Allies' differing perspectives

What could be more frustrating that ever since our security forces intensified military operation in the troubled north-west - with heavy attendant losses of men and material - in compliance with its commitment to fight terrorism, Pakistan has been subjected to stepped up land and air intrusions by its principal ally, the United States.
On Friday, the CIA-operated Predators launched two missile attacks. First struck a residence not very far from the Pak-Afghan border and the second, some two hours later, targeted a compound quite distant from the border. Some 35 persons, reportedly including "foreigners", were killed in the attacks. These intrusions are being carried out in defiance of Islamabad's repeated protests and a consensus resolution of parliament.
Twice in the last two months, the American ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Office to be told that the strikes should cease "immediately". As the FO spokesman insists, the strikes by Predators tend to undermine bilateral relationship "politically and diplomatically", Prime Minister Gilani has repeatedly warned against air space violations which adversely affect his government's anti-terror efforts.
But nobody in Washington seems to be taking note of the growing resentment against American raids into Pakistani territory. In fact, the opposite is happening, with dire threats emanating from official and non-official quarters. The latest comes from the US Homeland Security chief who has propounded a new doctrine in support of increased US acts of aggression.
Justifying aerial raids against Syria and Pakistan in the name of taking out anti-American safe havens in "badlands", Michael Chertoff apprised a bewildered group of British parliamentarians of advantages of pre-emptive use of force. His thesis comes quick on the heels of an equally disturbing comment by Defence Secretary Robert Gates who thinks his country should "modernise its nuclear arsenal as a hedge against rogue nations".
Rhyming to the hype for military interventions, as a 21st century version of Monroe Doctrine, the American academia is not far behind. While Henry Kissinger, in a recent book review, blamed the American debacle in Vietnam on the delay in bombing Laos which he says provided sanctuary to the Vietcong, Richard N. Haass, President of Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations, lumped Pakistan with Afghanistan as "one problem since it provides sanctuary to the Taliban".
"Pakistan's government appears unable or unwilling to control its own territory", he adds in a write-up for the Newsweek. With its commitment to fight terrorism questioned by its principle ally, Islamabad is caught between a rock and the hard place. On the one hand, it is to contend with the increasingly unpopular military operation in tribal areas and on the other it finds itself descending into an economic black hole.
The parliamentary resolution aptly depicts the national sentiment on its unremitting commitment to fight international terrorism. Indeed, the people want a halt to the military operation and a dialogue with the militants. The Americans are against talks and peace accords with the militants. As long as the two allies trusted each other they shared actionable evidence against militants and conducted joint operations.
And if on some occasion the US-led Nato forces acted pre-emptively against the militants, Pakistan military owned up their actions. But with the removal of the Chief of Army Staff President Musharraf from the scene that trust changed into suspicion. The new military leadership told the Americans: 'No, thank you, we will take care of the militants on our own'. In future land raids and air space violations would be resisted with full force, it warned.
The differing perspectives nurtured by the two allies have virtually placed the government of Pakistan on the horns of a dilemma. It can run afoul of American perspective on terror in this region at the risk of earning a place in an international economic quarantine. Practically, almost all the IFIs are obligated to and do 'respect' American regional and global perceptions and perspectives. Obviously, in this Catch-22 situation the democratic dispensation of Pakistan would be operating in an extremely limited space.
Should it not implement the parliamentary resolution or go against a true reflection of national will, it would incur public resentment and lose popularity. It would be a serious setback to the nascent democratic process in Pakistan - a misfortune that would be rightly attributed to American obduracy mainly stemming as it does from lack of its understanding of the Afghan imbroglio.