When prime minister Indira Gandhi and foreign minister Swaran Singh came to Washington, the Nixon Administration counselled non-intervention, but assumed that India planned to go to war, according to declassified documents. The Nixon Administration was not prepared to involve itself in a civil war, nor did the Nixon Administration pay much attention to Indian concerns about the crisis or reported problem of refugees in West Bengal. This is stated in the declassified documents, released in Foreign Relations Volume XI, entitled South Asia Crisis, 1971.
The signing of the India-Soviet Union Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Co-operation in August 1971, while not a mutual security treaty, was viewed in Washington as a blank cheque to India in its confrontation with Pakistan.
"President Nixon warned Soviet officials not to encourage India and informed India that if it started a war with Pakistan, the United States would cut off aid."
On November 22, India launched an offensive against East Pakistan. The Nixon Administration cut off economic aid to India, and Nixon himself decided to "tilt" toward Pakistan.
"This pro-Pakistan policy included support of Pakistan in the United Nations and pressure on the Soviets to discourage India, with accompanying hints that US-Soviet detente would be in jeopardy if Moscow did not comply," the document revealed.
"When Nixon learned that Indian war plans were designed to liberate 'Bangladesh' and southern Kashmir, and to destroy Pakistan's military armoured and air strength, he ordered the US carrier Enterprise and its escorts into the Bay of Bengal."
"At the US President's instruction, Kissinger met with People's Republic of China Ambassador to the United Nations Huang Hua to brief him on the crisis and US actions, and to suggest that China make co-ordinated military moves in support of Pakistan."
"The implication conveyed by Kissinger was that if the Soviet Union responded militarily, the United States would support China in any confrontation with the Soviet Union."
"When the Chinese asked to meet with Kissinger in New York two days later, the White House assumed the worst and concluded that China had already decided to take military action against India.
There was serious contemplation in the White House that the crisis might lead to nuclear war, but the general conclusion was that a regional conventional war in South Asia pitting India and the Soviet Union against China, the United States, and Pakistan was more likely."
The document says that for his part, President Nixon correctly realised that "Russia and China aren't going to war." In mid-December, surrender took place in Dacca.
"With US encouragement, Pakistan accepted an Indian cease-fire offer that would dramatically alter the Indian subcontinent."
The Department of State released on May 6 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971. This volume, part of the ongoing official record of the US foreign policy, presents key documentation on the Nixon Administration's policy immediately prior to and during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971.
Included in this volume is full coverage of the "tilt" toward Pakistan by President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger.
The volume begins with the political crisis triggered by the electoral success of Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League, and the announcement by President Yahya Khan on March 1, 1971, that the scheduled meetings of the newly elected National Assembly would be postponed indefinitely.
The announcement was met initially by popular demonstrations by the Awami League and the dispatch of additional troops to Dacca by Yahya Khan.
On March 15, Sheikh Mujib announced that he was taking over the administration of East Pakistan. Ten days later he was arrested, and action against what was viewed as a secessionist movement started.
"The United States was loath to intervene in Pakistan's internal affairs, especially since Pakistan was Nixon's secret conduit for a diplomatic opening to the People's Republic of China."
The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for "virtual autonomy in East Pakistan" and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year.
The document says, the crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff.
The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger.
The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the dispatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis.
The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States government.
The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded.
The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.
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