Who can be better qualified to comment on the rapidly spreading militancy in the north-western region of Pakistan than Aftab Sherpao? A blue-blooded Pushtun, former interior minister and above all twice the target of suicide bombers, he knows the situation in the tribal areas and adjoining parts of the NWFP first hand.
Given the credibility of his narrative in a recent interview with the New York Times his perspective helps one see the larger picture that tends to emerge in the weeks and months ahead. The central point that he made is that the war against militancy is losing broad-based support of the local population, not because the militants are winning hearts and minds of the people. The militants' clout is on the increase because they are increasingly successful in striking the fear of reprisal and revenge among their potential opponents in the areas of conflict.
Sherpao sounds "frustrated and outspoken" about the failure of the government to "respond aggressively" against the Taliban and al Qaeda elements. He believes the police are "scared, don't want to get involved"; Frontier Corps is "too stressed, fighting all over"; and the regular troops "have remained in their headquarters, they are not moving. That is their strategy". He apprehends the risk of "total Talibanisation" of the NWFP, and "unless you involve political parties, civil society, religious leaders this (war on terror) is not going to make any headway".
On the face of it, Sherpao's insightful exposition does not sit well with the official line on the situation in the north-west of Pakistan. Overseas, during the last week President Pervez Musharraf was telling his western audiences of significant victories over the extremists and militants, and in that context rejecting the United States' offer of overt and covert assistance.
At home, various government officials have made claims of scoring stunning victories over militants in Swat Valley and South Waziristan. The latest victory has been reported from Darra Adamkhel where the troops have turned the tables on the militants by retaking the Peshawar-Kohat road Friendship Tunnel after inflicting heavy casualties on the marauders. But in the short spaces between these highly optimistic reports one finds the fillers briefly reporting revenge killings by the militants.
They have ruthlessly beheaded government officials, members of security forces and pro-establishment tribal leaders, striking terror into the hearts of the general public. The terror let loose by the militants looks all the more real and unforgiving when the people find that the government has not been able to bring them to justice.
Consequently, the reign of militants is spreading. Over the last three years it has snowballed, spilling over from South and North Waziristans to Bajaur area, then to the Tank-Hangu salient and over to Swat-Malakand region in last December. Of late Taliban-centred militancy has reached Darra Adamkhel area, where the security force retook the 'Friendship Tunnel' from the local Taliban after a fierce battle. Over the years that the insurgency has been brewing in the tribal belt, the military action has increasingly alienated the local population.
Between the string of victories and defeats, alternately claimed by the security forces and militants, the people are the net losers. Last month it was the residents of Swat-Malakand region who bore the brunt of the fighting being victims of cross-firing and friendly-fire or underwent long spells of business inactivity and limb-numbing curfew. Now it is the turn of the residents of Darra Adamkhel and surrounding areas who are running helter-skelter in search of safety.
Even when the government will have achieved final victory against the militants the scars would remain. That is what should have been the government's special worry to ward against. But, it appears, at least on the face of it, that collateral damage your own people would suffer in a war that has become increasingly unpopular, was never given a serious thought or, if it was, could not be averted.
Otherwise, there was no justification for keeping the war-zone in the tribal areas out of bounds for the political and religious leaders, members of civil society and media persons. Had the military high command adopted counter-insurgency tactics instead of conventional warfare methodology the non-combatants would have suffered much less. One, therefore, finds great merit in the assessment made by Aftab Sherpao, and will hope that his reading of the situation would be given due consideration by appropriate government quarters.
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