This reply confirmed that Foreign Office had mental reservations about inviting Arafat while I was still thinking how to warn the Foreign Office of the consequences if Arafat was not invited, I received a telegram from the Prime Minister that he was sending the invitation to Arafat which I should personally deliver to him.
PM Bhutto's formal letter of invitation to Arafat, "Chairman of the PLO" came by bag, I went to deliver it to him at his Sabra Headquarters. News agencies took photos of the event. It was a historic moment; photos were prominently published in international press, for it was first ever-official contact through a formal communication from Pak Prime Minister to Arafat. It had its electrifying effect for the Palestinians.
Someone in the Foreign Office got extremely upset on the publicity of this invitation, or was it jealousy. Foreign Office asked for my "explanation" by a telegram as to why this photo appeared in the press? What a silly question, as if ZAB's personal letter to Arafat inviting him to the Summit was a "clandestine" affair and my meeting was "secret" rendezvous with Arafat? I appropriately replied it. It was reported to me verbally that Prime Minister's Special Assistant Bach asked the Foreign Office boss why Ambassador's explanation has been asked. Do you think such a major international event could be put under the rug? I delivered PM Bhutto's invitation to Prime Minister Taqi-uddin El Solh almost the same day as to Arafat. Photos of this event were also published in the press but nobody asked my explanation on that publicity.
A PLEASANT MISTAKE: When preparations for Lahore Summit were in advanced stage, a comedy of error helped PLO to get Pakistan's "recognition" through the mistake of the third Secretary. This is how it happened I was just rushing out to see the Foreign Minister Abu Hammad, when Abu Firas came with an official PLO note and a few passports asking for visas for a group he said was proceeding to Islamabad to set up PLO's Representative Office.
This was sometime before the decision to invite Arafat to the Summit had been raised. I called my Third Secretary Shafquat Kakakhel to deal with the matter while I was gone to see the Foreign Minister. I rushed back from the meeting to know what he did with the PLO request, he amazed me by saying that he had issued to them visas.
I said we should have sought government approval first, as opening a PLO Representative Office required Government's prior approval. This was not a request for grant of visa but recognition of PLO grating diplomatic status to their Representation in Pakistan. He said he had consulted Afzal Akbar (the one diplomat authorised to be in contact with PLO), Afzal Akbar said it was all right.
The Government had decided to recognise PLO. We were in a dilemma: Cancel these visas, or ask the PLO to hold up the delegation, or what and create a crisis in our relations with PLO at that critical moment. I decided to do nothing of this sort and let the fait accompolibe tolerated. Worst come, we will have to own the mistake. It seemed that ZAB took the matter in his stride and PLO opened its office in Pakistan, and recognition was extended to the PLO.
It was pleasant mistake of a third secretary of the embassy which granted recognition to PLO and what more allowed PLO to open its Representative Office in Pakistan, a decision which was for the Cabinet to take!
Greek Orthodox's Support to the Summit
The Greek Orthodox Christians of Lebanon and Syria who were sympathetic to Palestinians in contrast to the Lebanese Maronites wanted to participate in the Summit with a delegation of their own. Almost a couple of days before the Summit was due one morning Ghasan Tweini, the owner-editor of the top Beirut, daily Al-Nahar, in fact one of the top Arab world dailies, just walked into my office with Greek Orthodox leaders.
The Embassy receptionist, Jamil, a Maronite Christian himself, hardly finished telling me "Sir, Ghassan Tweini is on his way to your office, when he entered in my office along with a Greek Orthodox Bishop, he said "you know Ghassan tribe is the ancient noble Arab Christian tribe - We want to show our solidarity on this occasion with our Arab brothers. We are taking a delegation to Lahore headed by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch; here are their passports for visas." Who could say no to Ghassan Tweini and the Bishops.
I responded positively but said that since this would mean adjusting seats in the Assembly Chamber in Lahore, let me report it to the Prime Minister. Of course you can have visas collected tomorrow. He said the delegation is booked by next day's flight. I issued visas after informing the Prime Minister, assuming his approval, but of course on my responsibility. I was certain that Prime Minister Bhutto would be happy to have a top Arab Christian personality in the Summit. The Patriarch was in a way the Pope of the Greek Orthodox in the East.
