Nuclear weapons and missile proliferation. Many policy analysts consider the apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons by states. In May 1998, India conducted unannounced nuclear tests, breaking a 24-year, self-imposed moratorium on such testing.
Despite US and world efforts to dissuade it, Pakistan quickly followed. The tests created a global storm of criticism, and represented a serious setback to two decades of US nuclear non-proliferation efforts in South Asia. Pakistan currently is believed to have enough fissile material, mainly enriched uranium, for 55-90 nuclear weapons; India, with a programme focused on plutonium, may be capable of building a similar number.
Both countries have aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs. Pakistan's military has inducted short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (allegedly acquired from China and North Korea), while India possesses short- and intermediate-range missiles.
All are assumed to be capable of delivering nuclear warheads over significant distances. In 2000, Pakistan placed its nuclear forces under the control of a National Command Authority led by the president.
Press reports in late 2002 suggested that Pakistan assisted Pyongyang's covert nuclear weapons programme by providing North Korea with uranium enrichment materials and technologies beginning in the mid-1990s and as recently as July 2002.
Islamabad rejected such reports as "baseless," and Secretary of State Powell was assured that no such transfers were occurring. If such assistance is confirmed by President Bush, all non-humanitarian US aid to Pakistan may be suspended, although the President has the authority to waive any sanctions that he determines would jeopardise US national security.
In March 2003, the Administration determined that the relevant facts "do not warrant imposition of sanctions under applicable US laws." Press reports during 2003 suggested that both Iran and Libya benefited from Pakistani nuclear assistance.
Islamabad denied any nuclear co-operation with Tehran or Tripoli, although it conceded in December 2003 that certain senior scientists were under investigation for possible independent proliferation activities.
The investigation led to the February 2004 "public humiliation" of metallurgist Abdul Qadeer Khan, known as the founder of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and national hero, when he confessed to involvement in a proliferation network. Khan and at least seven associates are said to have sold crucial nuclear weapons technology and uranium-enrichment materials to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. President Musharraf, citing Khan's contributions to his nation, issued a pardon that was later called conditional.
The United States has been assured that the Islamabad government had no knowledge of such activities and indicated that the decision to pardon is an internal Pakistani matter.
While Musharraf has promised President Bush that he will share all information learned about Khan's proliferation network, Pakistan refuses to allow any direct access to Khan by US or UN investigators.
US NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS: In May 1998, following the South Asian nuclear tests, President Clinton imposed full restrictions on all non-humanitarian aid to both Pakistan and India as mandated under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act.
In some respects, Pakistan was less affected by the sanctions than was India, as most US assistance to Pakistan had been cut off in 1990. At the same time, Pakistan's smaller and more fragile economy was vulnerable to the negative effects of aid restrictions.
However, Congress and the President acted almost immediately to lift certain aid restrictions and, after October 2001, all remaining nuclear-related sanctions on Pakistan (and India) were removed. The United States continues to urge Pakistan and India to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states and provides no official recognition of their nuclear weapons capabilities.
During the latter years of the Clinton administration, the United States set forth non-proliferation "benchmarks" for Pakistan and India, including halting further nuclear testing and signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); halting fissile material production and pursuing Fissile Material Control Treaty negotiations; refraining from deploying nuclear weapons and testing ballistic missiles; and restricting any and all exportation of nuclear materials or technologies.
The results of US efforts were mixed, at best, and neither Pakistan nor India are signatories to the CTBT or NPT. The Bush Administration makes no reference to the benchmark framework. Concerns about onward proliferation, fears that Pakistan could become destabilised by the US-led counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, and confusion over the issue of political succession in Islamabad have heightened US attention to weapons proliferation in South Asia.
THE KASHMIR ISSUE: Relations between Pakistan and India remain deadlocked on the issue of Kashmiri sovereignty, and a rebellion has been underway in the region since 1989. Tensions were extremely high in the wake of the Kargil conflict of 1999.
