Balochistan policy needs to change

That government policy towards Balochistan, aimed at subjugating the militant nationalists through military force and winning the hearts and minds of the people via substantial spending on development projects, is not working, is obvious enough from the relentless violence that has gone on in the province.
It has also begun to raise questions outside Pakistan regarding the government's ability to restore normalcy to that strategically important and resource-rich province. The policy came in for severe criticism at a seminar organised by a prominent British think-tank, the Foreign Policy Institute, in London on Monday at no other a place than a committee room of the House of Commons.
Except for the Minister of State for Information, Tariq Azim, who represented the government viewpoint to a hostile reception, all other speakers - who included a well-known American expert on South Asian affairs, Selig Harrison; a Pakistani defence analyst, Dr Aysha Siddiqa; two Baloch leaders and a SAARC official - saw the government policy as being seriously flawed.
Harrison, who authored a book on Pakistan long before the country attracted world-wide attention as a frontline ally in the US 'war on terror', pointed out that at the moment the Baloch people were fighting for their rights as per the 1973 Constitution, and added that one day they might decide to go the way of the former East Pakistan. Indeed, these remarks are not too far-fetched. Baloch nationalists are already talking of separation if the government continues to refuse to let them gain control of their natural resources.
In fact, speaking at the seminar BNP leader Javed Mengal urged the international community, in particular the US and Britain, to extend their support to what he called the Baloch cause, and to withdraw their backing of the military government.
These countries, of course, have to decide to support or oppose the government on the basis of their respective self-interest. But the fact remains that troubled waters tempt interested outsiders to fish for a stake. President General Pervez Musharraf has already been accusing India, albeit in an indirect fashion, of doing just that in Balochistan. Which makes it all the more important that the situation is resolved amicably through negotiations with the dissidents.
Notably, having tried and failed to appease the pro-Taliban insurgents in the tribal areas, the government has been working out peace agreements with them, and is also advising the Kabul government to do the same in order to restore peace in Afghanistan.
This prompts some to raise the pertinent question why then our government has decided to adopt a different policy in Balochistan. Apparently, there is a feeling that the Baloch militants are not as united and as strongly motivated as the Taliban sympathisers are in the tribal areas, and hence they can be suppressed through the use of force. But that is a fallacious surmise on at least two counts: one is that even if they are not united at the moment, the Baloch people's deep sense of deprivation, frustration with the on-going violence, and the outsider interest factor might push them towards forging unity.
Though such a development would still not correspond to the East Pakistan analogy, it can cause a lot of instability. The other and the most important argument against the present policy is that the Baloch people have legitimate grievances vis-à-vis the federation of Pakistan. There is a long history of denial of their economic as well as political rights. These grievances must be addressed in a sympathetic way, no matter how outrageous the demands of the nationalist groups and parties might appear at this point in time. The use of force must be shunned in favour of a policy of engagement with the Baloch people all across the political spectrum.