There is a great difference between a bureaucratic approach and an ambassadorial approach; the latter is to take initiatives visualising what would be his country's best interest in a drastically changed situation. Sometimes the ambassador has to take the risk but it requires a correct assessment of his leadership's thinking.
KEEPING MISSIONS IN THE DARK AGAIN: I faced another embarrassment on B.D's recognition on which the embassies were kept in the dark about change of Government's policy. On files we were still under instructions to ask host governments to withhold recognition of Bangladesh till Pakistan recognised it. In December '73 the press reported that Lebanon was ready to recognise B.D. Acting on these instructions, I saw Lebanese Foreign Minister to withhold this decision and informed Foreign Office Came an angry telegram "Why did you do that. "We have asked all Muslim governments to recognise B D before the Summit" Imagine, they asked foreign "governments" but kept their own ambassadors in the dark I replied back that in the absence of the cancellation of existing instructions, missions had to go by what was on the file.
ARAFAT'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UN (13 NOV 1974)After his participation in the Lahore Summit, Arafat returned from Lahore in a jubilant friendly frame of mind having received grand ovation by the public. The starts of the gathering at the Summit to the common man were Arafat, Ghaddafi, and Feisal. At Lahore ZAB and Arafat became personal friends. Arafat and my own relations deepened. Arafat was calling me frequently for briefing me on the situation and quite a few times we just sat after the meeting chatting like friends on non political topics. Arafat's star was on the ascendance then. Kurt Waldheim UN Secretary General invited him to address the UN General Assembly.
Press started to speculate whether he would accept the invitation or send someone to deputise for him. It never occurred to me that Arafat would ask my advice on this matter.
Abu Firas, head of PLO's International Relations Department, came to me in the evening and said Arafat wanted to see me. Would I accompany him. It was normal for us to meet without prior notice. He accompanied me in my car and we reached Arafat's headquarters in Sabra. "What does he want to speak to me about?" I asked Abu Firas.
"He wants to consult you whether he should personally go to New York to address the UN General Assembly or send someone in his place". It was early November 1974. I thought of the gravity of the matter and the serious consequences of being consulted in the matter. I had been reading in the Press that a controversy was going on in the rank and file of the PLO about the risk involved in Arafat visiting United States. C I A or the Israelis could assassinate him.
The Press reports said that if Arafat decided to travel to New York, the commandos will be on alert to hit every American interest in the Middle East and Europe as a contingency should any thing happened to him in US or in the travel. It was said that the American installations, interests, embassies etc, will be blown up on a massive scale if any harm came to Arafat. According to the press, greater weight was being given to the views that Arafat should not visit New York. I quickly thought of what should be my advice to him. Oh my God, I was in a real difficult situation.
Supposing I advised Arafat that he should go to New York and something happened to him, what will be my situation in Beirut. Pakistan is considered by Arabs and most of Palestinians as a friend of USA, and although I was trusted by them that far, in a bad situation someone might come up with a brilliant idea that I had advised Arafat to go to New York because CIA had planted me to suggest to him to go to New York and that I was part of the conspiracy to bring him to New York so that he is assassinated there.
I thought of the Liaquat murder case in which certain friends of Liaquat Ali Khan were blamed for taking him to Rawalpindi so that he could be assassinated there. I was in a dilemma if any thing happened to Arafat in USA I might be a suspect as part of that plot, if I say no, he might miss a great opportunity.
The advice was not being sought from the government of Pakistan but from me personally, and I wanted to retain Arafat's trust as his friend but also to suggest that he should take the risk and accept the invitation to address the UN General Assembly. But, I thought it prudent to hold on to my real advice, till I ensured that he was willing to take the risks. He was shrewd enough to know whether I was hesitating to state what was really in my mind or not.
Passing through the security cordon of Arafat's headquarters, Abu Firas and myself went up narrow lift of the building and entered in Arafat's room. They were sitting on the floor. Arafat stood up to embrace me and we set down to business.
