A ''mixed model'', incorporating the strong points of both ''Continental'' and ''Anglo-Saxon'' models, has been suggested as replacement to the Trade Organisations Ordinance (TOO), 1961. There are some countries whose chamber systems incorporate characteristics from both models. These hybrids are referred to as ''Mixed Systems''.
The Committee on Revision of Trade Organisations Ordinance, 1961, headed by Justice Saleem Akhtar, in its initial recommendations, after studying the ''Continental model'' and ''Anglo-Saxon model'', has emphasised the need for providing a new legal framework which must be acceptable to both the civil society and the business community.
The French ''Continental Model'' is characterised by obligatory membership and a special chamber law, which defines its status and tasks. It was adopted by several states in continental Europe, including Germany, Italy, Austria, Netherlands, and Spain, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Under ''Continental Model'', chambers are created on the basis of national legislation and the chamber law prescribes the creation of chambers as corporations under public law.
This legal status enables the government to delegate to the chamber certain functions, which are normally assigned to public authorities (eg education, examinations, and business registration). In Great Britain, a different chamber system emerged.
Following the liberal tradition of British economic policy, public authorities pursue a less interventionist approach, favouring self-administration of the business community.
As a result, there is no law specifically governing the chambers in Great Britain. Instead, chambers are established under private law requiring registration either in the business or associations register. Membership is voluntary; regional coverage is not regulated; and the tasks of chambers are not legally defined.
The world-wide importance of this chamber system--often referred to as ''Anglo-Saxon'' or ''Anglo-American'' model--resulted in part from its introduction in the British colonies. The ''Continental'' and the ''Anglo-Saxon'' models represent two opposite poles in trade chamber development. Chamber system in most countries can be classified as one of the two models.
Based on the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the two chamber models the Committee shared some options on how to use the experiences documented in the primer. These models present reflections of various countries'' particular historical circumstances.
Thus, attempting to copy another country''s chamber system is neither feasible nor desirable, it said. Each chamber system must take into account its own country''s political, economic and social conditions. Since chambers are not static entities, there is constant need to revise and reform the chamber systems.
The strongest features of ''Continental'' model, that might be attractive for adoption, are the privileged legal status and the sound financial basis. The particular strengths of the ''Anglo-Saxon'' model lie in its independence from government and in its demand orientation.
It has been pointed out in the initial recommendations that the existing legal environment governing trade bodies in Pakistan is generally slow to respond to modern-day requirements of trade bodies. The enforcement is selective and injudicious in application of most legal provisions. It provides opportunities to the government to excessively intervene in the functioning of trade bodies, direct changes in their rules and bylaws, reject the election results, and appoint administrator for a prolonged period up to three years.
The new legal framework must provide for a definite, clear and objective system for licensing of trade bodies, conducting trade bodies'' elections and dispute resolution.
The law and the rules made thereunder should ensure elimination of ''fake'' trade bodies that are created only for personal reasons rather than with national objectives.
It has been pointed out that trade bodies are generally not operating effectively, efficiently and as per norms of good corporate governance, for various reasons, including disinterest of genuine and leading businessmen/stakeholders, absence of well-defined goals, objectives and operating procedures, ill-defined responsibilities and authority of office-bearers, etc. "Of course, weak and injudicious enforcement of the trade law, and rules and bylaws of trade bodies accentuate the weak working thereof," according to the initial recommendations.
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