Throughout 2000 and 2001, cross-border firing and shelling caused scores of both military and civilian deaths. A 2001 summit meeting in Agra, India failed to produce a joint statement, reportedly due to pressure from hard-liners on both sides.
Major stumbling blocks were India's refusal to acknowledge the "centrality of Kashmir" to future talks and Pakistan's objection to references to "cross-border terrorism." Secretary of State Powell visited South Asia in an effort to ease escalating tensions over Kashmir, but an October 2001 bombing at the occupied Jammu and Kashmir assembly building was followed by an alleged December assault on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi (both incidents were blamed on Pakistan-based groups).
The Indian government mobilised some 700,000 troops along the Pakistan-India frontier and threatened war unless Islamabad ended all cross-border infiltration. Under significant international diplomatic pressure and the threat of India's use of force, President Musharraf in January 2002 vowed to end the presence of entities on Pakistani soil, and he outlawed five groups, including those most often named in attacks in India, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Despite the Pakistani pledge, infiltrations into occupied Kashmir continued, and a May 2002 terrorist attack on an Indian army base at Kaluchak killed 34, most of them women and children. This event again brought Pakistan and India to the brink of full-scale war, and caused Islamabad to recall army troops from patrol operations along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border as well as from international peacekeeping operations.
Intensive international diplomatic missions to South Asia reduced tensions during the summer of 2002 and appear to have prevented the outbreak of war. Numerous top US officials were involved in this effort and continued strenuously to urge the two countries to renew bilateral dialogue.
A "hand of friendship" offer to Pakistan by the Indian prime minister in April 2003 led to the restoration of full diplomatic relations, but surging separatist violence that summer contributed to an exchange of sharp rhetoric between Pakistani and Indian leaders at the United Nations, casting doubt on the peace effort.
However, a new confidence-building initiative got Pakistan and India back on a positive track and a November 2003 cease-fire was initiated after a proposal by Pakistani Prime Minister Jamali.
President Musharraf also has suggested that Pakistan might be willing to "set aside" its long-standing demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir, a proposal welcomed by the United States, but called a "disastrous shift" in policy by Pakistani opposition parties.
Although infiltration did not end, New Delhi acknowledged that it was significantly decreased and, combined with other confidence-building measures, relations were sufficiently improved that the Indian prime minister attended a January 2004 summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) in Islamabad.
There Pakistan and India issued a joint "Islamabad Declaration" calling for a renewed "composite dialogue" to bring about "peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides." A major confidence-building development came in April 2005, when a new bus service was launched linking Muzaffarabad in Azad Kashmir and Srinagar in occupied Kashmir, and a summit meeting produced an agreement to address the Kashmir issue "in a forward looking manner for a final settlement."
Still, many Kashmiris reject any settlement process that excludes them. Kashmiri groups express determination to continue fighting in Kashmir despite the Pakistan-India dialogue. Deadly attacks by separatists are ongoing and demonstrate that the issue remains dangerous and unresolved.
ISLAMIZATION AND ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT An unexpected outcome of Pakistan's 2002 elections saw the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA or United Action Front), a coalition of six Islamic parties, win 68 seats in the National Assembly - about 20% of the total. It also controls the provincial assembly in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and leads a coalition in the Baluchistan assembly.
These western provinces are Pashtun-majority regions bordering Afghanistan, where US-led counterterrorism operations are ongoing. The result led to concerns that a shift in Pakistani policies might be in the offing, perhaps even a "Talibanization" of western border regions. In June 2003, the NWFP assembly passed a Shariat (Islamic law) bill in the provincial assembly.
Two years later, the same assembly passed a "Hasba" (accountability) bill that many fear would create a parallel Islamic legal body and be harmful to human rights. Such developments alarm Pakistan's moderates and President Musharraf has decried any attempts to "Talibanize" regions of Pakistan.
Islamists are notable for expressions of anti-American sentiment; they have at times called for "jihad" against what they view as the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty that alliance with Washington entails.
Most analysts contend that 2 December 2003 attempts to assassinate President Musharraf were carried out by Islamic militants angered by Pakistan's post-September 2001 policy shift.