I noticed that in his small office room, the persons present in it had formed two groups. One was sitting behind Arafat, and included several top Palestinian chief of Palestinian organisation. Among them were Habash a Hawatmeh, the groups who according to the Press were against Arafat. So it was obvious that Arafat had at that time working relation with all Palestinian faction leaders. These were the people whose names caused fear in the Western intelligence and security services. I knew that I was looked upon by all Palestinian factions as a friend of the Palestinian struggle.
The other group was sitting just near the entrance headed by Professor Nabil Shaath, who was busy drafting Arafat's speech to be read at the UN. Arafat said "Brother, I have called you to advise me, what do you think of this invitation of to. Do you think I should go to New York personally to address the UN or send someone to represent me "The manner in which the question was raised suggested that there were two views on the matter in the PLO leadership this is why other leaders were present to hear the advice being sought from some friends whose views he was seeking as professionals he trusted.
I said "Brother whatever be the decision, it would have to be your decision and yours alone. I would merely give you my views about accepting or not accepting the invitation. It is up to you to decide, and on a matter like this the responsibility for the decision must be yours and yours alone. However, since you have asked me, I feel that I must say that there is a graver risk to your life if you go to New York. The chances of your being shot dead are very high, almost 99.9 recurring 9. Israelis will do anything to kill you.
They can spend millions of dollars to have you killed. This is a real probability. You can be killed going to or in New York. CIA may have you shot dead". I was purposely being blunt. Abu Firas remarked that Arafat's security in US had been assured. I said that if President Kennedy could be shot dead, what guarantee there was that Arafat might not be killed in US. I spoke on this line. Arafat listened to me carefully registering every point, but without any reaction or getting jittery, in fact, smilingly in his usual style.
However, I did not say that he should go or not go. My emphasis was only on the real danger to his life, adding after suitable intervals that the decision and its responsibility would have to be his and his alone. We had some light conversation and I returned with Abu Firas to my office. I treated the matter entirely a personal affair between me and Arafat. I sent no report on this meeting to Islamabad, no staff member was informed.
Next day, about the same time Abu Firas came to me and said brother Abu Ammar (Arafat) wanted to see you again just now. I asked him what for? He said the same matter. We went to Sahra in my car, as usual, and when I met Arafat he asked me the same question. I said "Brother yesterday, I gave you a negative reply to emphasise the grave dangers to your life if you go to New York which are very real.
I repeat that the probability is there. Whatever decision you take must be yours and the responsibility for it should be yours only. Today, I will tell you that you must go, but after taking into consideration the risk to your life. I heard some suggestion that a representative of yours should read your speech to the UN General Assembly. It is not the speech that matters but the person who makes it. For example, an Ambassador speaks on behalf of his President. A message conveyed on behalf of a president is not the same thing as a president making those remarks himself.
You have been waiting for international recognition of your struggle. Now you have this opportunity. There are some battles that the general must lead himself, even if he knows he is most likely to be killed in that action. Once you go, you will have millions of dollars free publicity to your cause. The TV and Press and satellite cameras would be relaying your message throughout the world.
American common man knows nothing about your cause and about you except through the hostile publicity. The common American is likely to be open-minded to you. You should go, but let me stress that decision; must be yours and yours alone. You should take the responsibility for it. Arafat smiled and we parted after some light talk.
On way back to the embassy, Abu Firas said Arafat had called you again today as he did not think that yesterday you gave the advice from your heart. Today he wanted to give you an opportunity to say frankly what you felt. When I was leaving Arafat he asked me to convey to ZAB an important message on the same matter, which I did, and when he returned from New York he confirmed that ZAB had arranged the matters as he had asked him to do.
It is a very interesting foot note that after I was consulted by Arafat the second time, at the Iranian ambassador's reception I met the American ambassador Godlay, beefy and quite an uncouth person, more like a butcher than an ambassador. I asked him whether Arafat and his party had decided to go to New York, and have sent their passports to American Embassy for visas? He said not so far, and meaningfully added; "Why ask me, ambassador. You know better".
When Arafat returned from his UN visit, I invited the entire delegation and the Lebanese Prime Minister Taqiuddin el-Solh and Bizri, Information Minister, to a dinner at my Rouche Residence. Among the invitees was one lady about whom I was told to make sure that her photo was not taken for any social magazine as she was a leader from the Israeli. Occupied areas. At my dinner Nabil Shaath remarked to me, "Right after you had left Arafat giving him the advice to go to New York, I was thinking what a grave responsibility you and I had taken in giving him this advice. I had said the same thing to him".
