US Vice President Dick Cheney, during his recent surprise visit to Kabul, was acutely conscious of the fact that Pakistan's new leadership could rethink and revise the country's policy towards militancy in the tribal region. But he hoped the new government would remain "good friends", because Pakistan had "as big stake as anyone else" in fighting militancy.
Then, he went further, reminding Pakistan that it was its obligation to control its sovereign territory so that it did not become safe haven or sanctuary for terrorist groups. It is more or less the same line that Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai takes in the presence of foreign guests in Kabul.
At the Nato summit next week, although the main focus would be on the coalition countries' growing disenchantment with the US-led perception of peace in Afghanistan, there may be a call as well on Islamabad to gear up its fight against the militants in tribal areas, now named the Pakistani Taliban.
But a deep disappointment awaits the United States leaders, given the perspective unfolded to The New York Times both by Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif. Both said they intended talking to the Pakistani Taliban. The newspaper's correspondent who had met with both the leaders got a clear sense that they would like to "repackage the conflict in a more palatable way for Pakistanis".
Of course, there is a slight variation in the stances of Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif as reported by The New York Times, but they comprehensively share the belief that the policy adopted by Pervez Musharraf should be changed and instead of fighting the militants they should be engaged on a negotiating table.
They say force should be used only as a last resort. Zardari calls the war against militants "Pakistan's war", resonating the public perception that the Musharraf regime has have fought militancy as part of an American agenda. He also wants the army to pull out from the troubled areas and a beefed-up police force should take over.
Nawaz Sharif goes a step further; he thinks the militants are amenable to talking peace and matters should be settled between them and the Pakistani authorities. In other words, both of the two emerging leaders say let the newly elected parliament of Pakistan incisively look into the imbroglio and evolve a strategy towards fighting militancy. But they do want the foreign militants like Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens out of Pakistan.
The newspaper says the talk of adopting "softening stance" towards the militants as compared to the "freer hand" President Musharraf had given to the Bush administration has alarmed American officials.
To what extent the emerging coalition government in Islamabad would be able to revise its policy towards the Taliban-centred policy is yet largely a matter of conjecture. Pak-US bilateral relationship is multifaceted, with close bonds in almost all sectors of public and private interaction between the two countries.
This relationship goes back more than half a century. But there had been times as well they openly differed, and that had earned Pakistan stiff US sanctions and denials. Therefore, the possibility that Pakistan's new rulers may jettison the pro-US policy in tribal region is quite likely. They know for certain that their electoral victory is partly, if not fully, embedded in the widely held public resentment for President Musharraf's anti-terrorism alliance led by Washington.
The spate of suicide bombings that of late has intensified, particularly against military and paramilitary targets, and can be traced to military operations in Fata and Swat areas, they think, will weaken the morale of the forces and undermine their fighting spirit.
While it would have been very problematic for Musharraf to retrace his footsteps back from the battle front against the tribal militants, the new leadership faces no such difficulty. And as for the US financial support in fighting militancy, they not only question its rationale but also find some holes in its use.
This perceptional mismatch that is going to confront the Pak-US relations in near future will surely put under strain its bilateralism. But given that both want militancy to weaken with angry tribesmen reverting to normal life there is no reason why they should not be able to forge a common strategy.
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