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Do you recall the Darfur tragedy? It caught the attention of the international community in February 2003. More than 5 years later the devils on horseback are still ravaging not only in Darfur itself, but also they have spread the conflict into Chad.
There is no solution in sight to this tragic, prolonged mess in which, according to the United Nations' estimate, 400,000 died from violence and disease and 2.5 million people are considered displaced as of October 2006. That means the number is increasing. It is July 2008 now!
The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement has failed because it is too limited in scope and the number of parties to the Agreement was too small to secure peace. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 of 31 August 2006, which called for 20, 600 UN troops and police officers to support the 7,000 members of the African Union force in Sudan, was derailed by the objection of the Sudanese government and, therefore, not implemented.
Only did UN Security Council Resolution 1769 of 31 July 2007 finally replace the African Union Mission in Sudan by the UN African Union Mission in Darfur, but it took another year to have the UN peace envoy appointed on 1 July 2008.
In the meantime, parties to the conflict have splintered into different directions both in terms of geographical range as well as political goals, contributing further to multiple confrontations. Violence and human suffering continue as the status quo in chaos helps various competing interest groups to maximise their respective positions.
The situation in Zimbabwe is equally oppressive. The presidential election held on March 29, 2008 did not produce a clear-cut winner of the majority, as the opposition candidate, Mr Morgan Tsvangirai, of the Movement for Democratic Change, won 47.9% and incumbent President Robert Mugabe 43.2%, thus necessitating a runoff election between the two candidates.
What happened thereafter was a series of terrorising incidents such as ruthless obstruction, intimidation, and violence against opposition supporters and other ordinary citizens for the sole purpose of ensuring Mugabe's re-election by whatever means.
Mugabe successfully derailed the runoff presidential election. He denied the basic freedoms of assembly and speech, and, above all, he deprived citizens of any freedom of choice in political process. Mugabe extirpated all conditions essential to a fair and free election.
The sole opposition candidate had to drop out of the election on June 22, 2008. The runoff presidential election was pushed through on June 27 with only one candidate, President Mugabe, despite international appeals, including those from African leadership, to call it off. The outcome was, of course, the re-election of Mugabe, devoid of any semblance of legitimacy.
In Burma, the Burmese military's top brass, who styled themselves as "the State Law and Order Restoration Council," seized power in September 1988. Ever since, egregious conditions have remained unchanged for decades, despite the United Nations' sanctions and repeated calls for the release of political detainees and an end to military rule. Oh, yes, there was a new development back in November 1997. The military junta renamed itself as "the State Peace and Development Council."
As I mentioned in this column ("Demonstration effect of democracy at work," July 2, 2008), the army has successfully built up a garrison state. Since 1990, a charismatic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, has been under house arrest intermittently.
Her brief solace from the junta's iron grip would be at the mercy of the military dictator's whim; whether he may agree to her release always depends upon degrees of external pressures applied to the junta.
Who applies external pressures or, more broadly, international sanctions to perpetrators of the international code of conduct? Why are the devils on horseback in Darfur, Mugabe of Zimbabwe, or Burma's junta still allowed to continue what they are doing in spite of the denunciation of such conduct by relevant members of the international community? How many times have we heard of United Nations resolutions, whether adopted by the Security Council or the General Assembly?
Why was the government of Sudan permitted to defy UN Security Council Resolution 1706 in the first place when it is a mandatory obligation of all members of the UN, unless otherwise specified, to carry out the Security Council's decisions taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter?
Although we speak of the international community, there is no centralised authority that is empowered to pass judgement on the question of compliance with international norms of conduct and responsibility; nor is there a centralised policing force to carry out such judgement.
For better or worse, the world is organised horizontally, and states and other relevant non-state actors may, by a dédoublement fonctionnel, ie, dual function, be claimants in one case and sit as decision-makers in the next comparable case. In short, international relations are governed by mutual tolerance, reciprocity and a threat of retaliation. The notions of "mutual tolerance" and "reciprocity" create a lot of leeway or latitude, if you will, for decision-making among countries in the region.
The closer the countries are in their relationship with each other in the region, the more acute their need for special consideration not to offend their neighbours in the region. And when these neighbours are organised as a regional organisation, "mutual tolerance" and "reciprocity" become institutionalised and embedded in decision-making processes.
Just consider South Africa's reluctance to take a position vis-à-vis Mugabe, who had materially helped the African National Congress in its fight against the government in Pretoria. With that background knowledge at hand, the African Union Summit still appointed South Africa President Thabo Mbeki as mediator in its efforts to resolve Zimbabwe's political crisis. Reactions from Tsvangirai, head of the opposition.
MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE WERE QUICK: "Our reservations about the mediation process under President Mbeki are well known... Unless the mediation team is expanded... and the mediation mechanism is changed, no meaningful progress can be made toward resolving the Zimbabwe crisis," Tsvangirai said.
The decision-making pattern relating to the Darfur situation is no different. It reflects the inability of the Africa Union's leadership to deal with the internal political crisis situation of its member state. They expect the same reciprocal treatment when misfortune falls on them next time, resulting in the high level of tolerance of, and acquiescence in, the government's abuse and repressive practices.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has persistently refrained from commenting on abusive and repressive situations in Burma in accordance with its policy of non-interference.
THE ASEAN'S RELUCTANCE TO FACE THE REALITY IS OFTEN LAMPOONED AS THREE MONKEYS: see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil. ASEAN's policy for consultations and consensus in effect contributed to the creation of a de facto veto by not agreeing to forge consensus.
As a result, its decision-making process is reduced to the lowest common denominator, as evidenced in the measures taken in the haze pollution case in the region. Diversity in regional perspectives enriches the quality of world public order; however, the perspectives of regional organisations cannot be so exclusive as to impede the sanctioning process of the international community.

Copyright Business Recorder, 2008

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