Some observers identify a causal link between the poor state of Pakistan's primary education system and the persistence of xenophobia and religious extremism in that country.
Anti-American sentiment is not limited to Islamic groups, however. In January 2004 testimony before a Senate panel, a senior US expert opined: "Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernised elites on the other side.
"A July 2005 Pew Center opinion poll found 51% of Pakistanis expressing confidence in al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden to "do the right thing in world affairs" and, in an October 2005 Time magazine interview, President Musharraf conceded that "the man on the street [in Pakistan] does not have a good opinion of the United States."
A Pew poll taken months before the 10/05 earthquake found only 23% of Pakistanis expressing a favourable view of the United States, the lowest percentage for any country surveyed. Yet that percentage doubled to 46% in an ACNielson poll taken after major US disaster relief efforts in earthquake-affected areas, with the great majority of Pakistani indicating that seeing perceptions had been influenced by seeing such efforts.
However, a January 2006 missile attack on Pakistani homes near the Afghan border killed several civilians and was blamed on US forces, perhaps renewing animosity toward the United States among some segments of the Pakistani populace.
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE: There had been hopes that the October 2002 national elections would reverse Pakistan's historic trend toward unstable governance and military interference in democratic institutions. Such hopes have been eroded by ensuing developments, including President Musharrafs imposition of major constitutional changes and his retention of the position of army chief.
International and Pakistani human rights groups continue to issue reports critical of Islamabad's military-dominated government. In 2005, and for the sixth straight year, the often-cited Freedom House rated Pakistan as "not free" in the areas of political rights and civil liberties.
While praising Pakistan's electoral exercises as moves in the right direction, the United States has expressed concern that seemingly non-democratic developments may make the realisation of true democracy in Pakistan more elusive.
General Musharraf's April 2002 assumption of the presidency ostensibly was legitimised by a controversial referendum marked by evidence of fraud and coercion. In August 2002, Musharraf announced sweeping constitutional changes that bolster the president's powers, including provisions for presidential dissolution of the National Assembly.
The United States expressed concerns that the changes "could make it more difficult to build strong, democratic institutions in Pakistan." The 2002 election nominally fulfilled Musharrafs promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved in the wake of his extra-constitutional seizure of power.
The pro-military Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) won a plurality of seats, while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing. Musharraf supporter M.Z. Jamali became Pakistan's new prime minister, but the civilian government was hamstrung for more than a year by fractious debate over the legitimacy of constitutional changes and Musharraf's continued status as army chief and president.
A surprise December 2003 agreement between Musharraf and the Islamist opposition ended the deadlock by bringing the constitutional changes before Parliament and by eliciting a promise from Musharraf to resign his military commission before 2005.
Non--Islamist opposition parties unified under the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) accused the MMA of betrayal and insisted that the new arrangement merely institutionalised military rule in Pakistan, especially after the April 2004 establishment of a new National Security Council.
Other apparent reversals for Pakistani democratisation came in 2004, including the sentencing of ARD leader Javed Hashmi to 23 years in prison for sedition, mutiny, and forgery, and the "forced" resignation of Prime Minister Jamali for what numerous analysts called his insufficient deference to President Musharraf. Musharraf "shuffled" prime ministers to seat his close ally, Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz.
Aziz is seen to be an able financial manager and technocrat favoured by the military, but he has no political base in Pakistan. Moreover, in the final month of 2004 Musharraf chose to continue his role as army chief beyond the stated deadline.
The United States has indicated that it expects Pakistan's scheduled 2007 general elections to be free and fair throughout the entire process. In June 2005, Secretary of State Rice told an interviewer that "Pakistan has to make inroads on democracy." One month later, the Senate Appropriations Committee expressed concern with "the slow pace of the democratic development of Pakistan" (S. Rept. 109-96). Pakistan's August-October 2005 municipal elections saw major gains for candidates favoured by the PML-Q and notable reversals for Islamists, but were also marked by widespread accusations of rigging.
(To be concluded)
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