One member of Arafat's delegation told me that from some seashore in Lebanon. Arafat and the delegation boarded an Egyptian sub-marine to go to Cairo, from there they proceeded to Algiers, where they flew in a special plane to New York.
DESTRUCTION OF BEIRUT: Lebanon was by and large peaceful on surface from summer 1973 to the end of 1974 but underneath lava was building up Muslims were making political statement escalating their demand for Mushareka, Christians was training their militias. I had a glimpse of it in late 1974. We had gone for a social call on the Grand Mufti of Palestine, Alhaj Amin-el Hussaini, and his family at his residence in the mountains in Beit Meri- the heartland of Christian militancy I heart firing of automatic weapons down in the valley. I stood up to take a look down below in the valley.
The Grand Mufti said the Kataeb were practicing with arms. Similarly in Faraya, in the Maronite Mountains, near the village of Khalil Jibran, where some Christian friends had taken us, I saw the Kataib practicing with modern assault rifles, information's.
Same time, Kalashnikovs started appearing in the hands of the Lebanese Muslims. Earlier only Palestinian Commandos had it. There was a mushroom growth of Muslim militias. Induction of heavy weapons started in the Palestinian camps due to sense of insecurity. The Palestinians had their camps in the South. Shah as Israel's friend was working against the Palestinian interests there. The conspiracy against the Palestinians was thickening. It seemed battle lines were being drawn.
The Christians had their political-military organisations, of which the Kataib or the Phalangist was the most important, Christians had three militia groups, one led by Dany Chamoun (son of Camille Chamon) another by Tony Franjieh and another by Bashir and Amin Gemayyal (sons of Pierre Gemayyal). They acted in unison.
They were well organised, well armed. Their hatchet men was Elie Hobeika and Samir Geagea. Whereas the three most important leaders in the "Progressive Forces" against the "Lebanese Forces" became Arafat, Jumblatt and Rashid Karameh; and as long as he was on the scene Imam Musa Sadr in the South but as a solo. On the Muslim side there was really no militia compatible to the Kataib but bravado groups of young men, like Murabetun, a Nasserite group, led by Ibrahim Qleilat.
Individual Muslim youth was however quite well armed. The various Muslim communities, Kurds in Beirut and Shias in South of Beirut were more organised but under local toughies. Palestinians were the balancer in this situation. 1975 and 1976 were the years of a bloody Civil war in my time. Let me give an over view of the start and spread of the Civil War through out Lebanon in 1975.
The devastation the Civil War caused in these two years was colossal. According to An Nahar, Beirut's principal daily 75,000 persons were killed or were seriously wounded, 100,000 cars were burnt, thousands of apartments and buildings were reduced to ruins, of three million population of Lebanon, over half left the country for safe havens abroad. In fact of Beirut's own population in the civil war was reduced to 200,000 from 800,000. All embassies left Beirut for Damascus or Nicosia except Pakistan Embassy. It did not close down even for one day.
Even during the worst shelling when the roads were deserted we continued to work. For a few months during Lebanese Civil War only three ambassadors were left in Beirut, then two; and after Pope's nuncio (ambassador) whose embassy building was damaged by some shelling left for Junnieh, in East Beirut mountains, there was a time when only one Ambassador was found in Beirut, the Pakistan Ambassador, that is this humble servant.
Pope's nuncio was going to Rome for consultations but this humble servant stayed on its Beirut. I was under intense pressure of my staff to leave for Nicosia, as Cyprus was also in our jurisdiction. One staff member quietly slipped out via Damascus to Pakistan (or deserted his duty).
When the staff complained of climbing up to their apartments in the absence of electricity, I pointed out to them that the highest apartment of the staff was on fourth floor mine was on the eleventh floor. They were in twenties and thirties, I was in late forties.
Three considerations prevented me from fleeing from Beirut hardship, I liked the adventure of living under the shadows of gunfire and moving about undaunted by the situation. I enjoyed moving out any time when any locality where Pakistanis were living was hit or was shelled.
(TO BE CONTINUED)
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