were Al-Fatah and Zuhair Mohsin's El-Saiqa. But, Al-Saiqa was Syria controlled organisation, which was also undertaking 'operation' in Occupied Palestine. After my meetings with Arafat, all PLO doors were opened to me Al-Fatah was the only Palestinian organisation which had a political wing, an international relations wing, an intelligence wing, security wing, and 'operations wing' for undertaking operations inside Israel. The only complete and comprehensive organisation was Al-Fatah. I felt that Arafat had political touch and diplomatic approach and was likely to stay as the one acknowledged Palestinian leader. It was this perception which I presented to ZAB and which helped him in opening up to Arafat, besides his (Bhutto's) own attachment to Palestinians liberation struggle.
Subsequently, I had several meetings with Arafat, some in relaxed mood like friends. I felt that he was the only pragmatic leader with charisma, flexible, moderate. In one of his relaxed informal meeting with me when he had the company of some PLO leaders, in 1975, he told me that Rabin had sent him his regards through a French correspondent who interviewed them both, and he asked her to convey his regards to Rabin. Although PLO had decided to keep away from ideological affiliations, majority of Al-Fatah was Muslim minded. Sitting in Arafat's office, I noticed that most visitors would greet each other with Salam-o-alekum and very few with Merhaba. Merhaba indicated that the person was either non-Muslim, or a communist. I came to know the PLO high command in due course. Sometimes during my calls on Arafat Abu Iyyad, the Black September leader or Abu Jihad, Commander of Al-Fatah Forces were present. I developed an intellectual rapport with Shafiq El Hout, the handsome intellectual in PLO brain trust and Farouq el Qaddumi, their 'Foreign Minister' another intellectual. Both were admirers of ZAB. After I had frequent meetings with Arafat, El-Saiqa's chief, Zuhair Mohsin invited me for a meeting. He was based in Damascus but came off and on to Beirut. It was difficult to get to know him as he was very reserved and tight lipped person, just the opposite of Arafat.
(TO BE CONTINUED)
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