Afghanistan's instability

President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, despite his entirely predictable victory in the presidential election in October, continues to be faced with some old, some new problems. First and foremost, he faced a difficulty in forming his cabinet. He needed to strike a balance of representation in the cabinet between contending forces, ethnic groups, warlords and educated Afghans who have returned from self-imposed exile in the West.
Another complication in this respect had arisen because of the provisions of the Constitution adopted this year that cabinet members must have higher education degrees and any that have dual nationality should be vetted by parliament, which is yet to be elected (elections are due in April 2005).
These two conditions are likely to remain a problem for educated Afghans returning from the West. Having the means and opportunity to flee their country through its decades of Soviet occupation and civil war, they generally belong to the educated class. But while they would probably easily fulfil the condition of higher education, the question of dual nationality may hit some incumbent ministers of the interim government and some aspirants for a berth in the new cabinet.
It is not clear whether the president has renounced his own dual nationality. In order to persuade future cabinet members in this regard, the president would have to lead the way and set an example of commitment to his country's future.
According to President Karzai, the twin threats that face Afghanistan are warlordism and opium cultivation. He could also have added the continuing threat from the Taleban and al Qaeda.
The insurgency shows no sign of abating, although the scale and frequency of attacks on the foreign troops and local forces have definitely declined. The warlords want their share of power.
Accommodation of their demands would tend to sideline the educated aspirants for high offices. Karzai must also find the right balance for the mosaic of ethnic groups that makes up Afghanistan.
That means accommodating not only the Northern Alliance, which so far has an inordinate weight in the government, but also the Uzbeks, Hazaras and other ethnic groups in northern and central Afghanistan. But most critically of all for the stability of the national compact reflected in the cabinet's formation, adequate representation must be accorded to the Pushtuns, who command a plurality of the population.
Opium production is at a peak in the country. This has made Afghanistan the source for 87 percent of the heroin reaching the international market. Substitution of opium by other crops is a programme stillborn because of donor stinginess.
The presence of 27000 US and Nato-led troops gives Karzai the upper hand over regional factions. But until the Afghan army and police become a credible force, Karzai's regime will continue to be seen as totally dependent on that foreign presence.
In the absence of fair Pushtun representation in the new set-up, there may be forces in countries adjoining Afghanistan that may believe that the only way to achieve Pushtun upper hand is to keep the pot boiling in Afghanistan through the insurgent Taleban and other dissident groups. Although such a policy may appear to offer immediate advantages, this is a myopic view.
A stable and credible polity in Afghanistan that ensures representation to all ethnic and political groups would be far more beneficial for the neighbours, particularly Pakistan, especially since all the pipelines for oil and gas from Central Asia and communications infrastructure for two-way trade have to pass through Afghanistan.
This may be better achieved by supporting the Karzai regime economically, financially, technically and through easing the Afghan transit trade. Co-operative engagement with Kabul rather than the past ambition of dominating Afghanistan through a pliant regime will serve Pakistan best in the long term.