Siachen stalemate

The latest round of Pakistan-India talks on demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier concluded in Delhi on Wednesday, as apprehended by many analysts, on a deadlock.
India's Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee told reporters that the process of withdrawal and redeployment at the designated places could begin only after the two sides "delineate and authenticate" the existing positions from which their forces are to be withdrawn.
He blamed the Pakistan side for not agreeing to his country's proposal for the authentication of positions. Unfortunately, the stalemate is reflective of mutual lack of trust, which is bad news for the composite dialogue process.
As it is, Pakistan has easy access to the barren glacier, and it maintains only around 4000 troops there against India's 7000. Hence India's worry that it would be easy for Pakistan to reoccupy the glacier if it so chooses at some point in the post-demilitarisation period. It is insistent that the troop positions be authenticated as they exist at present. But that stance is hard to accept for Pakistan since it practically amounts to legitimising the illegal act through which Indian troops advanced into the positions they now hold.
Understandably, it is willing to document the present troop positions but not to make the same a part of a main agreement. Also, Pakistan says the authentication of the two countries' respective ground positions be made at three important points in history: one at the time of Simla Agreement in 1972, the second in 1984, and the third as the situation exists at present.
The purpose, obviously, it to nullify the legality of India's claim, in the event of a new dispute, over the parts of Siachen it occupied in 1984 in violation of the Simla Agreement, which makes sense, if it constitutes a counter-proposal and is not a pre-condition for a resolution.
Notably, as far back as 1989 India had almost agreed to the redeployment of forces and determination of ground positions in conformity with the Simla Agreement. Those were the times when India did not find much benefit in making any serious effort to resolve the core issue of contention, Kashmir, with Pakistan. As such, it saw no particular advantage in hanging on to its acquisitions in Siachen.
There is little justification for New Delhi, therefore, to lay so much emphasis on the authentication of the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) at present when a genuine composite peace process is under way - though it is moving at a frustratingly slow pace.
The leader of the Pakistan delegation at the Siachen talks, Lieutenant General Tariq Waseem Ghazi (Retd) later told the press that both delegations agreed to refer the issue back to their respective governments for a political decision. That sounds like a wise referral considering that New Delhi's foreign policy establishment is yet to overcome its traditional animosity and distrust in matters relating to any differences with Pakistan.
Even the 1989 near-agreement on Siachen, it may be recalled, was the outcome of direct discussions between the then prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi, rather than the representatives of the two countries' foreign policy establishments.
It is hoped, therefore, that Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, who recently vowed to turn Siachen into a 'mountain of peace', will take the necessary political decision to resolve the Siachen dispute at the next round, thereby also pushing the overall peace process forward.